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THE INDONESIAN BUREAUCRACY:
STABILITY, CHANGE, AND PRODUCTIVITY

Theodore M. Smith

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ABSTRACT

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Two themes stand out in the extant literature on Indonesia's post-independence bureaucracy: first, the difficulty it has faced in transforming an inherited, stabilizing role into a change-promoting role; and second, a tendency toward fragmentation and toward self-serving activities at the expense of national objectives determined by the country's leaders. The broad objective of the present research has been to evaluate the growth of a productivity orientation in the bureaucracy and to develop indicators which speak to the probability that nationally established development priorities will be accepted and promoted at regional and local levels.

The question of the potential of village leadership as a resource which national policy-makers can use to advantage in stimulating rural change is addressed at the outset. Sociological data developed in the framework of this research point to important changes in social mobility, education, and age in a broad-ranging sample of 389 village headmen. Additional attitudinal data tend to substantiate the notion that change, defined principally in terms

of rural infrastructure and education, is very much in the minds of "traditional" village leaders. Efforts are made to go beyond attitudinal data with the intent of mapping village productivity levels, and the results seem to indicate two general conclusions: (1) there is a strong and widespread village tradition of autonomous development through gotong-rojong (mutual aid) institutions, and (2), the strength of this tradition varies widely across villages, even those in close proximity to one another. It is further evident from input calculations that most of this locally initiated change is directed toward "development" projects rather than to symbolic, religious, or other projects than might be conceived more narrowly as prestige projects.

Some important changes with respect to the roles and role occupants of sub-district officer and regent positions are next explored. Traditional recruitment mechanisms that are patrimonial and ascriptive seem to have been broken recently in striking fashion. Role perceptions are undergoing marked changes in some cases; decidedly evolutionary change in others. Special problems encountered by military officers in civil positions are examined, and some strong doubts are raised about the effectiveness of the sub-district officers as agents of change.

In Chapter Five the analysis moves to issues of structure and procedure encountered at the higher levels: provincial and national. The apparent political necessity of a centralized governmental structure is explored in relation to the economic desirability of applying decentralizing strategies that might capitalize upon the strengths of Indonesia's multiplicity of cultures. Problems of

coordination, the distribution of authority, and communication are reviewed with the purposes of explaining them in context. In Chapter Six the focus turns to bureaucratic behavior and the evaluation of strategies relating to motivation. Sanctions, it appears, are generally inapplicable. Data concerning the availability and application of performance incentives seem to show them to be generally irrelevant or unavailable. A patrimonial style and a strongly embedded career ethic partially compensate for these deficiencies, but only with respect to the perfonmance of the traditional, stabilizing functions of the bureaucracy.

In the concluding chapter, the Indonesian bureaucracy is assessed in light of diverse comparative findings that public bureaucracies in new nations are either change-resisting organizations, or that they are change-inducing organizations. The tentative and qualified judgment reached here is that Indonesia's national bureaucracy is indeed a major force for political and social change and that the bureaucracy is more than just a purveyor of change; the bureaucracy,itself, is undergoing signficant changes. Less clear at this stage is the question of whether or not these changes are being institutionalized or, rather, represent temporary adaptations to demands specific to the regime of President Suharto.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"The central problems the leaders in development face are organizational."[1]

Bureaucracy is often written about in such a way that the reader cannot feel it, see it, or hear it work. In fact, it is considerably easier to write in this manner today than a decade ago because the conceptual vocabulary used to describe organizational behavior and form has expanded significantly. It is not particularly difficult, for example, to address such important concepts as power, authority, goal displacement, or role congruence without ever describing the human beings who use the power or authority, who work to support or displace the goals, or who find themselves in roles incongruent with stated organizational objectives. Perhaps the rush to conceptualize and the approbation which attended this trend has now peaked with the realization that ten years of intellectual inquiry by members of the Comparative Administration Group have produced very little of value for decision-makers in low-income countries.[2]

This is not to say that the ideal path to explanation, more specifically to policy-relevant explanation, lies solely in the empirical description of bureaucrats and their system-related behavior. More likely, a resource calculus which begins to explain the possibilities for and the implications of both structural and

functional bureaucratic change will bring one much closer to achieving explanations that are relevant to policy considerations. The implementation of every policy involves the accumulation and expenditure of some type of resource or combination of resources. With the present state of our knowledge, the costs involved in resource accumulation and expenditure can only be crudely calculated. Supply curves can be drawn to represent resource availability; implicit opportunity cost curves can speak to the maximum utilization of available resources; and, perhaps less accurately, demand curves can give clues to the performance of system-maintenance functions. None of these calculations is easy and none of them can yet be done in a precise manner. Costs, however, are somewhat easier to calculate in advance than benefits and it is likely that more rapid progress will be made on this side of the ledger.

To take a single, concrete example, that of performance-based salary increases for the Indonesian bureaucracy, the costs in terms of new salaries can be easily computed, reasonable estimates can be made with respect to new costs attending performance appraisals, and opportunity costs can be imputed from program experience of the recent past. While ongoing evaluations should be able to assist in the mapping of changes in bureaucratic output that follow such salary increases, a task somewhat easier in fields such as revenue collection where productivity unit increases lend themselves readily to quantification, these changes are not easily projected with accuracy. As an independent variable affecting productivity, monetary compensation may be significant to a greater

or lesser extent than a host of other variables that deal with organizational form, motivation, or the task environment.[3]

The ultimate objective of this work is to achieve a level of explanation that can speak directly to options available to Indonesian decision-makers in their desire to increase productivity levels in that country's public organizations. In fact, the work cannot claim to have succeeded in that primary goal for two principal reasons. First, output data are as yet too limited to facilitate the kind of analysis that is necessary. In education for example, there are not yet records on the numbers of schools built, the number of teachers trained, and the number of students advancing from each level of schooling. In the public works domain, there are at best only sketchy records of buildings, roads, and irrigation channels that have been built or repaired. The Ministry of Home Affairs has no mechanism for measuring progress in community development programs for which it is responsible. Only now is the National Development Planning Agency beginning to develop some statistics on the implementation of the national five-year plan (REPELITA) which was inaugurated in 1969.

Additionally, there is yet to be established a tradition of empirical literature on the Indonesian bureaucracy. Aside from pre-Independence studies by Dutch historians and sociologists, particularly the works of B. Schrieke and those that he inspired, there are only a very few published works that deal even descriptively with public organizations in Indonesia.[4] What is lamented here is not the lack of quality of these descriptive writings but the absence of baseline data against which to compare output over time.

A second reason which explains why this work is still one step removed from demonstrating the comparative efficiencies of manipulating selected variables to increase productivity can be found in the fact that our frame of reference is too broad to permit the meticulous kind of micro-productivity analysis that is required for refined conclusions. As will become clear, the analysis presented here deals with literally hundreds of organizations in the Indonesian governmental system. To the extent that it focuses on one organization, that of the Ministry of Home Affairs, it deals with an organization that is primarily service and regulatory oriented, both of which functions do not readily lend themselves to output measurement. No apologies are made for these limitations. A broader mapping of the overall bureaucratic system and many of its sub-systems is needed before the primary productivity variables can be identified. The role of the Indonesian bureaucracy is pervasive and it would be unfortunate to settle upon narrowly defined variables for analysis prior to such a mapping.

The Role of State Administration. State administration has an historical tradition of central, even overwhelming, importance in Javanese society. The Javanese believed that their king was the only medium linking the micro-cosmos of man with the macro-cosmos of the gods. The king's powers were thought to be unchallengeable and unlimited; his decisions were God's will and his actions God's management.[5] Similar respect for the ruler's role can be found in the South Sumatran kingdom of Sriwidjaja and in the more modern kingdoms of Southern Sulawesi.

The role of the state apparatus may be equally important today, although its source of legitimacy is somewhat changed due to more than 250 years of intervening colonial rule and post-independence strategies to build legitimacy through experimentation in democracy. In fact, governmental presence may now be more encompassing due to changes in communications. Its financial impact can only be described as strong; the fiscal 1969-70 national budget equaled more than 48 percent of the country's estimated gross national product.[6] In terms of status, the most prestigious occupations in the country are those of high-level civil servants; the jobs most in demand by recent and forthcoming university graduates are those in the public sector, although this may be changing slightly with the slow growth of private sector job opportunities. More significant yet, the Government has assumed the major burden for Indonesian economic development in the 1970's through the initiation of both long-run and annual planning. And finally, it is clear that with the decline of constitutional democracy, most of Indonesia's internal politics revolve around the bureaucracy.[7]

Each of these truths testifies to the importance of scholarly attention to the bureaucracy; each suggests the importance of some kind of bureaucratic ethnography prior to the testing of specific productivity variables. Our ground therefore, is somewhere in between the broad Weberian descriptive work on traditional authority systems and the narrower, more recent attempts to isolate and quantify the impact of selected behavioral

characteristics and organizational forms, much as Crozier has begun to do with respect to the French system.[8]

Productivity. If productivity is to be the basic concern, then productivity must be defined, or at least explained to such a degree that our point of reference is reasonably clear. The Scientific Management tradition has tended to equate productivity with efficiency. What could be more graphic than a portrait of Frederick Winslow Taylor standing over the man with a shovel, seeking to ascertain the one single set of motions which would maximize the output of the worker. Likewise, those following the human relations approach, and who were agreed that informal organizations could stimulate as well as impede performance levels in formal organizations, implicitly defined productivity in efficiency terms. To achieve greater output, strategies were devised to strengthen the orientation of the worker and his informal groups toward the organization and its goals. Labor and capital inputs remained essentially the same while motivational variables were experimented with. Minimal inputs may have been used in the form of added personnel officers, office picnics, limited authority sharing, but the basic drive was to achieve added output for roughly the same cost in resources.

Another definition of productivity is that of effectiveness and it is the one preferred here, though not to the exclusion of efficiency. Productivity defined as effectiveness simply means increased output without respect to changing levels of input. There is something of a paradox here which must be explained. Why should efficiency be treated secondarily in low-income

countries where resources are more scarce by definition? Do not such countries appear to be precisely the settings in which efficiency ought to matter most? The paradox lies in the fact that concern over efficiency in public organizations whose functions are deemed essential to society appears to be a matter for either (1) resource-rich organizations, or (2) organizations having stable goals over time. Perhaps this can best be illustrated by example.

With the initiation of Indonesia's present Five-Year Development Plan, projects were approved by the hundreds and their funding authorized shortly thereafter. Treasury offices of the Ministry of Finance, however, evidenced great reluctance in releasing the funds until a host of conditions were met by project officials in the functional ministries. As a result, six months after the initiation of the plan only about 25 percent of the development budget funds had been released, notwithstanding the fact that start-up months usually demand greater expenditures for supplies and equipment than do subsequent months. In effect, a concern for efficiency thwarted the achievement of output goals at a time when the primary functions and goals of the administrative apparatus were undergoing major changes. A bureaucracy which had traditionally served system-maintenance and regulatory goals was now being asked to concentrate on output and was in theory being offered the resources needed to serve the new goal.

There is another reason why effectiveness rather than efficiency ought to be the criterion by which productivity is evaluated in low-income countries. The concern with efficiency as

the ultimate yardstick is rooted in the study of private industrial organizations; efficiency is, in fact, a system-maintenance function that is integral to the survival of most (though not all) private organizations in a competitive setting. But the public organization in a low-income country serves a host of other goals. It may serve to legitimize the government in rural areas where the presence of officials constitutes the only symbol of the regime. It may fulfill the function of eliciting contributions, monetary or otherwise, that can be used for public purposes. And it may provide other public services to a province, district, or village that are essential to government, whatever their comparative costs. That these functions are performed efficiently may be helpful; that they are performed effectively may be essential.

Finally, any organization subject to changing goals and functions of major proportions is likely to be somewhat more inefficient in its use of resources. Costs are involved in changing behavior patterns, experimentation is normally required, and mistakes in applying new procedures are common. As will become clear below, the Indonesian bureaucracy's goals and activities are undergoing changes of major proportions. To insist on efficiency as the criterion for productivity would be an intellectual exercise of secondary utility under such circumstances.

Two Central Questions. Since productivity is the touchstone of this analysis, there are two basic questions which must be directed to the core of that concern. First, what are the key

variables which affect productivity? These variables can be divided into two categories: those that are intra-organizational and those that are extra-organizational. Intra-organizational or internal variables are those which deal principally with the distribution of power and authority and with human behavior. They may in some cases relate to processes that have little to do with authority or motivation. External variables are the parameters set by the task environment. In terms of an exchange model, they may range all the way from explicit demands for resources to the voluntary contribution of resources. They may assist or they may impede the performance of the bureaucracy. They may even subvert or co-opt the organization to serve purposes different from its stated goals, a practice that is probably far more prevalent under regimes where mechanisms to ensure responsibility are poorly developed.[9]

The second question is hinted at in the foregoing paragraph: productivity for what? This query is not intended to raise the larger question about the validity of the national goals which the bureaucracy is charged with serving, although such value questions are clearly legitimate. The issue raised here is more of an empirical one: for whom is the bureaucracy actually producing? To what extent is productive capacity being utilized to serve the goals of the regime, those of other public or private clienteles, or inarticulated, self-serving goals of the organization itself? These ends are not necessarily mutually exclusive by any means. Revenue officials, for example, may very well work three sides of the table at the same time.[10] In letting construction contracts,

public works engineers may see the purposes of the regime served as well as the ends of selected contractors. In isolated cases, increased performance levels on the part of individual public servants may serve no more than personal aggrandizement ends, such as the hyper-active customs officer who finds it in his own pecuniary interest to be as thorough as possible in his inspections. Finally, modern Indonesian history has a wealth of cases to show where the interests of political parties have been directly served by a bureaucratic elite.[11] It is important, therefore, to ask not only the question of what ends increased productivity is intended to serve, but the empirically answerable queries of what objectives actually are being furthered.

Productivity Variables

What determines the productivity levels or effectiveness of Indonesian public institutions? In rough form we have described above two broad sets of variables, those which are internal and those external to the working of an organization. In simplified terms, it may be that internal organizational structure (the formal distribution of authority) is the key variable which accounts for different levels of productivity. Equally possible, the free behavior of role occupants within the structure may be the most influential variable. Should one wish to stand this latter proposition on its head because of a principal interest in behavior, then it is not difficult to hypothesize that productivity, itself, may be the governing variable in influencing behavior.[12] These observations are advanced here only to put the present

analysis in its place. Productivity is treated as the dependent variable. Sources of variance in productivity levels are sought in independent variables which include not only the distribution of resources (power, authority, and their component elements) but the motivation to employ those resources for stated ends.

Major Independent Variables. (1) Bureaucratic Structure. Early during its tenure the Suharto Government took a major step in restructuring Indonesia's governmental apparatus. From scores of ministries which had been established in piecemeal fashion without plan under President Sukarno, the number was reduced to less than twenty-five. The principal objectives, although not articulated, were probably twofold. One involved a traditional concern of administrative scientists, that of span of control; only it was broader in its implications. Additional control was required for purposes of political survival as well as for improvements in conventional administrative responsibility. As Herbert Feith once noted,

> Indonesia's bureaucracy is a strong one, not in the sense that the government leaders can use it to achieve whatever they want but rather in the sense that it itself determines the social ends for which its activities are to be carried out.[13]

The other doubtless reflected a desire to save money for investments more likely to show greater economic returns than those used to provide for the trappings of ministerial privilege. If appropriate data were available, this policy decision could be tested, in propositional form, to see what changes in performance structural reform actually brought about. The literature on administration is replete with exhortations for structural reforms, most

of them anchored in "principles" which Herbert Simon effectively dismissed as proverbs over twenty-five years ago.[14] Social scientists ought to be able to speak more carefully and thoroughly to the implications of structural changes, for neither intuition nor experience which is limited to a single setting is likely to produce convincing rationale for structural change. On a macro- or political systems level, this may be close to an unmanageable task; but in the case of a single organization, it is within easier reach.

There are two contradictory propositions in the literature of public bureaucracies regarding the value of more concentrated authority or less concentrated authority. Riggs argues that decentralization tends to strengthen the influence of those who are least committed to development (change) while Crozier argues that a greater centralization of power means that change must come from the top and that it will probably be slow in coming.[15] Both proceed from differing implicit assumptions about the potential value of contributions from subordinate bureaucratic ranks. In any case, both propositions focus on structural form and are testable. Part of the analysis presented below in Chapter Five represents an indicative empirical test of the Crozier proposition that selective decentralizing measures would most likely increase productivity levels.

A further proposition which argues the utility of a decentralized authority structure touches less on productivity than upon system-maintenance functions. The argument is that the sharing of bureaucratic privileges is a stabilizing force among

the Indonesian elites. Less easy to determine, however, is the precise amount of stability which might contribute most to the achievement of productivity goals. Propositions using organizational structure as the independent variable are indeed empirically testable. What is required are output data before and after an administrative reorganization with some means either to assess other intervening variables or to hold them constant. If changes in efficiency levels are to be mapped as well, data reflecting input variations can be included in the analysis. Such an exercise is not the province of this work, but hopefully of one to come.

(2) Behavior. Often decisions are made and policies carried out by members of an organization that are not necessarily the product of the members' role set as defined by both the goals and structure of the organization. A variety of influences motivate people to perform certain actions, only some of which are directly attributable to the formal structure in which they work. The importance of informal organizations has already been mentioned as a source of variance. Charismatic authority is another source. A host of manipulatable, intra-organizational variables having the potential for affecting motivation can also be mentioned: the application of incentives or deprivations normally contributes substantially to an individual's adaptation to prescribed roles. The aphoristic admonition, "If you want to get ahead, go along!" is principally a plea for higher role congruence. Higher levels of role congruence are an objective that is logically obtainable through the expenditure of organizational

resources. Depending upon the setting, salary increases, promotions in authority, status, and/or prestige, training to improve technical skills, indoctrination in organizational goals, and the distribution of perquisites can all be used in varying degrees to influence member behavior.

Other factors influencing behavior are external to the organization and, therefore, much less controllable. Education for skills is a prime source of variance affecting the technical capacity of new officials entering the service of an agency. Cultural norms that tend to inhibit the expression of initiative at lower echelons can be almost pervasive in their influence. More important yet, a single bureaucrat may be subject to the demands of multiple roles. Evidence drawn from the Indonesian situation shows clearly that religious, ethnic, political party, family, and territorial loyalties all place claims on the actions of public officials. Resource-rich clientele groups may or may not choose to alter the goals of public organizations to suit their own purposes through strategies fashioned to influence the behavior of public policy-makers. Conversely, the total absence of clientele demand for resources may allow other sources of variance, some of them perhaps no more than personal whims, to intercede in the performance of a bureaucratic role. The field officer of a large department who has no effective clientele to serve may go fishing or, if Bali is his territory, he may find himself at a cockfight.

The foregoing list of behavior sources of variance is not exhaustive, merely indicative. Each of the factors mentioned

can be put in propositional form with respect to different levels of output. By way of example, a very important break in the salary structure of the Indonesian civil service has recently taken place in the Ministry of Finance with a nine-fold increase in salary levels. Taking the motivational factor (salary increases) as the independent variable, the Government implicitly hypothesized that output would vary directly with salary scales--at least within a specified range. In a number of respects this change presents the opportunity for an almost ideal case study: both inputs and outputs (revenue) are quantifiable, the ministry is currently understaffed, and there is known to be substantial slack in the government's revenue producing potential.[16]

The utility of deprivations can also be assessed, something attempted in Chapter Six. In this situation resources are withheld from organization members whose behavior may be non-supportive of the goals of the organization. A further step is the withdrawal of resources already made available to the individual, such that he has nothing to employ in exchanges with either constitutents or his organizational superiors. The utility of applying sanctions of this nature in the Indonesian context is not perfectly clear yet, but there is probably some indirect gain for productivity. Neither coercive measures nor deprivations are likely to stimulate greater output on the part of those involved, but they may do two things: (1) permit the reallocation of resources to those who are more productivity oriented, and (2) place limitations on role deviations that are in fact counter-productive.

It is probably true that ultimately the best approach to explaining both change and its implications lies in the application of a resource-exchange model.[17] Power, structure, and values affecting motivation all influence the degree to which resources are likely to be exchanged as well as the type of resources to be exchanged. The propensity of one sector (rice farmers, for example) to withhold its support for the policy of the government (e.g., the introduction of high-yielding varieties) in effect determines both the amount and type of resources that must be applied by the government in implementing such a policy. Subsidies may be required, persuasion of a propagandistic nature, the risking of the government's legitimacy in its role as a provider of technical information, and perhaps the application of coercion. Depending upon farmer cooperation and response, such a program will cost more or less. The objective in charting such costs beforehand is simply to inform policy choices. Conceivably the opportunity costs in renovating old irrigation systems might indicate that fewer resources applied to that activity would bring equal or greater returns in the same time period. If the introduction of high-yielding varieties is deemed an essential function of the government, cost analysis using the resource exchange model can still serve effectively to predict output levels with varying mixes of resource inputs that will be required.

The intent here is not to summarize the Ilchman model in detail but to suggest that its application for problem-solving purposes is likely to be improved if substantial mapping of a

bureaucracy is carried out beforehand. The type of resources to be involved in any one particular exchange action frequently can be projected intuitively with reasonable accuracy, but less certain is the particular mix of resources which should be employed. Before any decisions can be made about the mix, however, there must be a reasonably thorough understanding of those variables which resource investments are intended to influence. This, briefly, is the rationale for the work on the Indonesian bureaucracy which follows in the succeeding chapters. In particular, this is the reason for the degree of attention directed toward the attributes, values, and attitudes of public officials themselves.

(3) Resource Levels. In terms of each of a bureaucracy's functions, there is probably some critical minimum amount of resource inputs necessary before an organization can maintain itself, much less demonstrate outputs that vary directly and proportionally with inputs. Here is what is meant. In Chapter Six there is some evidence presented to suggest that civil service salaries at the regional government level provide for only one-fourth to one-third of the monthly expenditures of most officials. Under these circumstances it seems reasonable to hypothesize that new and substantial inputs for project purposes might facilitate only a very limited increase in output, or perhaps no increase at all. In similar fashion, low levels of administrative infrastructure may place limitations on productivity that are insuperable until such time as further investments expand the infrastructure. Shortages in skilled manpower present an obvious

example: only "x" number of bridges can be designed by "y" number of civil engineers in a given time period. Communications facilities may also place absolute limits on how fast selected activities can be consummated. Possibly infrastructure of a less conventional nature may be required--investments in the institutionalization of an organization.

An understanding of the need for some critical minimal level of resource inputs may partially help to explain Robert Daland's conclusion that the implementation of economic planning was dysfunctional from the point of view of the Brazilian bureaucracy.[12] He does not present data to permit us more than a tentative judgment but it may very well be that the critical minimum of resources necessary to elicit behavior changes was not available or, if available, was not employed for that purpose. In another type of example, that of Indonesia's relatively new national family planning program, the seemingly dilatory growth of a program is due not to a shortage of financial resources (which are in fact overwhelming), but to an almost total lack of organizational infrastructure. In sum, assumptions about productive capacity of any organization, be the objective gross output or efficiency, need to respect a simple admonition: i.e., calculate inputs in their broadest sense.

(4) Process Variables. To the list of variables which account for different levels of productivity, we are adding three processes or functions which condition exchange. Communication, which depends in varying degrees upon the existence of infrastructure, is the process by which information is exchanged.

Both structural and behavioral variables help to determine the substance as well as the form of communication, a fact which suggests that this process variable might well have been dealt with above. We deal with it here because of its unique importance in facilitating all forms of exchange. Coordination and control likewise are processes or functions that involve exchanges of resources. Special attention is drawn to them here because of the fact that field work carried out in connection with this study pointed to these processes as being central to the understanding of exchange in the Indonesian context.

Communication as infrastructure usually has direct bearing on the rate at which administrative activities are consummated. The better the facilities, the more speedily information can be transmitted. However, infrastructure is no more than enabling; it facilitates the exchange of information only when and if the exchange is desired by both the sender and receiver. This elementary point is reviewed here because there are some very strong operational reasons within Indonesian organizations for minimizing the exchange of information. Brief examples begin to explain this: (a) policy decisions are so concentrated in the top levels of organizations that the marginal utility of information declines very sharply after a certain point; not only is added information less useful in decision-making, but it may be risky for an official to become responsible for additional information that lies beyond his own fund of exchange resources. (b) Less information in the form of transmitted instructions from decision-makers is a de facto mechanism allowing subordinate officials at

lower echelons greater latitude (authority) in making decisions at those levels. (c) Conversely, sometimes the lack of information (rules, decisions, guidelines, etc.) transmitted from above offers subordinates a mechanism by which to escape the expenditure of their own resources. In Indonesia this is frequently exhibited in the response: "I cannot do anything to help you because there is no regulation covering that." In summary, communication per se is not so much a variable but a pattern that orders resource exchange.

The same thing can be said for coordination. Coordination is, in one sense, no more than adaptation to increasing functional differentiation which stems from new sectoral demands and new goals. Adaptation usually requires the establishment of some form of temporary collegial authority structure that may be either intra-organizational or inter-organizational in character. In any case, such adaptive measures are what Eisenstadt calls "the most important problem faced by all the bureaucracies."[19] In Chapter Five, employing what we call a "problem approach" to the understanding of productivity in the Indonesian setting, focus on the process of coordination is helpful in trying to identify both structural and behavioral variables which bear on productivity. As will be seen, the demand for coordination places certain strains on organizations, some of them clearly due to uncertainties about the kind and quantity of resources exchanges that new collegial structures will require. This suggests the proposition that the less predictable the outcome of a resource exchange, the more reluctance there will be to enter into it.[20] Other variables

are also at work and can be placed in propositional form: (a) the value attached to "correct" organizational form is stronger than that affixed to ad hoc decision-making structures that facilitate greater resource exchange; and (b), demands for coordination tend to further separate authority from responsibility, particularly in light of the transitory nature of collegial decision-making, with the result that accountability is weakened. These points suggest that, as a process, coordination is a fruitful function upon which to focus the analysis of productivity.

The means and extent to which control measures are applied have a direct bearing on productivity, too, but appear to speak more to the question of "productivity for what?" than to the question of how much productivity. Control is the instrument of accountability, an instrument that may inhere in extra-organizational entities as well as in the internal characteristics of an organization. With high levels of role congruence, strategies to ensure control are not of prime importance; with lower levels of role congruence usually found in situations of substantial or rapid change, they are much more important. In the case of Indonesia this fact presents the administrator with a dilemma: the amount and/or rate of change taking place demands effective control devices while at the same time cultural norms tend to order behavior in such a way as to make the expression of careful control very difficult.[21] Again, the analysis of a process, control in this case, helps to explain one of the general variables related to productivity, that of role congruence.

The Indonesian Situation: An Overview

We have argued elsewhere that the nomenclature of nationhood is misleading. Indonesia is not one country but many. By the historical accident of Dutch colonialism, some 3,000 inhabited islands and scores of traditional kingdoms have been assembled to constitute a single nation-state. It is not too much to say that during the twenty-five years since Indonesia declared its independence the primary goal of national leaders has been that of political productivity for purposes of national integration. What resources the early regimes were able to generate were invested principally in (1) stability, with particular reference to the breakaway, separatist movement in Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1958;[22] (2) in legitimacy, manifested most openly in measures which accommodated all political elements of consequence in governmental positions; and (3) in solidarity, best represented by President Sukarno's attempt to establish a national ideology, expansive enough (he thought) to elicit the support of nearly all Indonesians.[23] Solidarity investments were also reflected in a jingoistic stance vis-a-vis major Western nations, exemplified in part through the protracted "confrontation" with Malaysia in the early to mid-1960's. The application of most of the regimes' resources to what Geertz calls an "integrative revolution" left very little for the production of conventional goods and services or for investments in infrastructure that would facilitate such production.[24] This statement is made matter of factly for its is not easy to argue convincingly that, from the standpoint of

post-independence regimes, these investments were made unwisely. One suspects that much of the criticism leveled at President Sukarno and some of his predecessors is due more to a lack of understanding of Indonesia and the rudimentary elements of political economy than to anything else.

In any event, the Indonesian economy declined significantly during the late 1950's and for most of the following decade. During the same period, the civilian bureaucracy increased in numbers from what Selosoemardjan referred to as "the small community of members" to 541,000 and government agencies proliferated.[25] Resources allocated to the bureaucracy were increasingly consumed by civil service personnel, leaving less and less for program implementation. Investments to improve administrative infrastructure were minimal throughout this period and few attempts were made to alter the goals, structure, and behavioral characteristics of public organizations for performance purposes. The one major try at restructuring the government between 1950 and 1957, that of sharing authority with regional and local governments was a response to the demands of political parties whose strengths were localized. While this decentralizing measure involving the sharing of authority might be viewed as a calculated strategy designed to serve regime legitimization ends in the long run, the truth lies elsewhere. The policy was a direct response to centrifugal forces--forces, it turned out, strong enough to threaten national integration objectives. The perceived dangers in this policy were sufficiently compelling to cause Sukarno to abandon it in the late 1950's.[26]

While they are often obligated to do so, scholars usually find it awkward to explain the exclusion of certain factors which beg for inclusion in their general analyses. Such is the case here concerning the impact of some 250 years of Dutch rule on the structure and behavior of the Indonesian bureaucracy. The influence was, of course, considerable and could well be used by another writer as the major theme for a work on the Indonesian bureaucracy. While we have tried to extract the principal historical variables and have applied them where they appear particularly relevant, readers with a strong historical bent will inevitably be less than satisfied.

Structural Characteristics of the Bureaucracy. Certain historical influences stand out sharply, particularly one that partially explains the centralized nature of Indonesia's national bureaucracy. The Dutch ruled indirectly, relying on native officials at lower levels of the structure. A colonial report of 1900 cited by Clive Day indicates that the core Dutch administration outside Batavia (Djakarta) at that time equaled no more than 430 officials.[27] More were attached to functional departments and to privately held plantations of course, but the nature of indirect rule required centralized control if the Dutch were to rule East India. In 1904 Day could write that the most striking characteristic of the Dutch colonial organization was the immense concentration of power in the Governor General and of "the evil of centralization" in the system of finance.[28] Less important than the Yankee historian's value judgments about the Dutch system

is the fact that it showed a high level of congruence with traditional, indigenous notions about the structure of power and authority.

In the case of 16th to 19th century Mataram Java, Soemarsaid Moertono has described the basis of centralized rule: an official's relationship to the monarch was both unconditional and submissive, for only the king could grant welfare and prosperity.[29] Indeed, there are breaks in the tradition of centralized, authoritarian power structures. Bargains were struck and autonomy granted to fringe districts of the Mataram kingdom. Additionally, surprisingly advanced levels of democracy emerged in kingdoms outside Java, most notably those of Wadjo and Bone in the southern part of Sulawesi. Yet the basic pattern of concentrated authority is one that inheres both in the larger system and in individual organizational units.

Behavioral Characteristics. The origins of Indonesian bureaucratic behavior are complex. Part of this is due to the fact that it is difficult to separate bureaucratic norms from a set of highly refined social norms. There is little that is sui generis to the bureaucracy.[30] Part of the complexity results from the multiplicity of ethnic groups from which bureaucrats originate. And part is due to the historical fragmentation of the bureaucracy which is in some degree perpetuated by the fact nearly all departments have their own degree-granting, training academies--in effect, their own pre-service socializing institutions. Despite its fragmented nature, there are a few common principles around which certain aspects of behavior can be grouped.

First, in proportional terms the overall bureaucracy is strongly Javanese. This imbalance is generally minimized for purposes of national unity and while the precise dimensions are not known, estimates of more than 90 percent have been offered.[31] Not only was Java the focus of Dutch colonial policies designed to build administrative infrastructure in East India but, as a late Indonesian psychologist explained:

> The Javanese are obedient, diligent and accurate in their work. The Dutch colonial government liked this . . . . The Javanese are still inclined to serve the state. Indeed this had its roots in the past history and philosophy of the Javanese to dedicate themselves to their idol and to what they worship . . . Although during the colonization they served a foreign government, the understanding that this was the legal government to whom even their kings subjected themselves justified their serving a foreign government or at least reduced their reluctance to do so.[32]

To say that the bureaucracy is strongly Javanese is to say that there is an intense concern for status, for smooth, constrained, hyper-polite behavior. Social relationships, in Geertz's words, are "characteristically hierarchical, formal and dyadic. Each person defers (at least outwardly) to the man directly above him--his supervisor, his guru, his senior, or his father--and guides (at least ostensibly) the man directly below him--his subordinate, his disciple, his junior, or his son."[33] As a rule, subordinates would not think of directly questioning decisions of their superiors and if opposition in subordinate ranks does develop it is normally manifested in the sluggish implementation of directives. The superior, no less than the subordinate, generally is reluctant to enter into possible conflict situations. He gives his orders and rarely attempts to intervene or to closely

supervise their implementation. This pattern of behavior reciprocally gives subordinates their own measure of freedom from possible overt conflict.[34]

Second, a principle from Dutch colonial administration, institutionalized as a bureaucratic norm in the early 19th century, can be traced up to the present. This was Van den Bosch's rust en orde which, as Furnivall notes, was more like "peace and quiet" than "law and order."[35] Indeed, this may have been more of a policy goal than a bureaucratic behavioral norm, but the two cannot readily be separated. In a very real sense, the native regents of the Dutch period were "police officers," serving the traditional function of maintaining stability and quietude among the natives. Although Furnivall has argued that the policing function must be understood in much broader terms than present definitions encourage--because it encompassed the notion of "welfare officer"--his analysis seems too normative. Whatever the enunciated polices were, the system was framed not primarily with the object of doing something, but more with that of preventing things from being done. The norms were guardian norms, not entrepreneurial norms; the budgets were guardian budgets, not change budgets.

Goals. Not only was there a high level of congruence between Dutch and indigenous authority structures, but also in the matter of operational goals. History records that the Government of the Netherlands and the enterprises it sheltered reaped great wealth from East India and that they returned much less than was extracted. There were indeed many genuine attempts to improve

the lot of the indigenous peoples as well as much open debate in Holland about whether or not there was substance behind such policies, the polemics of which need not detain us here. On balance it is a fair judgment to say that the primary objective of Dutch colonial policy was commercial and that the function of the colonial bureaucracy was to sustain order.

The operational goal of traditional Javanese kings was also that of maintaining or restoring order but with the conceptual or philosophic objective of ordering man's world to mirror that of the gods. Heaven-divined or not, it appears that what was good for Dutch business was good for the gods, or vice versa. In any case, Selosoemardjan is essentially correct in arguing that the principal operational goal of the colonial administration was that of maintaining political, economic and social control, a task performed with remarkable efficiency.[36] This high level of efficiency can best be accounted for in the congruence of both goals and structural norms, though some Dutch sharing of both authority and financial resources with the indigenous elites necessarily accounts for the degree of Dutch success in their application of indirect rule.

The Task Environment. The overview offered here would not be complete without reference to four additional considerations. First, diversity in ethnicity, geography, and religion forms the principal bases of conflict in the country. The roots of the conflict and the variegated resource demands which they represent are much more complex than the historical split between Java and the Outer Islands over the division of national revenues. They

lie in wide variations of adat (customary or traditional) law, of economic structures, and of systems of government. While they are often conveniently subsumed under the heading of "regionalism," most of the twenty-six first-level regions (provinces) are significantly different, such that it is extremely difficult to write about Indonesia without raising the discussion to a level of generality that obscures more than it clarifies. Variations within each region are also often substantial. Culturally, for example, it makes a great deal of difference whether or not one is talking about the coastal (pesisir) part of Central Java or the interior (the old kingdom of Mataram). These differences go far to explaining why the "regional problem" has been and is likely to be a continuing issue for the long-range foreseeable future.

Second, religious differences, the cleavages of which follow geographic diversity to a lesser extent than those ethnically defined, are important not only for the degree to which they structure demands upon the government, but also for their influence on internal bureaucratic behavior. The demands are those conditioned mainly by the major divisions in Islam, and range from the fundamentalist movements seeking an Islamic state to those of more conservative persuasion whose adherents are inclined to enter into resource exchange without attempting to restructure the political system. Represented by the Nahdatul Ulama (Moslem Scholars) party which received about 20 percent of the national vote in 1971, this conservative group is strikingly underrepresented in the present political structure at the national

level--a condition which may eventuate in a crisis of demands for an Indonesian regime at some future time. Aside from these macro-considerations, the lingering ascriptive quality of bureaucratic norms continues to reflect religiously based influence in functions and processes that might readily be anticipated: recruitment, promotions, and decision-making.

The role of the Indonesian military is as important as it is difficult to define. Findings offered in Chapter Four will indicate that the Army is now deeply integrated into the civilian bureaucratic structure at national, provincial, and regency levels where its influence is direct. In addition, parallel military structures follow those of the civil apparatus from top to bottom representing an alternative authority sturcture which may be complementary, competitive, or dominant--possibly all of these depending upon the nature of the issue. Moreover, the military as a sector makes substantial demands upon the regime as well as upon the civil bureaucracy. These demands take the form of claims against the budget, for positions of power, or for privileges that entail the non-application of a wide range of regulatory provisions.

Finally, this overview would not be complete without reference to two factors which have contributed in very significant ways to Indonesian national integration. First, Indonesia underwent a deep and meaningful revolutionary experience in its struggle for independence.[37] Following independence, nationalist leaders sought to perpetuate the revolutionary mystique for purposes of both national integrity and regime legitimacy. Sukarno,

himself, evidenced both the most theatrical and the most effective application of this strategy, a strategy which, in terms of the politics of nation-building, proved generally successful. While there is voiced concern on the part of today's intellectual elite that the spirit of the revolution is dying as a new generation moves toward power twenty-five years after independence, the fact remains that Indonesia's nationalist leaders succeeded in extending the political capital inherent in the revolutionary experience for a longer period than have their counterparts in many other new states.

The second factor can be found in the remarkable way in which Bahasa Indonesia has permeated the multiplicity of Indonesian cultures; it is a success story yet to be told. Suffice it to say that the national language is written and spoken in all government offices throughout the archipelago; it is the language of instruction within the entire national school system; and, since the time of Independence, conflict over this keystone of national language policy has never arisen, nor does it appear likely to emerge in the future. The genius of settling upon a minority language which was not rooted in the high culture of Java dates to a series of meetings held during the 1920's and attended by members of an embryonic literati. The nationalist experience of the succeeding decades doubtless served to strengthen identification with the language, even among revolutionary leaders who continued to use Dutch while at the same time resisting it. Given that the Javanese language is spoken by upwards of 50 million Indonesians and the fact that preliminary linguistic

geographies have identified over 200 distinct language groups throughout the islands, the widespread adoption of Bahasa Indonesia must be regarded as a national asset of high fortuitous proportions.

A Methodological Preamble[38]

The objectives of the present study are limited, more limited certainly than one who has experienced the cultures of Indonesia would wish. At the same time they are broad, much too broad to speak with unquavering confidence to the problems which are discussed in the following pages. The compromise drawn between these two conflicting interests is in essence an attempt to map parts of the Indonesian bureaucracy--its structure, the values and behavior of its officials, and the problems it faces in both stimulating and regulating change in a society of 120 million people. Few Americans possessed of all their faculties would attempt the same kind of exercise in the United States, although it might be much simpler to do so with the comparatively homogeneous population of the U. S., its high level of bureaucratic role congruence, ample data, and a large bank of scholarly work to draw upon. That an enterprise of such extended conceptual scope was entered into here reflects a weakness of mind not matched by the heart.

If Indonesia is in the process of undergoing change, then that change will have to be recorded in the daerah (the regions) before it can be accepted as fact. Here is a country of villages with an agrarian population. Djakarta, the nation's largest city

by far and its window to the West, has 4 1/2 million inhabitants and a culture of its own. To learn about the regions, three provinces were selected for field work: West Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and Central Java. Not coincidentally, each reflects a strong and distinct cultural tradition. In addition, each has a quite different historical tradition. Two lie outside Java and one is in the heartland of Java. Population varies from a low of 2.8 million to a high of 22.3 million and population density varies by about the same margin.

For purposes of this study, six different sets of interview schedules were administered to regional officials: high-level bureaucrats (157), lower-level bureaucrats (146), economic planners (54), sub-district officers (226), village headmen (389), and university students (554). Officials in the first two categories were drawn from the Ministries of Home Affairs, Finance, Public Works, and Education. The regional planners and sub-district officers were officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The village headmen, while not government officials, report to the sub-district officers. Government documents and reports referred to in the text were obtained directly from officials in the field. These are listed in the bibliography along with secondary sources.

Organization of the Analysis

The discussion is organized from the bottom up. It is upon the villages that the politics and economics of Indonesia rests and it is with these that we begin in Chapters Two and Three.

The next structural unit above the village is that of the sub-district which is an administrative unit of the regency. Chapter Four deals with bureaucrats at each of these two levels: regents and sub-district officers. Chapters Five and Six focus not only on officials at the province level, but evidence an expansion of the analysis to reflect systemic variables affecting the whole of the administrative process in Indonesian public organizations.

In structural terms the discussion begins with the broad base of the village and continues up the pyramid of government to the narrow elite of province-level bureaucratic executives, many of whom would be playing national leadership roles in another context. (The Central Java provincial population of over 22 million people would make it a larger nation-state than a host of other present-day countries.) In conceptual terms, the analysis proceeds in reverse fashion by beginning with specific administrative considerations bearing on village development and then expanding to accommodate generic issues of Indonesian bureaucratic structure and behavior.

FOOTNOTES

1. Clifford Geertz, Peddlers and Princes Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963, p. 74.

2. See Warren F. Ilchman, "Comparative Wisdom and Conventional Administration: The Comparative Administration Group and Its Contributions," April, 1971, p. 57, (mimeographed). One suspects, too, that the social climate in which Western academics work today is likely to intrude upon the sociology of knowledge in such a way as to re-emphasize the practical and directly relevant at the expense of the theoretical, but the implications of a changing social point of reference are not yet entirely clear.

3. In 1969 the Government of Indonesia rejected the recommendations of foreign technical advisers who favored such selective salary increases. As far as is known, the potential benefits of such a scheme were never calculated. It was rejected on the basis of high intra-organizational costs, primarily ones of a political nature.

4. Schrieke's work and that which he encouraged his colleagues to do early in this century are particularly important for the sociological tools brought to the scholarship. See his Indonesian Sociological Studies, Part I and II, Bandung: Sumur Bandung, second edition, 1957. Also a work that he edited, The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilizations in the Malay Archipelago, Batavia (Djakarta): G. Kolff & Co., 1929.

   The principal non-Dutch works which deal in full or in part with the indigenous bureaucracy are those of Clive Day, The Dutch in Java, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966 (first published by the MacMillan Company, New York, 1904); J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India, London: Cambridge University Press, 1939; J. D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration, 1950-1960, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961; Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962; Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period 16th to 19th Century, Ithaca: Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1968; and Selosoemardjan, "Bureaucratic Organization in a Time of Revolution," Administrative Science Quarterly, II, (September, 1957), pp. 182-199.

5. Soemarsaid Moertono, op. cit., p. 35.

6. The budget was Rp. 243.7 billion while the estimated gross national product was Rp. 504.6 billion. See Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, "The Indonesian Economy: A Survey of Recent Developments," March, 1971, pp. 2 and 13, (mimeographed).

7. Herbert Feith is more perceptive than others in laying bare this reality, but his insight is the exception among members of the Cornell group which labored so effectively to explain political party behavior while all but ignoring the bureaucracy. See Feith, op. cit., pp. 311-314.

8. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

9. The literature on American public organizations is sufficiently strong on this point. Among others see Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949; and Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, New York: Knopf, 1966.
If Riggs' criterion for administrative development is applied, i.e., an increase in bureaucratic responsibility for policy implementation, then administration in most low-income countries is poorly developed. But by the same token, the U. S. Interstate Commerce Commission, established in 1887, must also be poorly developed. See Fred Riggs, Administrative Development: An Elusive Concept," in John Montgomery and William Siffin, eds., Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.

10. On one side of the table they serve the interests of the government, commercial or individual clienteles on the second, and themselves on the third side (underneath). No order of priority need be imputed from this listing.

11. See Feith, op. cit., p. 313.

12. Some early work by Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, for example, indicates that workers in high-producing groups showed greater cohesion than workers in low-producing groups. See "Some Recent Findings in Human Relations Research in Industry," Guy E. Swanson, et al, eds., Readings in Social Psychology, New York: Holt, 1952, pp. 661-662.

13. Herbert Feith, "Indonesia," in George McT. Kahin, ed., Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, Second Edition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964, p. 257.

14. See Administrative Behavior, New York: MacMillan, 1945.

15. Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1964, p. 379; Michel Crozier, op. cit., p. 198.

16. The conditions under which this change was inaugurated are only slightly less clear than they sound. An important secondary objective in the policy change was a considered attempt to improve control. Until a living wage could be paid, system norms precluded the application of strong sanctions for deviant, even unlawful, behavior. To the extent that the policy was directed toward improving role congruence there is an added testable proposition involved, but limited data on the leakage of public funds through corruption would doubtless make this an elusive exercise.

17. The first thorough exposition of this model applied to political choice is that of Warren Ilchman in hi The Political Economy of Change, with Norman T. Uphoff, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. Implications of this model are somewhat elaborated upon in Professor Ilchman's previously cited work, op. cit., 1971.

18. See Robert Daland, Brazilian Planning: Development Politics and Administration, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967, p. 209-212.

19. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States," in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, eds., Industrialization and Society, The Hague: Mouton (UNESCO), 1963, p. 163.

20. This proposition runs somewhat counter to that of Riggs who argues that effectiveness is better served by uncertainties in funding (resource exchange). The only qualification we would make is that the process of coordination in the Indonesian context raises uncertainties not only about funding but also about the locus of authority. Perhaps the latter consideration is equally important in contributing to coordination difficulties. See Fred Riggs, op. cit., 1966.

21. The roots of this phenomenon lie in the difficulties found in accommodating direct conflict and close supervision. See Lucien Pye, "Bureaucratic Development and the Psychology of Institutionalization," in Ralph Braibanti, ed., Political and Administrative Development, Durham: Duke University Press, 1969, pp. 400-426. See also, Robert Jay, Javanese Villagers: Social Relations in Rural Modjokuto, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969, p. 345; and Clifford Geertz, The Social History of an Indonesian Town, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965, p. 79.

22. The rebellion broke out in February of 1958 with the proclamation of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of

Indonesia, and full control was not restored to Outer Island pockets of resistance until 1961. See Herbert Feith and Daniel S. Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 35 (Spring, 1963), pp. 32-46. One other threat to political stability, aside from the special case of the attempted coups in 1965, was that of the Dar Ul Islam movement, a widely dispersed collection of Islamic santri fundamentalists who were in open military revolt for several years during the 1950's. The force motivating this revolt was a vaguely defined notion of a theocratic (Islamic) state.

23. This was NASAKOM, Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme, or the acronym for nationalism, religion, and communism.

24. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States, New York: The Free Press, 1963.

25. Selosoemardjan, op. cit., 1957, p. 185. Figures released in 1971 show that about 493,000, or eighty percent of the total number of civil servants, belong to ten departments: Education and Culture, 162,747; Religious Affairs, 159,646; Health, 40,000; Finance 33,563; Justice, 24,930; Communications, 17,086; Information, 16,000; Home Affairs, 14,971; Agriculture, 11,246; and the Office of the Attorney General, 13,153. Source: Report of Dr. Emil Salim, Minister of State for Reform of the State Apparatus, October 6, 1971.

26. The explanation of how and why the effort seems to have failed in Indonesia is provided in thorough fashion by John Legge, op. cit., Chapter 9, pp. 201-230.

27. Clive Day, op. cit., p. 418.

28. Ibid., pp. 421-422. A recent mapping of the structure of Indonesian public finance indicates that the basic pattern is little changed since the beginning of the century. See R. S. Smith and Theodore M. Smith, "The Political Economy of Regional and Urban Revenue Policy in Indonesia," Asian Survey, XI, No. 8, (August, 1971), pp. 761-786; and T. M. Smith and R. S. Smith, "Municipal Finance," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, VII, No. 1, (March, 1971), pp. 114-130.

29. Soemarsaid Moertono, op. cit., pp. 35-37 and 94.

30. The best description of these norms is that of Clifford Geertz in his, The Religion of Java, New York: The Free Press, 1960, Chapter 17, "The Background and General Dimensions of Prijaji Belief and Etiquette."

31. Soemantri Hardjoprakoso, "Conditions in Indonesia for an Efficient Use of Foreign Aid," Bangkok: October, 1969, (mimeographed). The estimate of 90 percent appears high and dated. A 1971 review of the 207 top office holders in Central Government agencies in Djakarta shows that 70 (about one-third) of the names are those of Outer Island origin--not a precise indication of backgrounds, but nonetheless a significant one. See Buku Kerdja 1971 Kabinet Pembangunan Republik Indonesia, Djakarta: Ministry of Information, 1971.

32. Soemantri Hardjoprakoso, ibid., pp. 1-2.

33. Clifford Geertz, op. cit., 1965, pp. 79 and 146.

34. While these norms were found to be most pronounced in Central Java, the writer's field work in West Sumatra and South Sulawesi led to similar findings in the Outer Islands, although hierarchical and non-conflict norms appear less strong in these two particular regions. At the time of this writing, Koentjaraningrat has an empirical study of bureaucratic values under way that may contribute significantly to the understanding of variations and change affecting Indonesian bureaucratic behavior.

35. See J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy, London: Cambridge University Press, 1939, p. 122.

36. Selosoemardjan, op. cit., 1957, p. 183; and Selosoemardjan, "Pemerintahan Daerah Dalam Suasana Pembangunan," September, 1970, p. 4, (mimeographed).

37. The basis for any further study of the Indonesian revolution is George McT. Kahin's, Nationalism and the Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952.

38. Appendix I contains a fuller explanation of the choices made with respect to methodology and a description of how those choices were pursued.

CHAPTER II

VILLAGE HEADMEN AS AGENTS OF CHANGE

The Five-Year Development Plan (1969-73) was primarily designed to increase food production and to complete large-scale infrastructure projects. Except for the introduction of new rice varieties and their attending inputs, there is very little in the Plan that concerns village development. Moreover, most Central Government programs which extend to the village level are weak and poorly financed. Programs such as Pembangunan Masjarakat Desa (Ministry of Home Affairs), Lembaga Sosial Desa (Ministry of Social Affairs), Pendidikan Marsjarakat (Ministry of Education and Culture), and those of Public Works, Health, and Agriculture face not only funding problems but encounter additional problems in overlapping, coordination, lack of skilled manpower, and poor communications. Where funding has been available in meaningful amounts, such as in the rice intensification program, a weak but large administrative apparatus has consumed much of the investment capital and often failed to deliver needed inputs at critical moments.[1]

Because of the lack of attention given to village development in the Plan and the sizable administrative demands which attend any of the other national programs which reach down to the village level, questions concerning the potential for autonomous

village development become important. In the absence of major contributions from higher levels of government, what are the will and capability of village units to initiate economic and social change? Can they finance their own development? Can they get needed technical advice? To what degree do they have necessary labor (both skilled and unskilled)? What are village development priorities and how do they differ from national change priorities imposed upon them? And finally, how great an impact do the central and provincial governments appear to have on change at the village level?

An attempt to measure these variables should have unquestioned importance for national and regional development planning, for it can clarify the range of inputs that will be needed from higher level governments to bring about specified types of change. Thus, the mapping of village self-development capacity should help to identify approximations of needed financial resources, skilled manpower, training for village administrators, communication content, primary education, etc. If, at the same time, some kind of measurement can be made of the effectiveness of various central and regional government programs operating at the village level, needed reforms and improvements can also be identified.

In this chapter and the one that follows we have attempted to carry out productivity mapping. The key element in this endeavor was an interview schedule administered to a sample of 389 village headmen in three provinces: 134 in West Sumatra, 106 in South Sulawesi, and 149 in Central Java. The questions were directed to four specific concerns: (1) what is the potential for

autonomous village development (swadaja masjarakat)? (2) what are the priorities of village development as viewed by the village headmen themselves? (3) who are the village headmen and how likely are they to serve as potential change agents? and (4) what impact do central and regional governments have on development at the village level? This chapter focuses on the third question and will broaden it by also attempting to show the environment in which this potential change-broker functions.

Village Government Structure and Functions

Generalizations concerning Indonesian village structure and functions are risky. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the village-complex (kelurahan) which subsumed several hamlets under one roof was not a natural one and it took place in different regions at different times. Second, traditional customary law (adat) varies widely across regions--impinging heavily on such important resources as authority and status. In the Luwu district of South Sulawesi, village-complex headmen who are descendants of earlier kings perceive their role and function in terms far different from the Minangkabau trader who has become a village headman in West Sumatra. Third, while Indonesia does have a basic law for government at the village-complex level (Law No. 19 of 1965), that law was promulgated during the "old order" of President Sukarno and all three governors have deviated from it without fear of embarrassment. Fourth, the status of the village government in relation to the national and provincial governmental apparatus is still ambiguous in some cases. There has

been pressure to make it part of the national administrative system by designating it the third level (tingkat III) of the decentralized system following the province (I) and the regency (II); but this change has not yet materialized except for some experimental attempts in Surakarta and Jogjakarta. For financial and political support, village headmen look to their own people, but at the same time they are expected to implement all governmental directives coming down from above. The dilemma posed by potentially conflicting allegiances insures that more than anything else, the lurah will be a broker.[2]

The structural diagram in Chart No. I on the following page illustrates what Central Javanese village governments look like if there are enough funds to fill all of the positions. As can be seen below in Table I, however, many of the positions remain unfilled because of resource deficiencies or because of local customs. Responses from 29 of Central Java's 35 second-level governments indicate the frequency with which certain types of officials are found.

The advanced functional specificity of traditional Javanese statecraft and the more intensified Dutch efforts in Java to build administrative infrastructure there have resulted in a much more highly institutionalized structure at the village level than in the Outer Islands. In West Sumatra the village headman is formally assisted by only a secretary and the hamlet chiefs (djorong) in his village.[3] In a Goan village of South Sulawesi studied by Chabot, only religious and adat officials come in for mention.[4] In almost all cases, however, there is a secretary. The village

CHART NO. I

ORGANIZATION OF VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN CENTRAL JAVA



(1) Security official (3) Religious official (5) Agricultural official
(2) Herald (4) Irrigation official

TABLE I

Types of Village Government Personnel in Central Javanese Villages

(Responses from 29 Regencies)

Official Positions: Function/Role	Number of Positions Filled
Kepala Desa: Head of Village Government	29
Tjarik Desa or Djurutulis: Clerk, chief admin.asst.	29
Modin, Kaum, or Lebe: Religious official	26
Kebajan: Village herald	25
Ulu-ulu, Ladu, Djogotirto, or Ili-ili: Irrigation officer	25
Polisi, Kepentengan, Djogobojo, Tamping: Security official	23
Kamituwa: Hamlet chief, deputy head	17
Bekel, Bau, or Tjongkok: Hamlet head	15
Pamong tani or Djuru tani: Agricultural official	13
Djuru Hygiene or Djuru Kesehatan: Health official	6

Source: Governor's Office, Semarang, 1969

head, the secretary, and the religious official (imam desa) are the only recognized public officials.[5] While it is certain that most, if not all, of the same community functions are performed in Outer Island villages, the positions have not yet become secularized and are still filled according to adat prescription. Regardless of the formal structure at the village level and the completeness of the positions, there is almost always an official who serves as religious leader and someone who serves as the adat authority. While the religious positions are appointive, the adat head normally assumes his unofficial position by reputation. Sometimes there may even be more than one individual who has

chosen to specialize in the community's customary law. As will be seen below, the normal route to becoming a headman is not through a religious or adat position, although in the strongly Islamic province of West Sumatra more than 20 percent of the headman sample served previously as religious officials (alim ulama).

Village Headmen

Primarily because Indonesia's economic structure is heavily agrarian and upwards of seventy percent of its manpower is employed in that sector, agriculture has received first priority in the national plan. The main challenge is that of raising food production and, for the most part, this means increasing food production on Java where nearly all arable land is already under cultivation. The technology for increased yields is already available or is rapidly becoming available. How successful its implementation can be accomplished depends in large part on the effectiveness of change agents or technological brokers at the village level. In the words of a Central Java legislative report, "Village development depends on the ability and creativity of the village headman."[6]

Two factors suggest that the burden of change will rest primarily on the shoulders of the village headman--that he will be the pivotal figure in Indonesia's attempt to participate in the Green Revolution. First, in the villages of most parts of Indonesia, the headman appears to hold real authority. In Central Java, the Moluccas, and South Sulawesi, for example,

anthropological studies show him to be a minor king. At the risk of generalization, Cooley's observation that villagers simply wait for leadership, no matter what the issue, seems to capture the patrimonial relationship of ruler to ruled throughout most of Indonesia.[7]

Second, the headman is well established as the representative of the national government in the village. This role of the lurah (a term which also means master or lord in old Javanese) can be traced up through the Later Mataram period (16th to 19th century) and into the Dutch Culture System (1830-1970). Even Raffles in his major financial reform proposals concerning the land tax designated the lurahs for a key role in the collection of this tax. Independent Indonesia, basing much of its Basic Law on Dutch statutes adopted early in the 20th century, perpetuated and strengthened the government's relations with the village in stating that the ". . . village is obligated to carry out tasks for all government offices of a higher level."[8]

Additional mechanisms tend to cement the headman's attachment to the national government. As we shall see, he stands for election in his village but the regent (bupati), after reviewing the votes cast for the leading candidates, makes the final decision. Moreover, where there is no land that attends the lurah office, the headman may be salaried by the kabupaten (as in Surakarta and some other cities) or by the province (as in West Sumatra and South Sulawesi). Finally, the headman is directly responsible to the regent (bupati) through the sub-district

officer (tjamat) whose frequent visits or meeting calls sustain the flow of information and instructions from above.

Selection Process. Our interest in the means by which the headmen are chosen is conditioned less by a concern for village politics than by a desire to know what type of person is likely to be selected, a factor bearing obvious implications for his potential as a broker of technological and social change. Present minimal statutory qualifications can be traced to adat law and to a Dutch law of 1907 which denied the headman position to (1) women, (2) men below the age of 21 or not yet married, (3) those previously dismissed from government positions dishonorably, and (4) those banned from taking public positions by judges.[9] The 1965 Village Law, put forward under President Sukarno, did not discriminate against women, raised the minimum age to 25, insisted on a primary school education or the equal of it, and demanded participation in carrying out Sukarno's Guided Democracy Political Manifesto. A revised law under consideration in Parliament at this writing would make two changes: return the minimum age to 21, and require that candidates may not have been involved, either directly or indirectly, in the attempted Communist coups in 1965.

A report on the structure of village government by the Central Java legislature suggests that the present nominating process, carried out by a committee headed by the tjamat, is not succeeding in bringing the most qualified people to candidacy. In the words of the report,

> In practice the candidates selected are usually not people who are competent but people who are rich. This is because the practice is for the villager to select not a candidate based on his ability, but based on the amount of gifts [he gives them]. This is even more true in the prosperous villages such that the selection of the lurah becomes a conflict arena of great activity (jang ramai sekali). The main reason for such conflict stems from the tanah bengkok and tanah lungguh that falls to the successful candidate.[10]

In surprisingly frank language, the report goes on to note that the plum of all this land encourages many candidates to go deeply into debt in providing gifts of all kinds to prospective supporters. The gifts, including money, clothing, and food are often necessary inasmuch as villagers in many areas have come to assume the privilege of selling their votes. Bargains are also struck with political parties which obtain claims to the use of part of the bengkok or tanah lungguh should the candidate succeed.[11] Having mortgaged several years of their bengkok's production value, successful candidates are left with minimal income and many social obligations during this period with the result that "their work is not good."[12] Land intended to guarantee their status and income is lost for that period.

To overcome this shortcoming, the legislative committee proposed a solution that demonstrates a conflict between traditional and rational-productivity values: examinations for all lurah candidates. In fact, such an examination is already being used in many locales, but the strength of adat normally renders it a formality. To stress the formalistic aspect of this reform is not to denigrate it, for the formal adoption of new modes of behavior is often the precursor of meaningful, social change. Our

point is merely to suggest that in the short-run the introduction of requirements such as these cannot be very effective in changing the type of person likely to be selected as lurah. The only possibility for rapid change arises in cases where serious social unrest permits higher authorities to appoint village officials. This will be discussed in the following section.

Lurah Backgrounds. Most of the village studies carried out in post-colonial Indonesia indicate that the headman position is normally hereditary, and that it is usually the first son (though not necessarily) who assumes the mantle once the father dies or retires.[13] The legislature in Central Java reached this conclusion in its study and went on to detail the negative consequence in this practice by pointing out that in the election for a successor, the villagers are unlikely to judge only the qualities of the candidate but are inclined to attach great importance to their evaluation of his father and grandfather.

Our own data, drawn from the sample of 389 village headmen, partially supports this standard view of headman ascendancy, but it also points up some interesting post-Independence changes. Table II shows that the greatest number had fathers who were farmers both prior to and after the Revolution (37 and 50 percent); 26.5 percent of the sample had fathers who were either headmen or lesser village officials and the fathers of an additional 8.5 percent were hamlet chiefs (kepala kampong). These last two figures give adequate support to the notion that the birthright is important, very often overshadowing independent evaluations that

might be made by villagers. But at the same time, figures indicate that heredity is not the overwhelming influence it has been assumed to be.[14]

But if the present headmen's previous jobs are compared with the occupation of their fathers, we find some significant changes. As might be expected, more of today's headmen formerly held positions as civil servants in higher levels of government than did their fathers, bearing witness to new vertical mobility that did not exist during colonial times (10.9 percent versus 2.8 percent). About twice as many of today's headmen served previously as school teachers than did their fathers. Perhaps the greatest change is in the number with military origins. While a negligible percentage of fathers served with the military, our sample from the three provinces shows that about 10 percent of today's headmen served with the military prior to becoming headmen.[15] As is true in the case of the regents (bupatis) and sub-district officers (tjamats), those headmen who were in the military services prior to being selected or appointed village headmen tend to retain their military status and remain subject to orders flowing down the military chain-of-command. This, in fact, has been arranged by design, for many of these officials were placed in the headman position specifically for the purpose of guaranteeing stability during the turbulence experienced in the aftermath of the attempted coups in 1965. (See Table II.)

TABLE II

Fathers' Occupations Prior to the Revolution and after the Revolution, and Previous Occupation of Present Headmen.*

(Responses of Village Headmen)

Profession/Occupation	Father before the Revolution (before 1945)		Father after the Revolution (after 1950)		Headman before assuming position	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Trading (vendor, trader, etc.)	34	(9.4)	16	(7.6)	35	(9.1)
Industry (artisan or enterprise	12	(3.3	4	(1.9)	16	(4.2)
Political party leader or mass organization leader	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)
Military or military pensioner	2	(0.6)	1	(0.5)	38	(9.0)
Village official: headman/other	96	(26.5)	35	(16.6)	112	(29.1)
Hamlet chief	31	(8.5)	21	(10.0)	20	(5.2)
Government official	10	(2.8)	6	(3.0)	42	(10.9)
Religious leader	10	(2.8)	6	(3.0)	2	(0.5)
School teacher (public/religious)	13	(3.5)	8	(3.9)	29	(7.5)
Farmer	135	(37.3)	106	(50.5)	62	(16.1)
Customary law leader (adat)	9	(2.5)	5	(2.4)	6	(1.6)
Fisherman	1	(0.3)	1	(0.5)	1	(0.3)
Student	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	13	(3.4)
Other	9	(2.6)	1	(0.5)	9	(2.6)
No Response	4		179		4	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

*The questions asked were these: (1) "Before the Revolution (1945) what was your father's occupation?" (2) "After the Revolution (after 1950) what was your father's occupation?" (3) "Before you became village headman what was your work (job)?"

The high number of "No Response" in the second question can be accounted for in the fact that a great many of the fathers died or retired during this five-year period. We coded "No Response" for answers such as "dead, pensioned, or didn't work any more."

Affiliations. Outside of the military, it is generally difficult to establish organizational affiliations for the village headmen, although Army intelligence probably comes reasonably close to doing so. This is particularly true in the Outer Islands where administrative infrastructure is weaker and lacks the Javanese history of village reporting. Partial data from West Sumatra (324 out of 543 villages) show that 7 percent of the wali negaris come from political groupings (aliran politik).[16] Data from 310 of 1,159 villages in South Sulawesi show close to 38 percent with political party backgrounds.[17] And in Central Java (7,655 villages accounted for out of 8,455), some 51 percent of the lurahs are party-affiliated.[18] The low figure for West Sumatra can best be explained by the banning of the Islamic Masjumi Party in 1960; Masjumi was by far the strongest party in that region at the time of the general elections in 1955.[19]

On the surface there appears little relation between headman party affiliation and this work's primary concern with village development capabilities. With the possible exception of the pre-1965 Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), Indonesia's political parties have not in recent years been program oriented. All of them are sympathetic to development, but none has an operational plan nor the rewards and sanctions needed to enforce party discipline. However, with informal communications and ascriptive ties playing such an important role, party affiliation may be an effective means for the headman to gain assistance from the tjamat or bupati. In Chapter Four it will be shown that 52.9 percent of the tjamat sample felt that political parties helped to speed up

the work of the government apparatus and that 42.6 percent of those responding identified themselves as being sympathetic to one party or another.[20]

Beyond party affiliation, we were able to establish some interesting associations for village heads in South Sulawesi and West Sumatra. In the former, some 22 percent of our sample come from the nobility (bangsawan)--being direct descendants of royalty which retained most of its kingship rights through the Dutch period. The majority of these individuals come from Luwu (the oldest kingdom), from Gowa (the strongest and most influential kingdom), and from Bone, though some are found in areas of lesser kingdoms such as Soppeng. Although the importance of this ascriptive attribute falls off very sharply above the village level, the prestige and status of royalty in the village remains very strong, providing a high level of support for nearly all of the headman's decisions. While difficult to measure, it appears highly probable that this identification helps the headman of nobility in dealing with higher officials of like backgrounds and vice versa. Our research uncovered the fact that about 29 percent (42 out of 146) of the tjamats in the entire province come from the nobility, that roughly 30 percent (7 out of 23) of the bupatis, and that no fewer than 39 percent (35 out of 90) of the top officials in the Office of the Governor have similar origins.[21] For better or worse, it appears that where the village headman in South Sulawesi can trace their origins to the nobility, the Government's options in seeking out potential change agents in the villages are restricted; it must work through these men.

In the Minangkabau country of West Sumatra where the rights of kingship do not pertain, we discovered that almost 21 percent of the sample comes from a professional religious background (aliran agama). From available evidence it appears that this factor does not have significant implications for bureaucratic connections. But since most of these religious officials are "modernists" and appear to have ties with Mohammadijah rather than with the more traditional religious groups, their religious affiliation may be correlated positively with a greater orientation to change.[22] Another 39 percent were previously traditional clan heads (ninikmamaks or datuks). While the clan used to be synonymous with the geography of the hamlet, this has changed and clans now spread across hamlet boundaries. The clan chief is likely to be sympathetic to an Islamic political party but his influence is normally limited to adat decisions. As an adat leader, each village headman has become a part of a provincial adat organization known as the Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau (LKAAM) which was resurrected upon military initiative in 1966 and functions at every level of the government in West Sumatra. Conceivably, the LKAAM could become a vehicle for political articulation even though there is no general adat doctrine or policy to promote and there are at present no plans to politicize the organization in an effort to introduce secular considerations.[23] It is enough here to note simply that a sizable percentage of West Sumatra's village headmen spring directly from traditional adat roles and that they are unlikely to place a high value on change.

Landownership and Landuse Rights. Because agriculture, specifically increased food production, is the key target of the current development plan, and because the headmen are in a critical position to affect the rate at which new technical know-how is accepted in the villages, it is important to know to what extent they,themselves, have a direct stake in changes now being proposed. The best clue to this answer is provided in the following two tables which show headmen landholdings and landuse rights. Table III, showing data taken from the entire sample, indicates that about 75 percent of the headmen own wet ricelands (sawah) and thatanother 50 percent have plantation holdings. These figures are extremely significant for they suggest that village leadership in the person of the headman is more likely to give critical, rational consideration to changes being introduced. It also means that the potential for general village rejection of the new technology is greater if the promises of the new technology are not fulfilled. Most important, though, the data on landholdings would seem to make possible an inexpensive strategy to overcome resistance to change by the initial subsidization of inputs for the headman holdings.

Because of their complexity and importance, landholdings and land privileges in Central Java bear separate treatment. We have already mentioned the intense competition for the office of lurah which stems from the perquisites which devolve upon the successful candidate, primarily in the form of bengkok, or landuse rights. The importance of these landuse rights can be seen

TABLE III

Village Headmen Sawah and

Plantation Land Ownership

Amount in Hectares	Sawah		Plantation	
	No.	%	No.	%
None	94	(24.3)	196	(50.6)
0.1 - 0.5	108	(27.9)	64	(16.5)
0.6 - 1.0	66	(17.0)	52	(13.4)
1.1 - 1.5	24	(6.3)	8	(2.6)
1.6 - 2.0	43	(11.7)	27	(7.0)
2.1 - 3.0	15	(4.1)	9	(2.3)
3.1 - 4.0	12	(3.2)	5	(1.3)
4.1 - 5.0	6	(1.6)	11	(2.8)
5.1 -10.0	12	(3.2)	6	(1.6)
More than 10.0	5	(1.5)	7	(1.9)
No response	2		2	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

in the responses given in a survey completed in 1969 (see Table IV below). The lurah and other village officials have the right to work the bengkok land and to collect the produce of that land as long as they retain their positions. The importance of two points stands out with regard to our own interest in the attachment of village officials to the land. First, as data from two sample kabupatens show below (Table V), these land rights are spread rather widely among village officials, rendering almost all of them participant farmers. Second, the large size of the bengkok perquisite in Central Java suggests that most lurahs are very seriously into the business of farming and that their holdings are significant enough to provide clear findings after the application of new technologies. When the bengkok figures are

TABLE IV

Bupati Responses to the Question:

"What are the sources of income of the *lurah* and other village officials?"

Source of Income	Number of Responses
Harvest assessment	2
Taxes and administrative fees	7
Bengkok (landuse rights)	34
Pologoro (administrative fees)	17
Land tax fees	5
Salary	3
Subsidy or bonus	12
Bondo desa	2

Source: Based on *Survey Struktur Pemerintahan Desa*, Semarang, Governor's Office, 1969, pp. 91-96, (mimeographed). The respondents constituted 34 out of Central Java's 35 regents (*bupatis* and *walikotas*).

TABLE V

Bengkok Privileges in Two *Kabupatens* of Central Java

Kabupaten Karanganjar		Kabupaten Demak	
Village Official	Size of Bengkok in hectares	Village Official	Size of Bengkok in hectares
Lurah	6	Lurah	17
Kamituwa	3	Kamituwa	4
Tjarik	3	Tjarik	12
Kebajan	2	Kebajan	3
Djogotirto	1	Ulu2	1.5
Pamong Tani	1	---	---
Modin	1	Modin	3
Djogobojo	1	Kepentengan	3
---	---	Bekel	4

Source: Based on *Survey Struktur Pemerintahan Desa*, Semarang, Governor's Office, 1969, pp. 91-96, (mimeographed). The respondents constituted 34 out of Central Java's 35 regents (*bupatis* and *walikotas*).

combined with the tanah lungguh(village treasury lands), it becomes clearer yet that the lurahs of Central Java are in a critical position to influence village receptivity to agricultural change (see Table VI). Acknowledging that in some cases

TABLE VI

Lurah Bengkok and Village Tanah Lungguh Holdings in Central Java (in hectares)

Amount in Hectares	Lurah Bengkok Rights		Village Tanah Lungguh	
	No.	%	No.	%
None	9	(6.1)	2	(1.4)
0.1 to 0.5	1	(0.7)	5	(3.4)
0.6 to 1.0	0	(0.0)	6	(4.1)
1.1 to 1.5	2	(1.4)	6	(4.1)
1.6 to 2.0	6	(4.1)	8	(5.5)
2.1 to 3.0	9	(6.1)	12	(8.3)
3.1 to 4.0	35	(23.7)	3	(2.1)
4.1 to 5.0	23	(15.8)	6	(4.1)
5.1 to 10.0	50	(34.4)	25	(17.0)
10.1 to 20.0	12	(8.3)	38	(26.6)
20.1 to 30.0	--	--	13	(9.1)
30.1 to 40.0	--	--	11	(7.7)
40.1 to 50.0	--	--	7	(4.9)
More than 50.0	--	--	6	(4.2)
No Response	1		1	

Source: primary data from field survey work, 1970.

this land is dry land (tegalan) and that lurahs often rent out parts of their bengkok, the essential point still remains: most of Central Java's village chiefs are large landholders.[24] The important development strategy conclusion to be drawn from this finding is that rice intensification programs in this province of 22 million people might well be designed to demand major commitments to the new inputs from its village chiefs.

Education and Communications. Under the Dutch a comparatively small number of primary schools were established in the villages and it was therefore to be expected that at Independence only a very few of the village chiefs might have had an opportunity for any formal training beyond the ritualistic curriculum of the religious schools. A careful study of village government in Central Java during the mid-1950's reached the conclusion that "it is rare for him (the lurah) to have been educated beyond primary school; often he has not completed grade school."[25] But after twenty years of self-rule, this picture has changed somewhat. Through survey techniques it is almost impossible to discover how many lurahs have never attended school or graduated from the first six primary grades; graduation or its equivalent is a legally established condition for candidacy, and respondents are unwilling to admit to not having met the requirement though many probably have not done so. Of far greater interest is the fact that upwards of half of the sample indicate that they have at least completed junior high school (sekolah landjutan pertama). Table VII shows that the average level of formal education has, in all likelihood, crept up considerably in the last two decades.

In 1969 President Suharto called a meeting of dalangs (shadow puppeteers) in Djakarta to give them a briefing on the goals and content of the country's development plan. As traditional reinforcers of knowledge in Central Javanese villages through their adaptations in the classical wayang presentations, the dalangs normally serve as an effective communications medium. A second source of information in the villages, and a more

TABLE VII

Level of Education Achieved by Village Chiefs in Sample

Highest Level of Schooling Attained	Number Achieving This Level	Percent Achieving This Level
Primary school	187	(48.1)
Junior high school	129	(33.2)
Senior high school	42	(10.8)
Vocational school	24	(6.2)
Academy*	3	(0.8)
Bachelor's degree	2	(0.5)
Master's degree	0	(0.0)
No Response	2	(0.5)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

*Academy may represent either a military academy or more likely one of the many academies run or sponsored by the ministries in Djakarta. In order to include religious education and that offered during the colonial period, the respondents were asked to equate that training with the present classification of schooling.

important one, is the village chief who, through regular or semi-regular meetings with the tjamat, brings the latest news about the government's desires and demands. A third channel, and one normally relegated to either school teachers or retired government officials living in the village, is that of newspaper reading. Although there is doubtless some bias in the responses, most headmen appear to be newspaper readers and it is interesting to note the origin of the newspaper that they read.[26] Twenty-seven percent indicate that they read a national newspaper from Djakarta. Another 59 percent read a regional newspaper and a final 14 percent in the sample of 389 indicate that they never read a newspaper. If the frequency of newspaper reading is compared across

regional officials at different levels, a general picture emerges to suggest that most are reasonably well informed about new development policies emanating from Djakarta. (See Table VIII). The writer's own reading of regional newspapers provides substance for the conclusion that they are remarkably informative with regard to economic and political news at the national level. To this can be added that 85 percent (331 out of 389) of the headman sample indicate that they have a radio in their home.

Tenure of Headmen. According to customary law in Central Java, the lurah, in Koentjaraningrat's words, ". . . continues in office without re-election as long as he retains the confidence and respect of his villagers, often until his death . . ."[27] One tjamat whom the writer interviewed in Kabupaten Kudus seemed obviously distressed in reporting that 16 out of 18 lurahs under him were above 55 years in age. In another kabupaten, that of Wonogiri, some 30 (about 10 percent) of the lurahs were over 65 and two of them were tottering along in their nineties.[28] The provincial legislature in Semarang took note of this age factor and condemned it thusly: "In the age of development this condition (aged lurahs) cannot be further tolerated because these lurahs simply cannot join in the development effort."[29] Three kabupatens in Central Java have made a start in dealing with this problem by applying an age limit of 55, the same as that applied to regular government officials. But the regents in the remaining 32 kabupatens indicated that there was neither position tenure nore age limitations on village headmen incumbency in their regions.[30]

TABLE VIII

Frequency of Newspaper Reading by Regional Officials, Headmen, and University Students

Readers	Never		Less than one week		Once week		Several times/week		Everyday		No Response
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
Economic planners	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	10	(18.5)	44	(81.5)	0
Higher level officials	0	(0.0)	4	(2.5)	4	(2.5)	33	(21.0)	116	(73.9)	0
Lower level officials	2	(1.4)	4	(2.7)	5	(3.4)	52	(35.9)	82	(56.6)	1
Tjamats	0	(0.0)	18	(8.0)	14	(6.3)	79	(35.3)	113	(50.4)	2
Headmen	46	(11.8)	89	(22.9)	101	(26.3)	80	(20.6)	71	(18.3)	1
University students	0	(0.0)	25	(4.5)	45	(8.1)	243	(44.2)	238	(43.2)	3

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

In West Sumatra and South Sulawesi conditions are somewhat different, as the comparative data in Table IX will show. The wali negari of West Sumatra must be elected every four years, something which introduces the possibility of change, although indeed there is no age limit.[31] In South Sulawesi the village chief is elected every eight years and he must be under the age of 45 in order to stand for election. According to law, therefore, he must retire at a maximum of age 53, or two years before higher government officials must retire.[32] While it is true that many headmen have been in office for extended periods (about 13 percent of our entire sample ascended to headman positions 25 or more years ago), recent legislation in the two Outer Island provinces and the post-coups turmoil in Central Java account for the present low tenure mean of 8.9 years.

Only very rarely are lurahs dismissed from office at the initiative of the village citizenry. Bupatis from only two kabupatens in Central Java (Sukohardjo and Bandjarnegara) indicated that villagers had ever taken steps to remove their chief; bupatis from the remaining 33 regencies responded that to their knowledge this had never happened in their regions.[33] In those few cases when a lurah has been removed, the action probably stemmed from some major violation of adat law, and bore no relation whatsoever to the effectiveness of the lurah in his performance of routine duties.[34]

For important political reasons, the provincial and regency governments will sometimes remove certain village chiefs, replacing them with care-taker (pedjabat) headmen until such time

TABLE IX

Ages of Headmen in Sample, by Province

Age Class (in years)	West Sumatra (133)		South Sulawesi (105)		Central Java (149)		Totals (387)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Below 20	0	--	1	(1.0)	0	--	1	(0.3)
21 - 25	0	--	3	(2.9)	2	(1.3)	5	(1.3)
26 - 30	10	(7.5)	13	(12.4)	1	(0.7)	24	(6.2)
31 - 35	15	(11.3)	22	(21.0)	7	(4.7)	44	(11.4)
36 - 40	24	(18.0)	27	(25.7)	9	(6.0)	60	(15.5)
41 - 45	26	(19.5)	25	(23.8)	18	(12.1)	69	(17.8)
46 - 50	31	(23.3)	10	(9.5)	34	(22.8)	75	(19.4)
51 - 55	13	(9.8)	2	(1.9)	27	(18.2)	42	(10.8)
56 - 60	8	(6.0)	1	(1.0)	20	(13.5)	29	(7.5)
61 - 65	4	(3.0)	1	(1.0)	17	(11.4)	22	(5.7)
66 - 70	1	(0.8)	--		9	(6.0)	10	(2.6)
71 - 75	--	--	--	--	3	(2.0)	3	(0.8)
76 - 80	1	(0.8)	--	--	2	(1.3)	3	(0.8)
Over 80	--		--	--	--		--	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

as an election seems appropriate. About 12 percent of Central Java's lurahs were replaced subsequent to the attempted coups in 1965 because of their alleged involvement in communist activities. As of March 13, 1970, there were still 547 temporary lurahs--about 6.5 percent of the provincial total.[35]

Attitudes Toward Development and Role Perceptions. A series of historical factors leads to the notion that the headman's fundamental role is to preside--and in so doing to maintain the stability or peacefulness of his village. In Mataram Java this pattern derived naturally enough from conceptions of the nature of kinship. "Originating changes in the normal order (was)

regarded as unthinkable, for innovation (was) fundamentally incompatible with the view that order is an undisturbed system, a pattern fixed by tradition and custom."[36] Through their indirect rule, the Dutch seldom attempted to alter this pattern, for outside the export plantation economy they were little interested in (and possibly even less capable of) administering change in the subsistence farming sector.[37] Furthermore, the prijaji view, represented in the persons of both pre- and post-colonial pamong pradja members, held that, in Jay's words, "(T)he lurah has essentially the position of a caretaker in his village complex. He is there to relay orders from above faithfully to his villagers and to maintain the conditions of the village complex. No innovating powers or responsibilities are given to him. The lurah is to exercise his powers and prestige to make those programs accepted by the villagers."[38]

In a subsistence economy where the individual production of food for survival demands little in the way of dependency relationships, the prijaji view of the lurah's stabilizing role probably made little difference. Aside from some general understandings on water rights that were reached through the adat law and courts, there was little in the way of productivity changes that the lurah could offer. However, now that population growth has seriously restricted what has been the most important production factor in Java--land, and now that government policy is consciously attempting to change other production factors, lurah attitudes and role perceptions become extremely important.

Knowing that the headman is strategically placed in both the structure of the government and in his own village-complex, to become an important change agent is not enough. Does he, in fact, believe that change is desirable? To find the answer, we first asked our sample of tjamats to assess their headmen's interest in development and gotong-rojong (mutual-aid) projects; second, we solicited answers from the headmen themselves, responses concerning both their attitudes toward change and the kind of change in which they were most interested; and third, we required our interviewers to rate the potential of each headman as a change or development agent.

Although no pretense is made for refinement of measurement in the data which are presented below, they demonstrate the existence of greater political resources for economic and social change than the present literature on Indonesian village leadership would suggest. Responses to two questions concerning village self-help projects show clear dissatisfaction with the lack of change achieved thus far and an overwhelming belief that the number and size of village development projects can be increased. (See Tables X and XI.) That almost 73 percent of the sample indicated that they were entirely unsatisfied, or less than satisfied with community self-help efforts is all the more significant for the fact that rarely are village leaders given to making unfavorable comments about their communities. In pursuing this question to discover wherein lay their dissatisfaction, we found that the greatest number (39 percent) of those in this group were unsatisfied because of the lack of results from previously initiated

TABLE X

Headmen Satisfaction Levels with Progress on Local Mutual-Aid Development Projects

Satisfaction Levels	Number	Percent
Not yet satisfied at all	121	(31.1)
Less than satisfied	166	(42.7)
Well enough satisfied	90	(23.1)
Very satisfied	10	(2.6)
No response	2	(0.5)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970

gotong-rojong projects. Another 35 percent said that a lack of money, materials and equipment caused them the greatest difficulty.*

Despite, or perhaps because of, the dissatisfaction which they registered, upwards of 88 percent of our total sample felt that there was a great chance to increase the number and size of these projects. As shown in Table XI, these numbers, too, are surprising for the fact that lower units of government generally attempt to mask their real capacities in hopes of gaining more assistance from above and/or in an effort to hide their potential taxable wealth.

*These responses were given to the open question: "If you are not yet satisfied at all or are less than satisfied (with the progress of gotong-rojong projects in your village), please give the reasons."

TABLE XI

Headman Responses to the Question:

"In your estimation, what are the chances of increasing the total number and size of gotong-rojong projects in your village during the upcoming year?"

Variations in Chances	Responses	
	Number	Percent
No chance at all to increase gotong-rojung projects	4	(1.1)
Very small chance to increase those projects	40	(10.3)
A great possibility to increase gotong-rojong projects	264	(67.9)
A very great possibility to increase those projects	78	(20.1)
No Response	3	(0.8)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 197

A similar, but equally surprising, response which will be dealt with at greater length in the following chapter, reflects the headmen's attitudes with regard to raising additional revenue for the village treasury. Table XII indicates that there is considerable optimism about the potentia. for additional self-financing.

Of course it is all very well for the village chief to be interested in intensifying efforts at community development through gotong-rojong efforts and increased local financing, but would these efforts be directed toward economically productive ends, or would they be channeled to other ends--such as monuments, mosques or churches, or the traditional village archways?

TABLE XII

Headmen Responses to the Question:

"In your view can this village's income be increased in the next two years?"

Variations in Chances	Responses	
	Number	Percent
No chance at all to increase the income of this village	9	(2.3)
Very difficult to increase this village's income	60	(15.4)
Not too difficult to increase the income of this village	231	(59.4)
Easy to increase the income of this village	71	(18.3)
No response	18	(4.6)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

The data are very hopeful on this point (see Table XIII). Each headman was asked which projects were planned under the Government's present village development program wherein guidelines specify that the funds (about $2,670 annually) must be used for infrastructure related to production, communications, and/or marketing.[39] Next the headmen were asked what projects they would select if they were entirely free to use the $2,670 as they wished. A comparison of the answers to both questions shows them to be remarkably consistent. Given freedom of choice, the headmen have a slightly greater preference for irrigation projects over roads and bridges and for schools over markets.

TABLE XIII

Nationally Directed Village Development Priorities Compared with Headman Development Priorities*

(multiple answers permitted)

Type of Project	(1) Projects Established under National Village Development Program		(2) Headman Development Priorities	
	No.	%	No.	%
Irrigation, drainage, dams	155	(39.9)	161	(41.4)
Roads and bridges	153	(39.3)	139	(35.7)
Markets	92	(23.7)	64	(16.4)
Schools	10	(2.6)	72	(18.5)
Agriculture (general)	35	(9.0)	30	(7.7)
LIvestock Production	32	(8.2)	31	(8.0)
Rice Padi storehouse	22	(5.6)	31	(8.0)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

To try to confirm this progressive orientation on the part of the headmen, the tjamat sample was asked a similar question concerning headman development priorities. While they doubtless projected some of their own preferences into the responses, the data in Table XIV lend significant support to the thesis that the headmen are strongly supportive of meaningful types of change.

*The questions asked were these: (1) "Which village development projects were planned in the framework of the Central Government's Rp. 100,000 Village Development Program?" And (2) "If you were free to use the Rp. 100,000 as you wished. which projects would you pick?" Inasmuch as the funds for the national program were restricted to projects related to agricultural production, communications, or marketing, the ten school projects planned were in violation of government regulations.

TABLE XIV

Tjamat Responses to the Question:

"Based on your experience, what kind of development projects are of greatest interest to the village chiefs?"
(Two responses permitted.)

Type of Project	Number	Percent
Road construction or repair	172	(76.1)
Agriculture (irrigation, new rice varieties and fertilizers)	161	(71.2)
Building of schools (education)	60	(26.5)
Building of mosques or churches	31	(13.7)
Social projects (general welfare)	12	(5.3)
Health projects (clinics, etc.)	4	(1.8)
Other projects	5	(2.2)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

Equally significant were the tjamat ratings of the headmen's attitudes toward development. Having now determined that development in its narrow sense means improvement in communications (roads, bridges) and agriculture (primarily irrigation), the following responses lend important additional support to the contention that the headmen are change-oriented. (See Table XV.) It might be argued that the tjamat's relationship to the headman is a paternalistic, protective one (which it often is) thereby biasing these answers on the favorable side. In order to place a cross-check on this bias, we asked a more critical elite group to rate the village chief's capacity as a development leader. These evaluations, made by advanced university economics students, provide a more critical view of headman capabilities, but they continue to provide a positive view of unrealized leadership potential at local levels. (See Table XVI)

TABLE XV

Tjamat Responses to the Question:

"Based on your own experience, what are the village chiefs' attitudes toward economic development and the Five-Year Development Plan?"

Variations in Attitudes	Responses Number	Percent
In fact, most of them do not care at all	2	(0.9)
They are little interested in village economic development	6	(4.5)
They are moderately interested in village economic development	97	(43.7)
They are very interested in village economic development	116	(52.3)
They don't know anything about economic development	1	(0.5)
No response	4	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

TABLE XVI

Advanced University Economics Students' Evaluation of Village Headmen in Development Leadership Roles*

Variations in Evaluations	Responses Number	Percent
Village chief has no potential at all as a development leader	13	(5.1)
Has a little potential but not very much	54	(21.1)
Average potential	97	(37.9)
Good potential	79	(30.9)
Excellent potential; modern-thinking	13	(5.1)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

*This subjective rating was made after the student had concluded the interview which, on the average, lasted about two hours. This step applies only to South Sulawesi (106 village chiefs) and to Central Java (149 village chiefs) and was carried out by advanced economics students at Hasanuddin University (Makassar) and Gadjah Mada University (Jogjakarta).

With regard to their attitudes toward development, we have established with a reasonable amount of certainty that the village headmen in these three provinces are favorably disposed to the kinds of change which national leaders wish to bring about. In general, they are change-oriented and are impatient with the lack of results thus far. How serious this commitment to change is will be evaluated in the following chapter through an examination of village development records.

The Task Environment. A full description of the nature of the demands placed on the village chief and how these demands circumscribe his freedom to introduce change would require a more extended treatment than we have space to provide. However, it is important that a few of the demands and limitations on his capability be explained here. By quantifying the responses of Central Java's thirty-five regents to the question: "What factors are believed to be the main obstacles to smooth village administration?" we can begin to understand some of these demands and limitations--at least as they apply in Central Java. (See Table XVII.) It is noteworthy that current government policy is attempting to deal directly with each of the two most frequently mentioned problems. Through the placement of military village chiefs and military bupatis in areas of acute conflict, the Army has intervened directly to increase local stability and, while not intended by Djakarta, the Governor of Central Java issued his own edict stipulating that the funds from the National Village Development Program would be used for capital in village banks.[40]

TABLE XVII

Factors Inhibiting Village Administration in Central Java

(multiple responses from thirty-five regents)

Type of Inhibiting Factor	Respondents Noting Factor	
	Number	Percent
Lack of capital, village income too small	12	(34.3)
Organizational conflicts: party, adat, religious	14	(40.0)
Lack of technically skilled manpower	9	(25.7)
Low salaries/benefits for officials	7	(20.0)
Advanced age of village officials	7	(20.0)
People's lack of loyalty to the Government	6	(17.1)
No unified village law; conflicts over statutory and adat law	7	(20.0)
Lack of education for village officials	4	(11.4)
Lack of leadership, ability, or willingness to take responsibility by village officials	5	(14.3)
Other	5	(14.3)

Source: Survey Struktur Pemerintahan Desa, Governor's Office, Semarang, 1969, pp. 45-51.

Some of the bupati responses are both fascinating and important for the type of problems they identify. From Kabupaten Kebumen came the response that "there are too many orders coming from different sides." From Kotamadya Tegal we learn that "too often there has been direct meddling by the military, forcing people to do things." In Tjilatjap we find that villagers often do not want to cooperate in local mutual-aid projects. And in Sukohardjo there is often a lack of cooperation between the village headman and his staff, most of whom are also elected.[41]

Summary and Conclusions

In an excellent report on local development prospects in West Sumatra, Esmara and Muchtar stress that the rate of growth in the regency of Padang Pariaman would be much greater if full support were given to the village headmen (*wali negaris*).[42] Consistent with our own view, this conclusion represents an indirect, yet forceful, plea for the recognition of village leadership as a resource which national policy-makers can use to much greater advantage in bringing about meaningful rural change. In the absence of comparative data from earlier periods when the village chief's primary function was to maintain or restore order, ever seeking to insure that the micro- would mirror his perception of the macrocosmos, we cannot conclusively show a marked change in his role perception. Yet our findings suggest that the headmen of the three provinces studied are more socially mobile, better educated, and more likely to be linked to structures originating with an urban elite. Despite concern for their advanced age, they are probably younger than ever before, better informed via newspaper and radio, and (in Central Java) comparatively richer in terms of their landuse rights. Finally, the data on their attitudes toward change show them to be keenly sympathetic to the improvement of communications, agricultural infrastructure, and education. Given these positive signs, it now remains to be seen if they are being translated into changes in village productivity.

FOOTNOTES

1. The best recent work on this is a dissertation completed in 1971 by Gary Hansen, University of California, Berkeley (Department of Political Science).

2. In Central Java, the village-complex headman is called a lurah; in West Sumatra he is a wali negari; and in South Sulawesi he is a kepala desa. The terms are synonymous.

3. A more complete description of West Sumatran village structure is provided in "Peraturan Tentang Pokok-Pokok Pemerintahan Nagari Dalam Daerah Propinsi Sumatra Barat," Governor's Office, March 18, 1968. See also Harsja Bachtiar, "Negeri Taram: A Minangkabau Village Community," in Villages in Indonesia, Koentjaraningrat, ed., Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967, pp. 349-380.

4. See Hendrik T. Chabot, "Bontoramba: A Village of Goa, South Sulawesi," in Villages in Indonesia, Koentjaraningrat, ed., Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967, pp. 189-209.

5. Interview with Chief of the Village Division, General Government Bureau, Office of the Governor, Makassar, December 30, 1969.

6. Laporan Hasil Survey Struktur Pemerintahan Desa, Report of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat, Seksi A, Semarang, April 28-May 3, 1969, p. 16.

7. See Frank L. Cooley, "Village Government in the Central Moluccas," Indonesia, No. 2 (April, 1969), pp. 139-163.

8. See Paragraph 36 of the Revised Village Laws, 1965.

9. STB. 1907, No. 212. This law is discussed in S. Poerwopranoto, Pembimbing Pamong (Pegawai) Desa, Semarang: Astanabuku Abede, 1952, pp. 10-14.

10. Laporan Hasil Survey Struktur Pemerintahan Desa Seksi A DPRD-GR Propinsi Djawa Tengah, April 28-May 3, 1969, p. 5. The translation is that of the writer.

    Tanah bengkok, although the definition tends to vary somewhat across villages, is generally defined as village land offered to village officials for their private use during their tenure in office. Often, a portion of this land is retained by the official when he retires from office. Tanah lungguh suffers wider variations in its definition, but normally refers to public lands which are worked or rented

out on behalf of the village government. Both of these forms of land usage have their roots deep in the patrimonial tradition of rural Central Java.

11. Interview with a leader in the Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement who served as a lurah at one time, Semarang, March 1, 1970.

12. Laporan Hasil . . . , op. cit., p. 6.

13. Selosoemardjan's description of a village in Banjumas Regency, Central Java, is apt. "All lurahs without exception are direct descendants of the former lurahs or are at least very closely akin to their predecessors. Any innovation that would interfere with the interests of the lurah and his ruling family would risk a great chance of failure, and if successfully accepted would meet unnecessary difficulties in its actual implementation." See The Dynamics of Community Development in Rural Central and West Java, Ithaca: Monograph Series, Cornell University Press, 1963, p. 21.

14. A provincial breakdown of present village headmen whose fathers served as headmen shows Central Java with 36.7 percent, South Sulawesi with 36.2 percent, and West Sumatra with a very low 9.7 percent.

15. Data which were obtained from the Governors' office in each of the three provinces vary slightly from this figure, but may not be current. In West Sumatra the percentage of headmen with professional military backgrounds was given as 7.4 percent, in South Sulawesi 9.6 percent, and in Central Java 2.4 percent.

16. Taken from Daftar Keadaar WALI NEGARI Hasil Pemilihan Umum dalam Daerah Propinsi Sumatera Barat, Governor's Office, Padang, November, 1969.

17. Daftar Banjaknja Kepala Desa dalam Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan jang Mendjadi Anggota Partai Politik, Organisasi Massa dan Karyawan, Governor's Office, Makassar, January 5, 1970.

18. From Daftar Adanja Kepala Desa, Care-taker Desa, Pedjabat Sementara Kepala Desa jang Masuk ORPOL/ORMAS dan lain2 dalam Wilajah Propinsi Djawa-Tengah, Governor's Office, Semarang, March 13, 1970.

19. Many former Masjumi members have turned to Mohammadijah organizations and if they are included in aliran politik, the West Sumatra percentage would rise to 22.

20. It remains unclear whether or not any inroads are being made into separating the pamong pradja from partisan political activities. To see if there were generational differences

with respect to this issue, the author interviewed 31 third-year students in Central Java's civil service academy (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri). Three from the sample responded to questions concerning party sympathy by saying that "As government officials we are not party people but stand above all political streams." But the fact that 60 percent of the sample expressed a clear preference for one particular party, the PNI, indicates that partisan politics and state administration are intertwined--even among the newer generation of civil servants.

21. These data derive from a careful review of personnel rosters and the assistance of the Chief of the Provincial Personnel Bureau in the Office of the Governor, Makassar.

22. Data presented in the following chapter will show that among the various political and "mass organization" groupings at the village level in West Sumatra, Mohammadijah is by far the most active in connection with social, health, and educational activities.

23. Based on interviews with an LKAAM leader in Padang, November 18 and 22, 1969.

24. The bengkok provision is found primarily in Java. Our interviews in West Sumatra and South Sulawesi did not uncover such a provision for village chiefs.

The size and importance of the bengkok landrights must be seen in context to be appreciated. The estimated mean and modal landholdings of the individual village farmer in 1817 and 1940 were slightly under one hectare. Statistics published in 1968 show each Central Java farm family owning the following amounts of land:

Amount in Hectares	Percent of Landowners Holding Amount
0.25	+30.0
0.5	52.2
1.0	12.8
2 to 5	4.4
More than 5	0.3

Most lurahs, therefore, are easily in the top five percent in the amount of land they control. Sources: Stamford Raffles, The History of Java, London: John Murray, 2 vols., 1830, p. 97; J. H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies, Haarlem: H. D. Tjeenk Willink, 1953, pp. 52-143; and Modernisasi Desa: Gagasan Gubernur Kepala Daerah Propinsi Djawa-Tengah, Semarang: Governer's Office, July 2, 1968, p. 46.

25. See Robert Jay, op. cit., p. 347.

26. The bias can be explained in the fact that some headmen doubtless feel shamed in reporting that they cannot or do not read the press.

27. See Tjelepar: "A Village in South Central Java," in Koentjaraningrat, ed., op. cit., (1967), p. 272.

28. Interview with the Bupati of Wonogiri, March 3, 1970.

29. Laporan Hasil . . ., op. cit., p. 16.

30. Survey Struktur Pemerintahan Desa, op. cit.,pp. 36-37.

31. Peraturan Tentang Pokok-Pokok Pemerintahan Nagari Dalam Daerah Propinsi Sumatera Barat, op. cit., p. 2.

32. Interview with the Chief of the Village Division, General Government Bureau, Office of the Governor, Makassar, December 30, 1970.

33. Survey Struktur Pemerintahan Desa, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

34. Even then, there is an obdurate reluctance to force a lurah out of office as indicated by a recent incident in Kabupaten Semarang. Upon the death of the lurah in one village, the wife of the deceased became a candidate to succeed her husband and was elected. Subsequently she began consorting with several different men, including some other lurahs in nearby villages. While most of the villagers were extremely disturbed by this behavior, they could not bring themselves to threaten her position, finally leaving it to the Governor's Office to replace her.

35. Source: Daftar adanja Kepala Desa/Coretaker Kepala Desa/ Pedjabat Sementara Kepala Desa jang masuk ORPOL/ORMAS dan lain2 dalam Wilajah Propinsi Djawa-Tengah, op. cit., 1970.

36. Soemarsaid Moertono, op. cit., p. 38

37. See B. J. Haga, "Influence of the Western Administration on the Native Community in the Outer provinces," in B. Schrieke, ed., op. cit., 1929, pp. 171-204

38. Robert Jay, op. cit., p. 355.

39. Based on the Decision of the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Finance, No. 45, March 31, 1969.

40. Governor's letter to President Suharto, No. DSA.G.15/9/3, Perihal: Pemanfaatan Bantuan Pemerintah berupa Subsidi Rp. 100,000 Kepada Desa, April 9, 1969.

41. Survey Struktur Pemerintahan Desa, op. cit., pp. 45-51.

42. See Hendra Esmara and Raisuddin Muchtar, Kebidjaksanaan Pembangunan Daerah Kabupaten Padang Pariaman, (mimeographed), Padang: Economic Research Institute, Faculty of Economics, Andalas University, p. 47.

CHAPTER III

VILLAGE PRIORITIES, POTENTIAL FOR AUTONOMOUS DEVELOPMENT, AND EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE

The objective in this chapter is to evaluate potential indicators of village change. First, we have expressly eschewed the prijaji view that "we know what is best for the villagers" by giving 389 village chiefs the opportunity to delineate the kinds of change which they believe are important to their villages. We have done this with the specific purpose of attempting to measure the congruence of village development priorities with those established by the national government. The objective in this endeavor can be simply stated: the higher the level of congruence, the fewer the resources that will be needed from the national government to stimulate change. The better village priorities are understood, the more realistic and effective national economic planning will be. Economic planners should, though they have seldom done so, do their planning on the basis of informed projections as to feasibility of implementation. At the very least, such projections will help to clarify the range of investments necessary to overcome a lack of sympathy for certain types of change.

Second, following the first step of mapping value congruence, there is a need to know actual production capabilities of

village level governments. Beyond stated interests, what changes have the villages actually brought about and through the use of which production factors? This information is important because it again helps to identify those areas where marginal assistance is likely to bring the highest return. To find the answer to this question we have sought to develop approximate indicators of village productivity in the three provinces under review.

Finally, we have attempted to develop a general record of the effectiveness of various central and provincial government organizations which are presently functioning at the village level. The rating of their respective capacities helps to clarify the reforms and improvements needed and/or desired by the villagers. At this time there is only hazy knowledge about the effectiveness of these organizations, and the need for some careful evaluation is obvious.

The Tradition of Self-Development through Gotong-Rojong. Gotong-rojong, the system of community mutual help, has a venerable institutional history in Java and it is through this institution that public community productivity is most easily expressed. An understanding of this tradition explains much about the responsibilities of the villager to his community and ultimately about what the community is likely to do for itself.

Soemarsaid Moertono provides a useful description of traditional gotong-rojong practices as they came to be institutionalized in the Later Mataram period. The bulk of the burden fell upon the kuli kentjeng, "a full-fledged member of the desa

community who received his traditional share of the communal lands of the desa."

> . . . (C)ore villagers must pay taxes, work in the field of the village chief or other notables or accompany them in their retinue (pantjen service); they also must maintain irrigation ditches, appear on gugur-gunung, stand guard duty (djaga) at night and, formerly, they had to serve in the armies of the lord. The next three categories of villagers have decreasing shares of the gawe desa (duties) so that the last group for instance is only required to appear when all members of the village, except children and the aged, are called out to do the annual cleaning of the cemetery or to help overcome a serious mishap affecting the whole village. This is what is indicated by the word gugur-gunung or kerigan. Outside the desa, in state service, gugur-gunung was a general call to the whole population to come out in times of natural calamities or in case of war but also to do special, extraordinary work like the building of a palace, and no doubt, in former times, the building of temples.[1]

Despite the imposition of additional demands and the formalization of pantjen services during the era of the Dutch Culture System (1830-1870), gotong-rojong communal services persisted; in Day's words, they consumed "a vast but indeterminate amount of labor in the building and maintenance of roads, bridges and enclosures in and about the villages, in watch and patrol duty, and in personal service for village officials.[2]

In post-colonial Java, it is likely (although it cannot yet be proved) that with the withdrawal of colonial demands, new opportunities were afforded community mutual-help activities. Statutory financial demands from above, although not significantly changed, were much less aggressively administered, village autonomy was strengthened, and the tradition of services and payments to higher Indonesian officials was weakened. This latter practice had rested not only on the settled notion of pantjen

duties deriving from the earlier days of Mataram kingship, but had been indirectly supported by the Dutch throughout the colonial period.[3] Moreover, the tradition of pologoro (payments for services performed by village officials) was weakened somewhat with the coming of Independence. One Indonesian, admittedly writing more from an ideological position than from an empirical one, argued shortly after Independence that "since our country's proclamation of freedom, pologoro has generally come to have no meaning in practice. Most of the people believe that pologoro does not fit with the times."[4] Increasingly needful of local support under less authoritarian circumstances, the village headmen, he reasoned, would be fearful of losing that support were they to insist on collecting pologoro payments. Subsequent evidence and our own findings indicate that this view is weak in its understanding of adat and that the practice is widely sustained today, albeit on a lesser scale.[5] The lessening of these higher level demands for resources makes it possible for village governments to devote more energy to local development projects, but whether this opportunity has in fact been taken advantage of we cannot tell for we lack the data necessary to draw comparisons over time.[6]

We do, however, have some specific evidence on the importance of gotong-rojong activities as a source of funding for development projects in Central Javanese villages. One survey, which included a random sample of 420 village headmen, discovered that such mutual-help inputs constitute by far and away the most important development input (see Table 1). If we take into consideration the fact that most of the private contributions are

TABLE I

Responses of 420 Lurahs in Central Java
to the Question:

"What is the primary source of village financing for development purposes?"

Source of Primary Village Funding	Percent of Lurahs Identifying Source
Gotong-rojong	55
Government subsidies	12
Village treasury	17
Private contributions	12
Other	4

Source: This survey was carried out by Hartowo, and the results are published in his Suatu Inventariasasi Pelaksanaan Pembangunan di Desa, Semarang: Bureau of Research, Faculty of Economics, Diponegoro University, September, 1969, p.9

directed to so-called "social prestige projects" such as mosques, archways, guard posts, etc., the relative importance of gotong-rojong efforts increases.

Further evidence presented below will firmly establish the importance of mutual-help activities in connection with village development for West Sumatra and South Sulawesi as well, but the final preliminary question to be handled here is one raised by Mohammad Hatta and Selosoemardjan. As a traditional form of social cooperation, how far can this institution be relied upon to generate cooperation for economic change? With its origins rooted in the planting, weeding and harvesting of crops (primarily rice), and therefore on matters of fundamental economic concern, it would seem that the more meaningful question to ask is this one: based on the evidence, how far is the institution

of gotong-rojong serving purposes that are directly related to the long-run economic welfare of each village? The following section speaks directly to this point.

Development Priorities

In the last chapter an interest in headman attitudes and role perceptions led us to focus directly upon change priorities as they listed them. Here we are concerned to know whether or not the broader village population is sympathetic to the same kind of priority listing and whether some form of institutionalized mutual-aid system is capable of serving their goals as they outline them. The following two tables begin to answer both of these questions. The data show rather forcefully that the prime development interests lie in those two kinds of projects which are most fundamentally related to major long-range change: irrigation and communications. Following these there is a sharp drop-off to what we would call social overhead types of projects--education and religion. Both strongly reflect social status orientations. Having a newer or larger mosque or school is far more important than what is taught in the present ones. Yet, the interest in schools and education is much more than ritualistic. In all three provinces, but particularly in West Sumatra, education is seen as a means to vertical mobility and high value is placed on its instrumental character. In a general comparison of the headman's priorities with those of his village, the headman is less interested in mosques/churches and in health projects than are his villagers; and he is more interested in roads, markets,

TABLE II(a)

Headmen Responses to the Question:

"From the list presented below, which development projects are of greatest interest to the people of your village" (Three responses permitted)

Type of Development Project	Number and percent listing this Type as being of Greatest Interest to people	
	No.	%
Irrigation, dams, drainage system	274	73.7
Road and Bridge repair	248	66.1
Village schools	211	56.3
Mosques and churches	142	37.9
Health (clinics, pharmacies, etc.)	56	14.9
Rice warehouses	49	13.1
Rice Intensification (BIMAS)	46	12.3
Village market	33	8.8
Small-holder plantation rehabilitation	21	5.6
Purchase of rice hullers	19	5.1
Confederated village market	6	1.6
Social projects (orphanage, etc.)	6	1.6
Other	25	6.7
No Response	14	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

and rice intensification programs. The differences, however, are not large and do not suggest potential serious conflict over the use of village funds.

Next, our data show that there is indeed a very high degree of "fit" between these development priorities and the application of gotong-rojong methods to achieve economically rewarding ends. We again asked our sample about popular interest in various kinds of mutual-help projects and found that irrigation, roads/bridges, and schools dominated the responses. (See Table II(b)).

TABLE II(b)

Headmen Responses to the Question:

"What kind of gotong-rojong project most attracts the sympathy and attention of the people in your village?" (Two responses permitted)

Type of Gotong-Rojong Project	Number Listing this Type of Project as being of Greatest Interest to People	
	No.	%
Roads and bridges	245	(63.0)
Irrigation, dams, drainage systems	224	(57.6)
Schools	126	(32.4)
Mosques or churches	82	(21.1)
Agriculture (in general)	18	(4.7)
Markets	14	(3.6)
Health (clinics, etc.)	5	(1.3)
Livestock or animal husbandry	4	(1.1)
Rice warehouse	2	(0.6
Small-holder plantation rehabilitation	2	(0.6)
Village Meeting Hall	2	(0.6)
Office for village headman	1	(0.3)
Other	19	(5.0)
No Response	5	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

Comparing the two tables (Table IIa and IIb), the priority fit is perfect through the first four types of endeavors, tentatively confirming the hypothesis that village institutions can easily accommodate nationally promoted development priorities. Gotong-rojong is obviously weak in serving health needs, but clinics do not necessarily demand special facilities and hospitals are irrelevant to the village setting for they could not be staffed with adequate medical personnel at this time.

Since skepticism is duly warranted with regard to such attitudinal survey data, we carried the investigation a further step

by developing a series of data on the number and type of gotong-rojong projects carried out by each village within the sample in the calendar year 1969. Information concerning the largest mutual help project undertaken during that year was also recorded. The resulting data, by province, in Table III, indicates a clear policy need to provide either greater flexibility in national programs or the granting of additional decision-making autonomy to regional offices of the Government.

TABLE III

The Number, Type and Largest Gotong-Rojong Projects Carried Out in 1969 in Sample Villages in West Sumatra, South Sulawesi and Central Java

Type of Project	West Sumatra, 134 Villages Projects		South Sulawesi, 107 Villages Projects		Central Java, 80 Villages Projects	
	Number	Largest	Number	Largest	Number	Largest
Roads	73	24	68	39	75	17
Bridges	27	4	38	3	70	16
Irrigation(incl.dams)	66	9	43	14	94	25
Schools	106	47	82	20	142	17
Mosques	103	26	70	18	43	6
Islamic Training Centers	33	3	10	--	29	3
Markets	14	1	23	1	--	--
Village Meeting Hall	5	1	25	3	7	2
Rice Warehouse	--	--	1	--	7	--
Churches	--	--	11	--	--	--
Maternal/child health clinics	15	--	5	--	1	--
Public wells	3	--	6	--	65	1
Housing	1	--	6	--	2	--
Planting rehab.	4	--	5	--	5	--
Police posts	2	--	1	--	55	--
Pharmacy	1	--	7	--	--	--
Athletic field	--	--	4	--	1	--
Sawah rehabilitation	9	--	1	--	4	--
Islamic schools	17	1	--	--	1	--
Pool/feeder streams	24	2	--	--	42	--
Village Gov't Office	20	--	1	--	--	--
Other	6	--	4	--	43	1

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

The data above reflect regional differences that might well have been anticipated. Mosques and Islamic religious training centers stand out in strongly Islamic West Sumatra; so do school projects, indicating high motivation for education.[7] In Central Java, comparatively high response levels cluster around infrastructure projects in agriculture: irrigation, wells, dams, pools,

and feeder streams. Also in Central Java a great many police or guard posts (pos pendjagaan) were built in 1969 through gotong-rojong efforts. One suspects that many of these may have been inspired by the Armed Forces, but post-1965 turmoil and a lengthy cultural tradition for such security measures may rank equally high in their ability to explain this behavior. South Sulawesi follows much the same pattern as West Sumatra with strong emphasis being given to schools, religious institutions, and roads. Although one important difference is observable in the church projects of South Sulawesi, both this province and West Sumatra share an obvious need for village infrastructure that does not appear as strong in Central Java. Village markets, meeting halls, government offices, and maternal/child health clinics are in considerably greater demand outside Java. Finally, one very simple finding should be noted in order to emphasize the heterogeneity of provincial priorities. The largest project in West Sumatra was most often a school; that in South Sulawesi most often a road; and that in Central Java most often an irrigation project.

Productivity Measures. There is wide disparity among villages with regard to inputs for community self-help projects. Some have a very active tradition where inputs can be measured in the tens of thousands of man-days per year while others show inputs which can easily be measured in hundreds. Some villages concentrate almost exclusively on road and irrigation projects while others are building only mosques and religious training centers. Moreover, these differences can be found not only across regions but even across adjacent villages.[8] This situation has the dual

disadvantage of, first, rendering the anthropologist's single-village analysis irrelevant for national policy considerations. Second, it jeopardizes the validity of broader survey research in that general findings cannot be applied to specific cases. A national program which depends upon average manpower inputs from a great number of villages may result in wasted resources in as many as fifty percent of these villages, villages which are not able to complement government subsidies with sufficient mobilized manpower to carry out the intended projects.

Given these reservations, we have nonetheless proceeded to calculate the inputs for 80 Central Javanese villages for the 12 months of 1969. If the calculations do not identify the capacities of individual villages, they do serve two other important purposes. First, they show the general order of magnitude of resource inputs in one broad geographical area, a finding which can be used to plan overall governmental subsidies to the provinces. And second, they provide insight into the amount of resources which villages are committing to different types of projects. Thus the present capability of 80 villages for building roads, bridges, irrigation channels, schools, etc. can be established. While measures such as these cannot show potential output rates given subsidies in the form of money, equipment, facilities, technical advice, etc., they do provide a baseline against which to measure the impact of these inputs at a later date. The Government of Indonesia's current Village Development Program is based on the assumption that subsidies will indeed encourage greater village manpower inputs. If this is the case, then it

should be reflected in per capita inputs over time. In short, it should indirectly provide a useful index of return on investment.

Table IV gives the approximate total inputs by the 80 villages for each of several different kinds of projects. Since manpower inputs constitute by far and away the greatest contribution, the totals are presented in man-days.[9] By taking the total population of the 80 villages (380,677) and the total man-days contributed during 1969 (5,288,165), the annual man-day per capita

TABLE IV

Gotong-rojong Inputs by Project in 80 Central Javanese Villages for the Calendar Year 1969 (Presented in Man-Days of Labor)

Type of Gotong-Rojong Project	Man-Days during 1969	Number of Villages
Irrigation (incl.dams,drainage, ponds,etc.)	1,142,937	57
Schools	1,127,092	48
Roads	1,037,994	56
Bridges	968,767	37
Mosques (incl.religious training centers)	628,060	38
Village Meeting Halls	249,485	5
Rice storage warehouses	37,335	5
Police posts	7,305	8
Wells	6,695	3
Markets	------	--
Other projects	122,495	21

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

input was computed to be about 14 days. Whether or not carefully directed government subsidies could raise this figure to 15, 20, or 25 days is still problematical. But the data presented in Table V concerning present weaknesses in gotong-rojong projects

suggests that significant increases are possible: headmen have identified the two outstanding weaknesses as being a shortage of funding and a lack of technical expertise.

Contributors to Village Productivity. We have established that the institution of gotong-rojong serves as the vehicle for most development projects undertaken at the village level and that core village landowners normally assume most of the burden. Since both the nature of the projects and the burden of their implementation are matters ultimately decided upon in the elected village councils, it seemed important to try to establish an average figure for the number of man days per year that is expected to be contributed. The mean figure given by village headmen was 36 days per year, or about 3 days per month--a figure at considerable variance with that just computed above. The discrepancy probably arises from the fact that most projects are incidental in nature; for the most part they represent responses to calamities or pressing needs, or they constitute responses to the availability of subsidies and technical advice from above. In short, although there are expectations of regularity in villager contributions, these expectations are rarely fulfilled. A tjamat in Kudus (Central Java) indicated that "gotong rojong is used only for incidental projects; there is no specified contribution and no planned sequence to the work.[10] In West Sumatra, most of the activity follows the harvest season when a whole village may give one or two weeks to a single large project such as a road or a

dock.[11] And tjamats in South Sulawesi reported that little work of this type is initiated without a subsidy from the kabupaten.[12]

The impressions given here are further confirmed by our headman sample in response to a question on the failings or weaknesses in present gotong-rojong efforts, factors which are outlined in the following table:

TABLE V

Village Headmen Responses to the Question:

"In your view, where are the weaknesses or shortages in gotong-rojong projects at this time?"

(Two answers permitted)

Lack of Cooperation from the People	Lack of Funds	Lack of Technical Advice	Lack of Manpower, Especially Young People	Other
18 (4.5%)	340 (87.4%)	225 (57.8%)	49 (12.6%)	62 (15.9%)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

While a distribution such as that above might easily have been anticipated, the responses still are significant for indicating that the return on marginal investments by higher levels of government could easily reach four to five times the amount of the subsidy.[13] Important, too, is the obvious willingness to recognize the need for outside technical assistance, a fact which indicates high receptivity to specific kinds of intervention from above. In our analysis of the performance capabilities of various governmental agencies, it will be clear that most of this technical

advice is needed for the construction of roads, bridges, and irrigation projects.

Concerning the contributions of non-governmental groups and various occupational groups, our findings are at best suggestive and indicate a clear need for a better understanding of the values and activities of different Islamic religious organizations. We asked the headman sample to identify those non-governmental organizations which were giving greatest assistance to the people at this time and discovered that, as a single group, Mohammadijah was most frequently mentioned, particularly so in the provinces of West Sumatra and South Sulawesi. Islamic political parties (NU, PSII, PERTI, and PMI) were noted in almost as many combined cases as was Mohammadijah. To clarify our understanding even further, an occupational breakdown was attempted to distinguish the types of individuals who were giving the greatest stimulus to change in the villages. The data show some interesting regional differences in the importance of adat in West Sumatra, the military in South Sulawesi, and the ordinary farmer in Central Java. (See Table VI) Looking at the provinces individually, the data suggest that attempts to induce change in West Sumatra might well be channeled through the adat confederation (Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau), through a secularly oriented Islamic organization called Badan Kontak Perdjuangan Umat Islam which is led by religious officials (ulamas), and through youth groups. The comparatively high rating given the military in South Sulawesi tends to confirm the view of that province's most recent military commander that his troops have been well integrated into village life, a

TABLE VI

Headmen Responses to the Question:

"From the list provided below, which kind of individuals most frequently encourage local development efforts?"

(Responses shown by province; two responses per headman permitted)

Identification/ Affiliation	West Sumatra		South Sulawesi		Central Java		Totals
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
Military or police	22	(16.8)	48	(46.6)	24	(17.0)	94
Businessmen (trade/ industry)	11	(8.4)	12	(11.7)	10	(7.0)	33
Farmers	48	(36.6)	52	(50.5)	126	(88.9)	226
Teachers	1	(0.8)	24	(23.3)	21	(14.8)	46
Religious officials	36	(27.5)	22	(21.4)	19	(13.4)	77
Youth groups	34	(26.0)	8	(7.8)	26	(18.3)	68
Political party leaders	4	(3.1)	17	(16.5)	23	(16.2)	44
Ninikmamaks (Adat heads in West Sumatra)	80	(61.1)	--		--		80
Civil Service Pensioners	1	(0.8)	--		2	(1.4)	3
Mohammadijah leaders*	14	(16.9)	8	(7.8)	7	(4.9)	
Military pensioners	4	(3.1)	3	(2.9)	4	(2.8)	11
Other	1	(0.8)	6	(5.8)	13	(9.2)	20
No Response	3	-	4	-	7	-	14

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

great share of them having become small landholders.[14] Other than the farmers themselves, no one group stands out in Central Java as being more seriously committed to development than the others.

*The mass organization Mohammadijah was specifically included among the list of choices in order to determine if a reputedly modernist-leaning element of Islam was in fact modernist in its activities. Aside from a hint of such progressivism in West Sumatra where Mohammadijah is active in health and education projects the survey results give a picture that is not particularly positive.

Certainly worthy of note, however, is the fact that political party leaders do not appear to stand above other groups such as the military, teachers, religious officials and youth groups--a finding which tends to confirm a standard Army view that political parties are not modernizing forces but represent only the traditional streams of society.[15]

If the data just presented are a reasonably accurate reflection of those types of individuals or non-governmental groups which comprise the forces for change in the villages, a cross-check on their influence with the headmen indicates that they are not nearly as effective as they might be. Since the tjamats supervise village governmental activities for the government and are in a comparatively independent position to make judgments, they were asked to assess the influence of several key groups upon the village chief. The only case in which the leading "modernizers" coincide with those having the greatest influence is that of West Sumatra's adat leaders and even this correlation is less than reassuring. As the data in Table VII show, religious and political party leaders clearly out-distance others in terms of their influence with the village headman. In terms of national development policy, this finding identifies what is probably the major problem faced by the Government of Indonesia: the need to develop a workable strategy to bring Islam and its party organizations into the world of change. Having gained neither access to important governmental positions nor, more importantly, to advanced secular education, Islam will continue to act as a change-resistant force until such time as it is co-opted.

TABLE VII

Tjamat Responses to the Question:

"Based on your experience, who in the villages has the greatest influence over the decisions and thoughts of the village chief in your subdistrict?"

(Two answers permitted)

Influencing Personnel	Number	Percent
Religious leaders	116	(55.5)
Political party leaders	87	(41.7)
Farmer landowners	66	(31.6)
Ninikmamaks*	63	(30.1)
School teachers	20	(9.6)
Former village chiefs	17	(8.1)
Military officials	11	(5.3)
Businessmen	7	(3.3)
Retired civil servants	2	(1.0)
Retired military officers.	0	--

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970. "Other" answers totaled 17, as did "no response".

Government Agency Performance Levels

One of the most dreaded words in the Indonesian national bureaucracy is that of rasionalisasi. The intent of "rationalization," as it was applied to a few state enterprises in 1967 and 1968, was simply to improve the efficiency of their operations and to free them from government subsidization. To do this it was necessary to discharge a number of superfluous employees, a task carried out in most striking fashion by the national airline,

*A ninikmamak or datuk is the head of a koum (clan) in West Sumatra. His role is almost entirely limited to adat (customary) law activities, but the strength of the adat law renders his role an important one in civil matters.

Garuda. The term rasionalisasi is now firmly entrenched in the vocabularies of Indonesian public officials, carrying a connotation akin to the plague.

Indeed there is genuine concern at high levels about the number of salaried civil servants, although if taken on a per capita basis the number is comparatively low. The influx at the time of Independence, the entrance of political parties into the bureaucracy and their successful attempts to establish cliques, and former President Sukarno's strategy of creating political balance through the establishment of more than 100 ministries at the national level--all of these factors contributed to an excess of employees throughout the governmental system. To this can be added a final and potentially more explosive contributing factor: university students began to be graduated in increasing numbers, most of them having 19th century European educations and few marketable skills beyond those needed for general government service.

In terms of aspirations, including obvious needs that range from education to health to agriculture nearly all government offices are seriously understaffed--acutely so if the issue of skilled technicians is raised. Aspirations aside, however, current personnel costs make up between 60 and 70 percent of Indonesia's routine budget and a considerable portion of its development budget; lesser amounts are available for equipment, the subsidization of agricultural inputs, the purchase of books for schools, etc. This is the case at the national level. But if one looks at the provincial level, the percentage accorded civil servant personnel is even more skewed. Central Java's 1968 budget

showed 86.2 percent being directed to employees, 4.4 percent for purchases, and 9.4 percent for capital development projects.[16]

The point to which we have been leading can be simply stated: goals and funding are seriously out of line. Most officials working at the province level draw enough money for their pauperish salaries, but other than that do not have working funds to carry out more than a few projects. In the words of one bupati, "The Central Government services are strapped; everyone comes to me for help when they need it."[17] In those of another, "Aside from Public Works, Agriculture, and Information which actually provide needed services for the kabupaten, the rest could be disbanded without loss. Many of their officials just draw their salaries and do not work at all."[18] Many agencies are indeed functionless at the subdistrict and village level. Even the pamong pradja, the core of the civil service which made regularly scheduled rounds (called tournée) during the Dutch period, appears to have withdrawn significantly from this minimal function. Three reasons appear to explain this condition: there is little money for such trips, tributes once given them as a matter of course are now suspect, and the pamong pradja members often have no funds to distribute.

Perhaps no more typical an example of these conditions can be drawn than one from the South Sulawesi office for Village Community Development (Pembangunan Masjarakat Desa), a national program directed by the Ministry of Home Affairs.[19] PMD has 289 officials in South Sulawesi to serve 1,158 villages; it owns no vehicles, making village visitations somewhat of a rarity. Its main function is supposed to be the coordination of village development programs, but this function has been taken over almost exclusively

by the bupatis and tjamats, who often view PMD activities as being little more than interference in their own programs. Its attempt to support 289 employees and a community development program on an annual budget of $7,300 in an area of six million people renders superfluous any analysis of the PMD's impact. In short, the Village Community Development program in South Sulawesi is understaffed, has little talent or imagination among its ranks, faces indeterminate communications problems, is incapable of economic planning, experiences minimal and uncertain levels of funding, and is unintentionally competing with key line officials (bupatis) for very scarce resources. This illustration is presented less to criticize the concept of a community development program than to make clear the type of bind that most agencies face in program implementation at lower levels of government.

Having presented these selected qualitative judgments concerning performance levels in the village, the analysis now turns to a broader assessment made by the headmen of the three provinces under study. Performance ratings were assembled for those agencies or programs which are (1) working at the village level and (2) which are directed toward change in an effort to better the general welfare of the villagers. As change-brokers, the departments of religion, information, justice, etc. have only incidental impact and for this reason were omitted even though their activities may reach the local level.

This kind of survey places the village chief in a conflict situation. His desire to respond forthrightly is tempered by an unwillingness to bite the hand of a present provider or that of

a future provider. Sometimes this unwillingness to criticize or to utter an objective evaluation on a bumbling, wasteful program may be less a strategic or calculated response than traditional role playing--behaving as one is meant to behave. In Robert Jay's words:

> Criticism is limited to questioning whether the details of programs and policy from above are locally applicable, and such criticism is not fed back up the chain of command . . . . Little or no explicit expression of criticism is permitted by the strongly hierarchical relations that exist between local officials and their organizational superiors.[20]

Thus the evaluations of governmental programs which are presented below should be taken as suspect on the favorable side. This does not vitiate their importance for they do identify weaknesses and more helpfully yet, speak to the point of comparative effectiveness.[21] A careful look shows that out of eight programs targeted for village level assistance, only two (health and agricultural extension) are rated as running well by more than half of the sample. Aside from family planning which has only recently been introduced into some Central Java villages, the two programs with the lowest scores are the public works program (a responsibility of the regency government) and that of the Village Social Institute (Lembaga Sosial Desa). See Table VIII.

Public works, which includes primarily roads and irrigation, ranks lowest in terms of actually having a program and the Village Social Institute ranks lowest in terms of performance--most probably because its activities are almost entirely dependent on funds that it can generate locally.

TABLE VIII

Village Chief Responses to the Request:

"From the list provided below, please evaluate the development programs directed to your village."

Government Program	Now Proceeding Well		Program Not Running Smoothly		Program No Longer Operating		Never Operated in this Village		NR
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Village Community Development(PMD)	169	(44.8)	52	(13.8)	33	(8.8)	123	(32.6)	12
Village Social Institute (LSD)	138	(36.3)	107	(28.2)	74	(19.5)	61	(16.0)	9
Mass (Adult) Education	166	(43.7)	79	(20.8)	57	(15.0)	78	(20.5)	9
Public Works (kabupaten level)	110	(28.9)	80	(21.0)	40	(10.5)	151	(39.6)	8
Health service	255	(66.6)	58	(15.1)	43	(11.2)	27	(7.1)	6
Agricultural Extension	236	(61.8)	62	(16.2)	17	(4.5)	67	(17.5)	7
Rice Intensification (BIMAS--mass guidance)	158	(41.9)	76	(20.2)	18	(4.8)	125	(33.1)	12
Family Planning (Central Java only)	19	(12.8)	50	(33.5)	1	(0.7)	79	(53.0)	0

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

Aside from a general performance ranking, Table VIII also explains something about the instability of various programs. The LSD, adult mass education, health services and public works programs have, in that order of frequency, been cut back. More than anything else this behavior reflects both inconsistent and probably wasteful funding manipulations in Djakarta. Finally, it ought to be noted that the introduction of new programs, such as

family planning, faces agonizing adjustment periods once the programs are introduced. Of the 69 villages in the sample which already have family planning programs, over 72 percent of them are said to be running poorly.

Since it is quite possible to say that a program is going well but at the same time believe that it is irrelevant, it was necessary to follow up the foregoing performance ratings with an assessment of the comparative contributions that these agencies make in meeting perceived needs in the villages. Tables VIII and IX show that there is indeed a high correlation between those programs that are running well and those which are believed to be of greatest assistance to the village: e.g., health and agricultural extension. Those programs said to be giving the least assistance also show a high correlation with those that are not running smoothly, e.g., LSD and public works.

TABLE IX

Headmen Responses to the Following Questions:

1. "From all the Central and Regional Government agencies, which ones give the most assistance to your village?"
2. "From all the Central and Regional Government agencies, which ones give the least assistance to your village?"
3. "In your opinion, assistance from which agencies is most needed in your village?"

(Two responses to each question permitted)

Agency/Program	Responses to No. 1		Responses to No. 2		Responses to No. 3	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Health services	138	(38.7)	16	(5.8)	94	(29.2)
Village Community Development	61	(17.1)	34	(12.4)	45	(14.0)
Village Social Institute	32	(9.0)	67	(24.4)	22	(6.8)
Mass (adult) education	22	(6.2)	37	(13.5)	23	(7.1)
Public Works	44	(12.3)	88	(32.1)	126	(39.1)
Agricultural extension	170	(47.7)	45	(16.4)	253	(79.2)
Rice Intensification (BIMAS)	19	(5.3)	20	(7.3)	6	(1.9)
Family Planning	0	--	4	(1.5)	0	--
Animal husbandry	10	(2.8)	29	(10.6)	22	(6.8)
Fishing (land and sea)	6	(1.7)	25	(9.1)	13	(4.0)
Dept. of Religion	11	(3.1)	8	(2.9)	7	(2.2)
Dept. of Education	14	(3.9)	11	(4.0)	29	(9.0)
Dept. of Information	30	(8.4)	19	(6.9)	23	(7.1)
Dept. of Home Affairs	51	(14.3)	4	(1.5)	7	(2.2)
Military and/or Police	6	(1.7)	1	(0.4)	3	(0.9)
Other	18	(5.1)	43	(15.7)	34	(10.6)
No Response	32		115		62	

Source: Primary data from field surveywwork, 1970.

The data show that both the agency giving the most assistance (Agricultural Extension) and that giving the least help (Public Works) are far and away the two services thought to be most needed by village chiefs in the sample. These findings bode well for the further development of the extension service and raise a key question for public works: should not more of the national public

works budget be directed to the provision of increased technical manpower and funding at the kabupaten level where it could serve village needs?[22]

At least four additional programs merit attention: first, although 158 from the sample indicated that the BIMAS program was going well in their villages, only six indicate that this program is "most needed." While pessimistic in its implications for the rapid adoption of new rice varieties and their attending inputs, these responses well reflect the personnel and logistical problems which the program has faced in its early years. Second, family planning in Central Java has a long way to go before it is going to have an impact at the village level; not one of the 149 headmen sampled felt that family planning is one of the two most-needed programs at the present time. However, the high ratings given to the health service suggest that a reasonably good administrative infrastructure might serve family planning very effectively. Third, the so-called "two function" (dwi-fungsi) role of the military, wherein it attempts to perform its security function as well as to involve itself in civic action programs, has quite obviously failed to impress village leaders thus far. Fourth, and finally, despite its pervasiveness and its large number of employees at local levels, the Ministry of Religion gets very low rankings on both the "assistance" and the "need" scales, giving support to the startlingly frank view of one military bupati that "Religion is important, but its bureaucratic function is almost useless; its offices should be disbanded."[23] But the Ministry of Religion was not established and did not grow so large in order to

serve conventional development or change goals, and it would be short-sighted to adopt a strongly negative view without first understanding the strategy involved in "buying off" traditional Islamic political elements (primarily the Nahdatul Ulama) through such bureaucratic sinecures.[24]

As a postscript to this section on agency performance levels, the reader is referred to the information presented in Chapter Four concerning the frequency of tjamat and bupati visits to the villages, where we show the tjamat as playing predominantly a supervisory role and the bupati in an aid-giving role. Our hypothesis is generally borne out by the data presented in Table X, for the tjamat ranks higher than the bupati in all categories except that of aid-giving and the provision of security. However, we were indeed surprised to find so few (12.3 percent) of the headman sample who indicated that they receive direct financial or material assistance from the bupatis. (See Table X.)

TABLE X

Headmen Responses to the Questions:

1. "In general, what is the result of the tjamat's visit to your village? (In the sense, is there benefit or not for your village? Explain your answer and if possible, give examples.)"
2. "In general, what is the result of the bupati's visit to your village? (In the sense, is there benefit or not for your village? Explain your answer and if possible give examples.)"

(Up to two responses recorded)

Response	1: Tjamat		2: Bupati	
	No.	%	No.	%
Gives assistance: money, materials, facilities	7	(1.8)	48	(15.5)
Gives suggestions, advice information, examples, etc.	147	(38.6)	90	(29.1)
Encourages the people; stimulates gotong-rojong spirit, etc.	162	(42.5)	141	(45.6)
Improves village administration, communications; carries out inspections/checking; assists with tax collection	75	(19.7)	63	(20.4)
Provides leadership	34	(8.9)	22	(7.1)
Serves to maintain security, to oppose PKI remnants, to stabilize village for upcoming elections	8	(2.1)	33	(10.7)
In general, visit is beneficiary	38	(10.0)	7	(2.3)
No benefit to visit	14	(3.7)	1	(0.3)
Other	1	(0.3)	0	
No Response	8		80	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

It is clear also that the tjamat is only in extremely rare cases a direct source of funding for the villages and, as our profile in Chapter Four suggests, his technical contributions are probably sharply limited. There is also, one suspects, a significant amount of mutual suspicion between headmen and tjamats, evidenced in part by the fact that only 23 percent of the tjamats believed that

headman cooperation with regard to gotong-rojong projects was "very good." For their part, the village chiefs could seldom give examples in which the tjamat had contributed in what was felt to be a truly meaningful way.

Summary and Conclusion

Although gotong-rojong became a much abused slogan during the Sukarno period for nearly every type of governmental activity that required some measure of cooperation, our findings show that much of the skepticism over its relevance at the village level is unwarranted. It is true that the tradition is weak in some villages and in others may still have the stigma of forced labor (kerdja paksa) attached to it. But the survey materials show that it is the foremost resource input in connection with village development projects. It is further evident that gotong-rojong labor is more often applied to "development" projects than to symbolic, religious or other projects that might narrowly be conceived of as "prestige" projects. Input calculations make clear that communications and agriculture infrastructure rank first in terms of importance followed by schools and religious institutions in that order. In terms of governmental performance at the village level, the findings show a strong desire for additional agricultural extension help, despite the fact that this agency is rated as already providing more assistance to the villages than any other agency. Equally significant for future planning purposes is the finding that regency public works agencies are the least helpful of all agencies but are rated second in terms of

the kind of help that is most needed in the villages. Finally, it is abundantly clear that the government's family planning program has a long way to go before it can be said to be effectively institutionalized at the village level.

FOOTNOTES

1. State and Statecraft . . ., op. cit., pp. 138-139.

2. Clive Day, op. cit., pp. 398-399.

3. While it is true that Dutch liberals were much concerned with the abuses of this practice, and that beginning in 1864 the colonial regime adopted statutory provisions to limit the burdens placed on village landholders, the Dutch were unwilling or unable to compensate lower native officials for this loss of both status and income. Without such compensation, the regulations were to have only limited effect. See ibid., p. 400.

4. See S. Poerwopranoto, Pembimbing Pamong (Pegawai) Desa Semarang: Astanabuku Abede, 1952, p. 21.

5. See Widjojo Nitisastro and J. E. Ismael, The Government, Economy and Taxes of a Central Javanese Village, translated by Robert Ward, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1959, pp. 15-17. The basis for the writer's own conclusions is a series of interviews with former village chiefs carried out in Semarang, March, 1970.

6. The best study to date on gotong-rojong is that of Koentjaraningrat, Some Social-Anthropological Observations on Gotong Rojong Practices in Two Villages of Central Java, Ithaca: Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project, 1961. This 1958 study of two villages reviews seven different types or kinds of gotong-rojong activities, some functionally defined, others defined more by type of association; e.g., family, neighborhood, village, etc. For the kerigan type, that inspired and directed by village officials, Koentjaraningrat discovered little enthusiasm among the villagers (p. 40). Moreover, his reporting on the failure of a large, multi-village irrigation project (pp. 54-55) might indicate a less than hopeful prospect for increased village development efforts through this type of social organization. To generalize from findings of such limited scope would, however, be inappropriate.

7. This finding must be treated gingerly as an indicator of high achievement orientation since villages build schools for status purposes as well as instrumental ends. Nonetheless, education is more highly valued in West Sumatra than in the other two provinces if the percentage of school-age children in school is taken as a measure.

8. Additionally, village size may be a determining variable. Of the 80 sample villages chosen for this analysis, the populations ranged from 843 to 11,937.

9. Where funds from the village treasury were used for a project, we equated Rp. 50 with one man-day of labor. While this figure is subject to challenge, it is close enough to the prevailing day-labor rate for our purposes. Subsidies from higher level governments were excluded from these calculations.

10. Interview, March 12, 1970.

11. Hendra Esmara and Raisuddin Muchtar, op. cit., p. 46.

12. Interviews with several tjamats, December 22, 1969. Our data confirm the fact that labor is by far the most important contribution made by the villagers, although regulations normally permit people to supply money or materials in lieu of their own labor. In response to the question: "What kind of contributions are most frequently given by the villagers to gotong-rojong projects?" 92.9 percent of the headman sample said labor, 6.1 percent said money, and 1.0 percent materials.

    In addition to indigenous contributions and occasional subsidies from the kabupatens, often it happens that people who have left the village for the cities retain a sense of obligation to their village. Asked if the villagers who have departed the desa have ever contributed to its development activities, 48.1 percent said "yes," 47.8 percent said "no", and 3.9 percent said they did not know. Those who responded "yes" were then asked if these contributions were truly meaningful and the large majority (82 percent) indicated that they were. Our findings showed that this practice was most strongly established in West Sumatra where the merantau tradition of leaving the village began centuries ago.

13. Additional, albeit qualified, support is given to this notion by the village chief responses to another question concerning villager interest in mutual-help projects.

1. Villagers give no attention at all to gotong-rojong projects	0(0.0%)
2. They give very little attention to gotong-rojong projects	31(8.0%)
3. They give adequate attention	207(53.2%)
4. They give very great attention to gotong-rojong projects	140(36.0%)
5. No response	11(2.8%)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

14. Interview with General Sajidiman, Military Commander for South and Southeast Sulawesi, January 13, 1970.

15. The most forceful expression of this view came from General Kemal Idris, then Military Commander for Eastern Indonesia, January 10, 1970.

16. Source: Anggaran Belandja dan Pendapatan Routin dan Pembangunan Propinsi Djawa Tengah untuk tahun dinas 1968, Semarang: Governor's Office.

17. Interview, November 18, 1969.

18. Interview, November 19, 1969.

19. This program dates to 1956-1957 when it was called the Bestim Daerah Kerdja. In a later incarnation it became the Badan Koordinasi Pembangunan Masjarakat Desa (1959). In 1964 Pembangunan Masjarakat Desa became a national department in itself, but in the post-coups period it reverted to its present subordinate status in the Ministry of Home Affairs.

20. Robert Jay, op. cit., p. 346.

21. Many Indonesian intellectuals as well as certain Indonesian scholars in the West have argued that one cannot do attitudinal survey work in Indonesia because the culture resists it. Our response to this is that one need not be interested in the optimization of knowledge regarding administrative behavior in Indonesia--only that amount of knowledge which makes the topic more understandable and ultimately subject to improvement (increased productivity) through better directed resource inputs.

22. Our own view is that this should indeed be done to capitalize on both locally perceived needs and local manpower resources. A minor source of confusion faced in carrying this out would inevitably be the question of who is going to do it. Should the district offices of the Ministry of Public Works be strengthened or should the public works section of the regencies (Ministry of Home Affairs) receive priority? We believe both should be given expanded roles.
While it is true that through the Rp. 100,000 village development program (1969) and the regency public works program (1970) many local works projects have received funding support, nothing has yet been done to improve the technical skills of those working at these lower levels.

23. Interview, November 19, 1969. (Bupati of Batu Sangkar, West Sumatra)

24. See Daniel S. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal Institutions, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press (forthcoming).

CHAPTER IV

LOCAL AGENTS OF MODERNIZATION: REGENTS AND SUB-DISTRICT OFFICERS

The following announcement appeared in a West Sumatran daily newspaper in late 1969:

> THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE FOR CARRYING OUT THE NOMINATION FOR HEAD OF THE REGION OF KABUPATEN SOLOK ANNOUNCES THAT:
>
> In connection with carrying out the selection of the Bupati for Solok by a plenary session of the regional parliament of Kabupaten Solok on November 17, 1969, we announce the following conditions for nomination.

The stated conditions were modest. Nominees to head this second-level "autonomous" government were expected to be loyal to the Proclamation of August 17, 1945, and to the Basic Laws of 1948. They were also expected to have ability and experience in government work, to have at least a junior high school education, and to be not less than thirty nor more than fifty years of age.[1]

On November 17 the Solok parliament voted overwhelmingly for an Army colonel to be the new bupati, reinforcing a trend that has brought about some very significant changes in the make-up of Indonesian second-level government leadership since 1965.[2] Of the 70 regents (bupatis and walikotas) in the three provinces of West Sumatra, South Sulawesi and Central Java in early 1970, no less than 41 (59 percent) were military officers. That eight out of 12 of West Sumatra's second-level region heads are military is

less surprising, given the history of that area's separatist revolt (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republic Indonesia) in 1958-1961.[3] Central Java's situation, where 19 our of 35 regents are military, represents a much greater change and is particularly significant for the fact that this province has long been the stronghold of the Nationalist Party (PNI), the Communist Party (PKI) and the pamong pradja (traditional civil service). Thus it appears that if one is to talk about regents as modernizers, he must perforce be conscious that he is dealing with Indonesian military officers and primarily with Army lieutenant colonels.

The Regents' Role in History. There is something of an interrupted warrior tradition among regional chiefs dating back to 16th century Mataram Java when the bupati was responsible for seeing that his own region was secure from both external and internal threats to peace. The degree to which military responsibilities were expected to be performed is evidenced by the fate which befell the bupati of Pasuruhan (East Java) when he fled in the face of a local rebellion. He was sentenced to be put to death by the kris because

> his crime being that he failed in taking care of the province of Pasuruhan (because) he would not meet the Winongan troops in battle.[4]

Later, when the Dutch East India Company first began to interfere in the affairs of the Javanese kingdom of Mataram at the end of the 17th century, the regents were nearly sovereign in their authority.[5] But during the 18th century they fell increasingly under the control of the Company: hereditary rights to positions

weakened as offices became purchasable from the Company and the regents drew increasing fire from Company officials for failing to produce.[6] Arriving as Governor General shortly after the turn of the 19th century, Daendels sought to put an end to well-established Company abuses by declaring Javanese regents to be Dutch government officials with the rank of lieutenant colonel in a Dutch-Napoleonic bureaucracy.[7] In Daendels' own words:

> Having . . . sufficiently preserved the authority of the native regents in the eyes of the ordinary Javanese, I have nevertheless made them completely subordinate and subservient to the aims of the government . . . . I have deemed it necessary to do away with the ideas they still harboured to the effect that they exercised a certain independent and autonomous government over their subjects in order to make room for their complete submission to the royal government, which they respect, knowing it to be now set over them.[8]

Raffles, during the British period of administration (1811-1816), followed much the same line. The regents are, he said,

> to be considered as the chief native officers in their respective districts; but it will be obvious, that by the new arrangement they must be effectually deprived of all political or other undue influence: and as the tranquility of the country is an essential and necessary object in establishing the new order, it is presumed they may be most advantageously employed in the department of police, while it must not be forgotten, that the watchful attention of the Resident must ever be directed to their conduct in the execution of this duty.[9]

The introduction of a new land rent system being Raffles' major policy change during that short period, he sought devices by which the direct administration of the people could be carried out. More significant, however, was the design to shift the regents' prime function to that of police surveillance, thereby strengthening a role which was to persist throughout the colonial period.

The regents were to be primarily stabilizers while the colonial rulers would deal with producitivity and change.

The end of the Java War (1825-1830) and the introduction of the new "Culture System" by Commissioner General Van den Bosch were accompanied by a recognition of the fact that the regent's traditional authority was indispensable to the Dutch. Having destroyed some of that traditional authority by ignoring the hereditary rights of native rulers for many years and by a few sporadic, but well intended, efforts to protect the people from the demands of their own native rulers, the Dutch (Van den Bosch) now sought to ally the regents to themselves. Rights of heredity were to be respected and the regents were to be treated as colleagues. Despite objections from the "colonial opposition" in the Netherlands, a determined effort was made to work through indigenous authority structures as they had previously existed. But in Vlekke's words, "It is doubtful whether the regents appreciated the theoretical equality of status with the Europeans they thus acquired, for they paid for it very dearly in loss of income and prestige and especially in freedom of action towards their subjects"[10]

The Modern Role. Three principles emerging out of the "Culture System" and still apparent today are (1) the fundamental policing function of the regent (bupati), (2) his role as an agent of the higher level governments, and (3) the loss of hereditary rights to this position coupled with a renaissance in the old practice of purchasing the office. The sellers today, however, are not the residents or governors, but the local parliaments--a

development which will be described below. The major post-independence change in the bupati's role stems from Law No. 22 of 1948 by which provinces, regencies, and village complexes became "self-governing" regions (daerah swatantra), possessing considerable autonomy over their own affairs. This history and the theoretical underpinnings of this change are adequately covered by Legge and Maryanov.[11] What is important to stress is that the return of autonomous responsibilities has been accompanied by demands of a magnitude heretofore unknown. Aside from his medebewind obligations in carrying out government policy, he must "regulate and be concerned with his own government's household" (mengatur dan mengurus rumah-tangganja) while responding to varied demands from the local parliament. The fact that at least seven of Central Java's kabupatens had populations of over one million people provides some feel for the size of these responsibilities.[12]

The bupatis that were interviewed generally felt that their most taxing obligations were those of running the autonomous government with minimal resources. Their duties in carrying out higher level policy were described as being routine in nature, or as one said, "just a matter of following instructions." Some were largely ignorant of national Five-Year Plan projects which were ongoing in their kabupatens, a finding which is not surprising in light of the fact that the national ministries have had prime responsibility for most major development projects at the regency level.

The bupati's main function is often decided by the nature of his kabupaten. Almost one-third of the bupatis in Central Java in early 1970 were military officers who had been installed directly by the governor as caretaker officials. In the words of a key, high-ranking military official, two different types of career officers were selected for these positions: "Where the political situation is reasonably stable, the modernizer/developer has been selected. Where the situation is tense or conflict-prone, the strict military type has been chosen."[13] In areas which are comparatively peaceful and dominated by one political party, such as Kudus and the NU, the military has taken a hands-off attitude and the bupati is an Islamic traditionalist.[14] Two other bupatis, one in West Sumatra and one in South Sulawesi, have developed province-wide reputations for zeal in promoting the adoption of new rice varieties. In poorer kabupatens, such as one in Eastern Indonesia of which David Mitchell writes, the bupati appears almost too busy with maintenance activities to consider the initiation of new development projects.

> The kabupaten has not been able to maintain its roads, buildings, vehicles, and other assets. The struggle to keep the typewriters typing, the jeeps and Land Rovers running, the roads open, and the roofs of the office and officials' homes from leaking occupies much of the time and energy of the kabupaten administration, and almost all of their limited finances.[15]

Not only are local revenues small, but most of the Central Government agencies working in this region are funded so poorly that they routinely turn to the bupati for assistance.

Despite the fact that most bupatis retain a kingly position in their own regions, they often face a difficult relationship with kabupaten legislatures. This is particularly true in Central Java where political organizations are more highly developed and where education is more advanced. Some bupatis in this region are said to have developed agreements wtih legislators (tahu-sama-tahu) for secret, unofficial diversions of resources--a practice which is often, though not always, in conflict with government development policies. The political stability achieved through this mechanism tends to restrain the Regional Military Commander and Governor from pushing for their replacement--even in the case of a few Army bupatis who are reputationally known to be somewhat corrupt. Some leakage, therefore, is sacrificed for political stability, a goal the military seems to put above all others. At least this appears true in terms of short-run goals.[16]

In West Sumatra and South Sulawesi where there are no military-appointed "caretaker" bupatis, the demands on the bupatis are not as strong, although the range of demands is equally great. In the words of one bupati, "There isn't any one group or body that doesn't make demands upon me for funds. Most of the requests come from agencies of the provincial and national government who lack operating funds. My ability to help is very limited because, while I do have enough authority, there is almost no money."[17]

The Selection Process. Comments to this point indicate that there are varied mechanisms by which the bupati is selected. In the introduction to this chapter, it appeared that a representative

institution, the local legislature, made the selection based on specified qualifications. The presence of 11 military, "caretaker" bupatis in Central Java suggests that the process may be strongly appointive. And finally, the seven out of twenty-three bupatis in South Sulawesi who are descendants of the nobility indicate that principles of heredity may be the determining factor in many cases.

What has happened is that an uneasy balance has been struck in the selection of regents between local and higher-level influence. Present regulations permit local parliaments to vote for bupati candidates, but these nominations are then forwarded to the provincial governor who passes his recommendation along with the list of nominees and their vote totals to the Minister of Home Affairs. The minister, who is also a senior Army general, makes the final decision.

In both West Sumatra and South Sulawesi it is apparent that local preferences are given considerable weight, for nearly all of these bupatis are natives of the kabupatens in which they are presently serving. This is not true in Central Java, reflecting a strong tendency on the part of the governor and Army to maintain greater control over local politics by placing "their" men in these positions. Military influence over the selection of regents in the two Outer Island provinces is more subtle but no less real. Several informants in a position to know explained that the regent position often goes to the highest bidder, to the one willing to pay the most to the parliament members whose votes are needed. There was further general agreement that the resource position of

the Armed Forces is more favorable than that of any other grouping, and that its electioneering expenditures were likely to exceed those of other political organizations.[18]

Origins of Today's Regents. Indonesia is clearly in a period of major transition with regard to its regency leadership. We have already pointed to the growing role of the military. Now it can be seen just how recent these changes are. Of the 58 bupatis in Central Java and South Sulawesi who were serving in early 1970, all but seven assumed these positions after 1965. (See Table 1).

TABLE I

Appointment Dates for Current Central Java and South Sulawesi Regents

Year	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Total
	1	6	4	32	6	8	1	58

Source: Governors' offices, Makassar and Semarang, 1970.

In most cases it appears that a clear break has been made with the hereditary principle which the Dutch sporadically nurtured. It would appear, too, that the pamong pradja has, by and large, lost control of the regent position to other elements in the polity.[19] In Central Java, part of this loss apparently stems from national decisions to de-politicize (or neutralize) party-based cliques which had captured the regent positions. In terms of the 1971 general elections, the changes also appear to facilitate greater

national control over the flow of pre-election campaign money. The Nationalist Party, which drew the most votes in the 1955 general elections in Central Java and is clearly the largest party there today, goes into the 1971 election with only one regent under its control. Since electioneering tends to be financed mainly through diversions of state resources, recent changes in the regents have important implications for party campaign activities. How the respective parties sought to capture campaign financing in 1971 is a question of significant political consequence which we cannot yet answer.

Limited data indicate that most of the regents are in their early forties, though two younger ones (33 and 34 years) appeared in the South Sulawesi roster. Neither of these two are military and both are descendants of former noble rulers--suggesting that in certain cases where elections are permitted to proceed without undue outside interference, the principle of hereditary right is still applicable. Most of the military regents noted in the following table are Army lieutenant colonels, but there are also a handful of those with the rank of major. Three are from the National Police and two from the Navy. In terms of political party persuasion, seven in Central Java are supporters of the Nahdatul Ulama, all being either former attorneys, judges, or university teachers. Only one, the bupati of Purworedjo, who is from the pamong pradja, has open PNI support. Two bupatis from less significant regencies in South Sulawesi are allied with political parties: one with the PNI and one with Mohammadijah. West Sumatra has none with party affiliations. Our main purpose in

TABLE II

Regent Affiliations in Central Java, South Sulawesi, and West Sumatra as of March, 1970

Affiliation/Origin	Central Java	South Sulawesi	West Sumatra
Armed Forces	19	14	8
Pamong pradja (civil service)	5	5	3
Government attorney	3	2	
Judge	5	--	
University teacher	3	--	
Dept. of Agriculture	--	1	
Private business	--	1	--
Unknown	--	--	1
Totals	35	23	12

Source: Governers' offices--Semarang, Makassar, Padang, 1969 and 1970.

tracing these affiliations is to demonstrate not only the changes that have taken place, but also to indicate the potential conflict situation inherent in the bupati position. The bupati today is generally a non-political man in an intensely political job. Secondly, although a key member of the traditional organizational structure of the Ministry of Home Affairs, those regents who are from the military retain their commissions and are subject to commands from the regional military commander. Normally these two legitimate lines of authority are not in conflict because both governors and provincial military commanders are senior Army officers. However, in West Sumatra where the governor is civilian and the military commander an "alien" Javanese, there are frequent crises of authority.

The preponderance of military officers in regent positions and of military provincial governors (22 out of 26) has important implications for national political stability. At no time in the past have Indonesia's national political leaders had this degree of control and support in the regional bureaucracies. During the constitutionalist period of the 1950's, as Feith notes,

> . . . in implementing the government's policy, the bureaucracy tended more and more to respond to demands made of it from elsewhere. It frequently vetoed policies which would hurt a significant portion of its own membership . .[20]

This new degree of control in the regions now offers Indonesia an option which in the past has been attended by almost prohibitively high risks: that of taking meaningful steps in the direction of decentralization. This option is further served by the decline of political party power and the effective control of the separatist revolts which emerged in Sumatra and Sulawesi in the late 1950's.

The recurring problem of a lack of civil servant discipline throughout the governmental system is one that is tailor-made to unsettle newly installed military regents. It challenges the military concept of authority, for commands rarely inspire crisp and thorough performance from kabupaten government subordinates. These lower officials are often too busy trying to make ends meet through "daylighting."[21] The practice is so common as to have spawned the negative sounding term of korupsi waktu (corruption of time), but the expression is not often used in strong, pejorative fashion. Military bupatis in Central Java frequently respond to this problem by ignoring their civil service subordinates and going directly to the villages. Data in the following table give

substance to this point by showing the frequency of regent visits to the villages. While the data do not allow statistical correlations to be drawn between frequency of visits and bupati affiliations, interviews with a wide variety of officials indicate that the Army regents go to the people much more often than do their civilian counterparts.

TABLE III

Village Headmen Responses to the Question:

"How often has the bupati visited your village?"

Frequency of Visits	Number of Responses	Percent
More than twice a year	132	(33.9)
About twice a year	51	(13.1)
About once a year	88	(22.6)
About once every two years	14	(3.6)
Less than once every two years	22	(5.7)
Never	80	(20.6)
No Response	2	(0.5)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

The Subdistrict Officer

> At the base of the pyramid the tjamat or subdistrict officer has maintained the vital link between the government and the rural population in general. He conveys information concerning national policies as far as they affect the village and, indeed, may be said to provide the village with its picture of the outside world. He mobilizes support for novel projects. He is an arbiter between conflicting pressures. He is, in effect, the government.[22]

If there are to be any heroes of Indonesian rural development or modernization, there is sufficient logic to say that the subdistrict officers should get the laurels. The tjamat is

positioned on the frontier of change. Every day he crosses the Rubicon to work in the "traditional" villages, but with nightfall returns to his starting point--for he is thought to be modern, urban, secular, and educated. Indeed the subdistrict tjamat is positioned strategically to serve as the broker for village change. He is the secular link between village adat and government programs which are now change-oriented, almost by definition. How much substance there is to this "agent of change" appellation constitutes our major focus on interest.

The Tjamat's Role in Recent History. Selosoemardjan has written that the tjamat (once called assisten pandji, later assisten wedana, then panewu) did not really find a meaningful role in the Dutch colonial structure until after 1918 when the villages of Jogjakarta were organized into administrative units. Probably because these units did not exist, the assisten pandji of the pre-1918 Dutch period did not even have his own staff.[23] But toward the end of Dutch rule the tjamat became increasingly involved in village affairs. Himself a tjamat during the pre-war period, Selosoemardjan recalls the paternalistic, tutelary attitude taken by the government officials in dealing with the villagers, and he characterizes much of the civil service's work as simple interference with village autonomy.[24] However, with the departure of the Dutch, the perceived need for social, political and economic rule diminished and the governmental apparatus, originally structured to serve those functions, began to atrophy. Early attempts by the country's new leaders to provide increased

regional and local autonomy were viewed as threats to the traditional authority of the pamong pradja, particularly to that of the subdistrict officers.[25] Indeed, their authority was threatened as new regulations provided for the free election of village headmen and a village legislature to whom the headmen would be responsible.

But the prestige of the pamong pradja remained--along with the patrimonial relationships that derived not only from the Dutch system but from traditional Javanese social structure. With the coming of general elections in 1955 the tjamat, whose role according to Selosoemardjan had been "reduced to that of an adviser without the formal power of coercion," suddenly became a pivotal resource. He became a conduit or intermediary for the flow of campaign resources. Formal influence was limited but his position vis-a-vis the bupati was not a plum to be dismissed lightly by most village headmen.[26]

After the attempted coups of September 30, 1965, it might have been expected that the tjamat's major role would revert to the control function, for nothing preoccupied the minds of certain military leaders close to the president more than the need to stabilize or smother local political conflict. But by now a parallel military organization reaching down into the kabupatens and below could handle this function and only in a relatively few cases was it deemed necessary to place military officers in tjamat positions. Also, many of the bupatis were now military and the tjamat's limited role in policy-making rendered him a neutral enough instrument. The ascendance of the military bupatis and their assumption

of the old colonial control function left the subdistrict tjamats in an uncomfortable position. As career civil servants they faced the new problems of coping with military superiors, but perhaps more importantly, they faced a possible basic change in their traditional roles.

The Modern Role. While their direct contact with villagers prior to 1968 enabled them to perpetuate the traditional housekeeping function (order and stability), beginning in 1969 they were supposed to begin doing the opposite--that is, promoting change rather than working to contain it. The Five-Year Economic Development Plan funded "upgrading" courses throughout the regions and all subdistrict officers were called to provincial capitals for courses which included lectures on development from almost all technical agency heads. Governors made new commitments to selecting tjamats from among graduates of the provincial civil service academies (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri), three-year institutions offering the equivalent of a bachelor's degree. The Government's purpose in now promoting the tjamat as an "agent of modernization" (agen modernisasi) is sensible and well grounded. His traditional status immediately made his authority in the villages a substantial and guaranteed entity, thereby minimizing investments that would be needed for this purpose in other situations. In focusing on the subdistrict officers, the Government has singled out a key link in the civil apparatus for investment. This fact and others just mentioned have attracted the attention of this study, directing the analysis to a mapping of the tjamat's potential as a change agent.

Ultimately, however, the main issue is a broader one, centering on the role of the rural modernizer in any new state where a government is consciously trying to provoke change. In Malaysia and other former British colonies, the focus might turn more on the district officer or on a rural development official from a national ministry. In Indonesia, the tradition of the pamong pradja and the particular concept of decentralization adopted after the Revolution insure that the tjamat, because of the authority and status that attend his role, will either be the broker for change or will strongly influence competitors for this role.

The Setting. In Central Java there is an average of about fourteen subdistricts (ketjamatans) within each kabupaten, while in the Outer Island provinces of West Sumatra and South Sulawesi the number is close to seven. Tjamats in Central Java supervise about seventeen village complexes on the average while those in West Sumatra and South Sulawesi about seven each. In terms of population, however, the differences are less great: about 45,000 people for each tjamat in Central Java and 36,000 for each in the other two provinces. These figures are presented in order to give some sense of the magnitude of their responsibilities. While the ketjamatan in Central Java has more villages and people, those in the Outer Islands tend to be larger and less densely populated, making the administrative task somewhat greater. To this latter point should be added the fact that communications in Sumatra and South Sulawesi are less highly developed than in Java--fewer roads and less public transportation.

Tjamat Responsibilities. Under the present decentralized structure, the ketjamatan is not an autonomous governmental unit, but rather an administrative division staffed by central government officials responsible to the pamong pradja chain-of-command which flows downward from the Ministry of Home Affairs. The tjamat is the agent of the bupati who in turn serves the governor who is ultimately accountable to the minister in Djakarta. During the Dutch period the tjamat served under the district officer (wedana) but that position was effectively abolished after the Revolution, although it still persists as a formalistic appendage in Java. Through regular meetings with village chiefs in his office and less regular visitations to the villages in his ketjamatan, the tjamat tries to ensure that both the form and content of governmental policy reach the village (desa). While such meetings are primarily designed to serve the purpose of paternal instruction, the authoritarian character of this superior-subordinate relationship varies. Some of the more progressive subdistrict officers do not wait for kabupaten direction or funding, but proceed to negotiate and help implement village development projects on their own.[27] Others, in the guise of making their appointed rounds, may be interested in little more than collecting tributes in the form of food stores.[28]

Fear of retribution renders village headmen unwilling to admit that the practice of paying tribute continues.[29] However, from them we did gain general information on the frequency of tjamat visits to their villages. The following table indicates that more than half of the villages in the sample are visited

more than once a month by their tjamats. In the absence of regulations requiring routine scheduled visits and of good communications with many of the villages, these figures give a generally positive cast to an assessment of tjamat performance. (See Table IV.)

TABLE IV

Village Headmen Responses to the Question:

"How often does the tjamat visit your village?"

Frequency of Visit	Responses	
	Number	Percent
More than once a month	196	(51.0)
About once a month	120	(31.3)
About once every three months	50	(13.0)
Above twice a year	10	(2.6)
About once a year	5	(1.3)
Less than once a year	1	(0.3)
Never yet visited my village	2	(0.5)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1970.

Some specific examples provide an understanding of two primary responsibilities assigned to the subdistrict officer. First, and with reference to his change function, he participates in the national village development program which allocates Rp. 100,000 to each village complex. As the program developed in Central Java, the governor, regents and subdistrict officers were to maintain full responsibility for it, with other agencies providing technical services as needed. Each village was to plan its own development projects, but these were to be reviewed by each tjamat before

being sent on to the bupati for his approval and the release of funds. Informally, the tjamat was to participate in the formulation of the village plans to use the Rp. 100,000; more formally he was expected to review construction progress and, within his means, to see that the assistance of other agencies (e.g., irrigation) was coordinated. Progress reports from each village were to be submitted to him for review and criticism.[29a] This formal description of tjamat responsibilities slights a little his development role, however; far more than ever before he is now involved in matters concerning the evaluation of change priorities and technical competence. Under these circumstances, his relationship with the village heads becomes increasingly demanding, for traditional authority alone becomes an inadequate retreat. He is, perforce, required to render economic and technical judgments or to defer to those whose competence in these matters gives them new authority. In short, the tjamat is no longer quite as self-sufficient as he once was because his duties are changing. This change is slow, almost imperceptible, but real.

In the other sphere, however, the traditional supervisory or stabilizing function persists as it has for many years. In response to the question: "Who carries out supervision of the activities of the village governments?" 34 out of 35 bupatis in Central Java responded that this is the main function of the tjamat.[30] On another issue, the regents were asked: "Who decides the outcome if a difference of opinion or conflict arises between village governmental officials and others?" Nearly all responded that this was the function of the tjamat. The general practice

probably follows that adhered to in Kabupaten Purworedjo where, in the first instance, the tjamat settles the issue during his rounds of the villages. Secondarily, or in special cases, the issue may be settled in his office at the seat of the ketjamatan to which the concerned parties have been called. Should the dispute persist and the tjamat feel incapable of resolving it, it may be referred to the bupati.[31]

Selection and Recruitment. Except for a few post-1965 cases where military exigencies or inclinations dictated otherwise, nearly all tjamats come from the ranks of the pamong pradja and are, therefore, professional civil servants. At present the preferred route to the position is through two to three years of government work after graduation from senior high school, three more years of training in the provincial civil service academy, and another two to three years of supervised work under a regent. As the data will show, however, most of the tjamats serving today achieved their positions through longer years of government service and less formal training. The following table, aside from demonstrating conclusively that the tjamats are career civil servants, shows that the age-range of today's subdistrict officers is large enough to prove that new channels of mobility have been opened up with the advance of education. (See Table V.)
The impact of Indonesia's declaration of Independence in 1945 upon the civil service is obvious, as is that of former President Sukarno's Guided Democracy period in which the civil service was also greatly expanded. While it cannot be clearly demonstrated,

TABLE V

Ages and Length of Government Service of 226 Tjamats

Present Age	Number	Percent	Age at Entrance to Government Service	Number	Percent
21-25	2	(1.0)	10-15	3	(1.3)
26-30	38	(17.0)	16-20	54	(24.1)
31-35	46	(20.5)	21-25	135	(60.2)
36-40	31	(13.8)	26-30	28	(12.6)
41-45	41	(18.3)	30 +	4	(1.8)
46-50	61	(27.2)			
51-55	5	(2.2)			
No response	2			2	

Year Entered Government Service	Number	Percent	Total Years of Government Service	Number	Percent
1937-1944	13	(5.7)	0-5	12	(5.3)
1945	69	(30.9)	6-10	57	(25.2)
1946-1950	34	(15.2)	11-15	29	(12.8)
1951-1957	34	(15.2)	16-20	24	(10.6)
1958-1965	69	(30.9)	21-25	91	(40.3)
1966-1969	4	(1.7)	26 +	13	(5.8)
No response	3			0	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970

the increase at that time may have reflected efforts by the PNI to improve its position vis-a-vis the PKI and the military.

The Governor of the province actually appoints the tjamat but he performs this formality upon the recommendation of the bupati. Ascriptive criteria have long governed the selection process, but military control and a new emphasis on formal

education are bringing about some changes. Military regents appear to place less value on family connections. feel fewer political reward obligations, and in general appear to be more interested in performance than their civilian counterparts.

Origins of the Subdistrict Officer. Our data show that about 80 percent of the tjamats in the three provinces under review were born in the villages and that about 70 percent of them were raised there--at least to the age of twelve. This rural cast to their backgrounds suggests that they are not strangers to the rural setting, but are familiar with problems faced by the ordinary farmer or farm laborer. That more than half of the sample are themselves landholders lends additional support to this point. There is conflicting evidence as to whether many of them are actually serving in the ketjamatans in which they were raised, but it appears that this is not the general practice. In South Sulawesi, fewer than ten percent of the tjamats are serving in their own subdistricts, but as many as 80 percent are still working within their own regencies.[32] The proportions appear to be roughly similar in West Sumatra, but in Central Java greater cultural homogeneity and a stronger civil service tradition appear to account for slightly greater mobility.

Tjamat religious leanings closely reflect those of the areas in which they serve, suggesting that such congruence may be an unwritten sine qua non for placement. Almost 95 percent of the sample professes Islam; four percent Christian (Protestant)--most of them serving in Christianized Tanah Toradja of South Sulawesi;

and one percent Roman Catholic, possibly reflecting an urban constituency in Makassar or Semarang.

Education. Central Java, with the strongest administrative infrastructure and civil service tradition, has the least well-educated subdistrict officers of those sampled--65 percent have only an elementary school education compared with 25 percent in West Sumatra.[33] But it is risky to suggest the existence of a tight correlation between formal training and performance. Almost 40 percent of West Sumatra's tjamats have a bachelor's degree, the highest ratio in the survey, but higher officials feel that general competence is probably lower than it was before almost all tjamats were replaced following the abortive insurrection in 1958. Moreover, there is serious question as to whether or not the kind of education now provided in the academies is appropriate. The curriculum is drawn from the traditional fields of sociology, politics, and law and there is not yet any attempt to vocationalize the instruction.[34] While serving the prestige and status needs of the future subdistrict officer (advanced degrees are highly valued), the education may eventually serve to weaken his authority vis-a-vis technically trained officials from other agencies who work at the village level. It is ironical that these officials are now being trained to serve in the best tradition of the Dutch colonials, but this is less a reflection of design than of a failure to understand the changing role of the tjamat or to comprehend the instrumental value of education.[35]

Landownership. Although the data show that considerably fewer tjamats than village chiefs hold land, the subdistrict officer is strongly rooted in rural agriculture.[36] Moreover, the size of his holdings indicates that it is subsistence rather than commercial agriculture. (See Table VI.) While in theory they are full-time professional civil servants, it is clear that the land provides a major source of support for many, if not a majority, of these officials.

TABLE VI

Sawah and Plantation Holdings by Subdistrict Officers

Holdings (in hectares)	Number of Officers	Percent	Holdings (in hectares)	Number of Officers	Percent
0	104	47.5	3.1-4.0	10	4.6
0.1-0.5	28	12.8	2.1- 5.0	9	4.1
0.6-1.0	16	7.3	5.1-10.0	15	6.8
1.1-1.5	2	1.0	10.1-20.0	3	1.4
1.6-2.0	17	7.8	More than 20.0	3	1.4
2.1-3.0	12	5.5	No response	7	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

One finds a slight change in this relationship to the land in looking at civil servants of equal rank in the provincial capital offices. Only 24.7 percent of this group indicated that they had landholdings.[37] Many of these officials, however, leave their jobs at various times to help in the fields of relatives or friends. In the Governor's office of West Sumatra it is unusual for a lower official to give more than 70 percent of his time to

his government job; frequently he asks for, and receives, permission to return to his family's village to secure rice and other provisions.

We do not have adequate data on lower level regency officials other than the tjamats, but the ties of the former to the land are also very strong. A bupati in a coastal section of West Sumatra estimated that 60 percent of his subordinate officials lived in nearby villages where they own wet riceland. Another bupati in the high plateau region of the same province estimated that 80 percent of the officials lived in the villages and noted that a three-hour workday in his office is about the average. Whether or not these lower level officials own land, they receive ten kilograms of rice every month for each member of their immediate families--except for children over 18 years of age. This policy was in large measure designed to protect civil servants against inflation during the last decade, but it can also be viewed as a transition period for the government officials who, by choosing government service, begin the process of separating themselves from the land.

From the sample of higher level provincial officials, some 35 percent indicated that they still maintained landholdings, a figure slightly higher than that for their subordinates.[38] The chart below shows landholding of officials by rank, including hypothetical estimates where hard data are lacking. It suggests that attachment to land is primarily a function of position in the administrative hierarchy with one exception. (See Chart I.)

CHART I

Percentage of Officials Holding Land, by Class of Official



Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

Only at the level of higher provincial officials does there appear to be an interruption in the pattern of increasing separation from the land as one moves up the administrative hierarchy, but here the reason for landholding is less likely to be subsistence than status. While this has changed somewhat, the importance of land as a source of status and prestige is still great. The tradition of "shared poverty" in Java rarely permitted the assembling of very large tracts in the hands of one man or family--in sharp contrast with what has taken place in many other low-income countries.[39]

Occupational Mobility. One fact seems very clear: government service at the subdistrict level is very much a family

tradition. More than twice as many tjamats had fathers who were in government service than in any other occupation--including farming. Since most, if not all, of the fathers who served the government service worked under the Dutch colonial regime, it is reasonable to suspect that Dutch values and bureaucratic behavior were transferred largely intact to today's subdistrict officers. Pejorative connotations need not necessarily be attached to this phenomenon, but it doubtless has significant influence on the tjamats' own role perceptions. To be a model civil servant for the Dutch was to see that assigned taxes were collected on time and that tranquility was sustained in the subsistence sector of the economy. While these are still important parts of the tjamats' modern role, we have argued that some additions to this role are now necessary to achieve a fit with national change priorities.

In light of this need, perhaps it is equally significant that so many of today's tjamats do not come from families with a civil service tradition. The lack of comparative data makes it difficult to establish whether or not the tradition is changing, but it appears that the economic downturns of the late 1950's and the 1960's encouraged more people from various walks of life to compete for government positions. During this period the government service came to offer much more than social status which had been the fundamental attraction during the colonial era; it offered a degree of economic security which was hard to come by in other professions. Doubtless too, there has been some flow to government professions from the traditional farming sector in Central Java because of two factors: first, land continued to

TABLE VII

Tjamat Occupational Mobility as Demonstrated by Fathers' and Grandfathers' Occupations

Occupation	Father's Occupation				Grandfather's Occupation				Hypothetical Personal Career Preference*	
	before the Revolution (1945)		after the Revolution (1950)		Father's side		Mother's side			
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Trading	31	(15.3)	23	(15.2)	26	(12.6)	33	(16.1)	17	(8.2)
Industry	5	(2.5)	5	(3.3)	1	(0.5)	1	(0.5)	14	(6.7)
Political Party	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	1	(0.5)
Government enterprise	4	(2.0)	3	(2.0)	2	(1.0)	2	(1.0)	10	(4.8)
Military/Police	12	(5.9)	10	(6.6)	5	(2.4)	1	(0.5)	6	(2.9)
Government official	93	(46.0)	62	(41.1)	82	(39.8)	70	(34.1)	115	(55.3)
Doctor/Dentist	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	14	(6.7)
Lawyer/Judge	1	(0.5)	2	(1.3)	1	(0.5)	1	(0.5)	2	(1.0)
Religious leader	3	(1.5)	4	(2.6)	0	(0.0)	2	(1.0)	8	(3.8)
Farmer	37	(18.3)	29	(19.2)	77	(37.4)	84	(41.0)	11	(5.3)
Teacher/professor	11	(5.4)	9	(6.0)	6	(2.9)	3	(1.5)	5	(2.4)
Other	5	(2.5)	4	(2.6)	6	(2.9)	8	(3.9)	5	(2.4)
No Response	24		75**		20		21		18	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

*This question was employed partly to develop some indicators concerning the tjamats' attitudes toward their jobs. The responses were made to the following question: "Supposing you had the opportunity to become young again and to begin again with your career. What kind of occupation would you select?"

**Deaths are responsible for most of these non-responses.

become more scarce as population continued to grow; and second, nearly universal education enabled many more people to meet the educational requirements for government service. Table VII provides a clear picture of these occupational changes, including data on hypothetical career preferences of today's subdistrict officers. Aside from reaffirming our point about the importance of family tradition in the civil service, there are a number of incidental findings worthy of note. The tjamats have very little interest in political party leadership as an occupation, almost an equally low view of the legal profession, and apparently no taste for the sacrifices and benefits that attend a military career. That only 2.9 percent of the sample would choose a military career if they could begin again is all the more surprising for the fact that the actual number of tjamats who have followed military careers is slightly greater than the 2.9 percent figure. Without attempting to push the data too far, the findings are certainly consistent with our own general impressions that partisan politics are sometimes played but not esteemed; that the legal profession is not highly respected; and that the military is viewed as a competitor for influence, authority, and other resources.

Communications and the Flow of Influence. The subdistrict officers meet formally with their respective regents about once a month, but in some cases the regent was found to schedule weekly meetings. In the last two or three years most of the tjamats in West Sumatra and Central Java have been furnished motor-scooters by the government, thus vastly increasing their mobility and their

contact with regency headquarters. Almost all of the contact between the regent and the subdistrict officer is in the nature of reporting upward and briefing downward. The social and occupational distance between the predominantly military regents and the pamong pradja subdistrict officers has already been explained and suggests that the relationship between the two tends to be comparatively formal.

There is also a multitude of informal communication networks operating both horizontally and vertically within the bureaucracy. This network is based upon well-established associational ties which include the family, the military, political parties, ethnicity, educational experiences, service together in the Revolution, normal friendships and sometimes religion. These associational contacts are generally referred to as koneski (connections) and have an important bearing of what gets done in the bureaucracy. The need and inclination to rely on koneksi derive from several factors. In the first case, formal communications may be very weak; messages passed through one of the above-mentioned nets may be more effective (and certainly far easier) than sending a letter. Secondly, the use of such nets appears to provide a substitute reward system for members of the bureaucracy. Present government compensation levels are too low and the public service ethic too new to provide adequate psychic and material rewards for performance. The use of koneksi, however, not only reaffirms status, but also reaffirms primordial loyalties, both of which are highly valued qualities. The following tables provide some initial evidence on the frequency with which connections are used and the

TABLE VIII(a)

Comparison of Tjamat Responses with Other Responses to the Question:

"Some people say that if an important task must be carried out in a hurry, a government official must have connections in the bureaucracy. What is your own experience in this matter?"

Opinions	Tjamats (226)		Lower Level* (146)		Higher Level (157)		University Students** (554)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Connections needed:								
Always	88	(39.0)	27	(18.5)	24	(15.3)	95	(17.1)
Usually	29	(12.8)	21	(14.4)	29	(18.5)	173	(31.2)
Sometimes	49	(21.9)	37	(25.3)	54	(34.4)	188	(33.9)
Seldom	1	(0.4)	0	--	2	(1.3)	23	(4.2)
No need	49	(21.4)	56	(38.4)	45	(28.7)	40	(7.2)
No response	10	(4.4)	5	(3.4)	3	(1.9)	35	(6.3)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

*The reference is to lower level civil servants in regional governments: higher level refers to our sample of provincial government executives.

**The question was phrased slightly differently for the student sample: "Some people say that if someone who is not a government official needs assistance from the government, he is forced to use connections (in the sense of personal contacts). What is your own judgment with regard to this matter?"

nature of the net most likely to be employed at the level of the subdistrict officer. By including three other elite samples in the presentation, an additional comparative dimension is provided. (See Tables VIII(a) and VIII(b).)

TABLE VIII(b)

Comparison of Tjamat Responses with Other Responses to the Question:

"If connections are important, what kind of connections are most often used?

(Two responses permitted)

Kind of Connections	Tjamats		Lower Level* Officers		Higher Level Officers		University Students**	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Family	108	(47.8)	51	(41.8)	58	(44.3)	249	(44.9)
Political Party	52	(23.0)	19	(15.6)	17	(13.0)	75	(13.5)
Military	30	(13.3)	6	(4.9)	9	(6.9)	53	(9.6)
Ethnic	29	(12.8)	11	(9.0)	10	(7.6)	17	(3.1)
School/University	29	(12.8)	15	(12.3)	51	(38.9)	--	--
Revolution	8	(3.5)	19	(15.3)	11	(8.3)	--	--
Friends, General	44	(19.4)	34	(23.3)	25	(15.9)	65	(11.7)
Other	16	(7.0)	24	(16.4)	25	(15.9)	--	--

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

*The reference is to lower level civil servants in regional governments: higher level refers to our sample of provincial government executives.

**Students were permitted only one response and were not offered "School/University," "Revolution," or "Other" choices.

The first of the tables shown above indicates that tjamats see a greater need to have connections inside the bureaucracy in order to gain their ends than do other regional civil servants. This finding would appear to be a reflection of the discrepancy between responsibilities and available resources. The demands upon the tjamat are simply much greater than the formal resources he has available to meet them.

The second table shown above indicates that, generally speaking, officials at regional government levels feel that family connections are used much more often than other associational ties. One suspects that this can partially be accounted for in the fact that family ties demand less in the way of reciprocity and tend to be more stable. With such a broad notion of the concept of family, it is not surprising to find that family connections are regarded as being so important throughout the provinces and regencies. Looking at the level of the Central Government in Djakarta, however, it is probably true that the importance of family connections declines while that of ethnic group, political party, and military connections tends to grow.[40] But it remains doubtful that any of these ties elicit compliance to the same degree, or are used as frequently, as are family connections at the provincial level and below.

Since connections are used for a wide variety of purposes it would be necessary to map the content of requests for service in order to gain an understanding of the functions that they serve--something which could not be done here. However, it is clear that they are relied on very heavily to secure government employment. They are also used to help people outside the government gain access to decision-makers; they often help someone to speed up markedly official processing time. Inside the government, connections are used for such personal ends as securing promotions once statutory requirements have been fulfilled. Routinely, connections are used for the simple purpose of speeding along government work that would be much delayed if formal

channels of communication were relied upon. And finally, connections in the form of tahu-sama-tahu ("let's keep it to ourselves") agreements are used for the purpose of diverting state resources to private use.

If one reviews the limited availability of rewards and inducements in the Indonesian bureaucracy, the system of connections can be viewed as much more than an interesting feature of the old patrimonial style. The psychological rewards of serving family or friend are doubtless significantly greater than the approbation which follows from the performance of routine official responsibilities. From the official's standpoint, it is far more rewarding to serve friends than to serve a large bureaucratic organization. From the perspective of members of the general public who seek government assistance, there are three different resources that can be used: time, money, or a friendship. The latter, being less costly, is used whenever possible.

While it is easy to view the use of connections pejoratively, one suspects in the Indonesian case that the informal communications structure they represent actually permits the bureaucracy to function much more effectively. Official communications, particularly those running upward, are notably weak.

Tjamat Perception of Administrative Problems. Because Chapter Five is devoted to an evaluation of those major productivity problems which can best be described as administrative, this section seeks to draw principally upon the subdistrict officers' own reactions to these problems. Their identification of

the major obstacles faced by their own offices, coupled with a general assessment of attitudes toward their jobs, will provide a foundation for conclusions to be drawn later.

Since the tjamat is frequently occupied with the tasks of both vertical and horizontal coordination, the kind of cooperation he is able to obtain from other government agencies has great bearing on his own ability to bring about change. Although the responses are subject to positive bias, Table IX tells us rather subtly that low levels of cooperation do constitute a problem for the tjamat. (See Table IX.)

TABLE IX

Tjamat Responses to the Question:

"Based on your experience, what is your view concerning the amount of cooperation between departments or offices in the governmental system?"

Degree of Cooperation	Number of Responses	Percent
There is no cooperation at all	0	(0.0)
Cooperation is normally difficult to obtain	22	(10.0)
Sometimes cooperation is smooth	111	(50.2)
Cooperation is usually very smooth	88	(39.8)
Don't know	0	(0.0)
No Response	5	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

The fact that less than 40 percent of the sample is willing to state that cooperation is usually very good suggests that there are indeed major compliance problems at the subdistrict level, problems that are doubtless entwined in the issue of authority. As we shall have occasion to see, the lack of both formal authority and real authority gives rise to administrative obstacles at every level of the Indonesian administrative structure--no less so in Djakarta circles than at the lowest level, the subdistrict ketjamatan. Aside from the matter of authority, jealousies over funding tend to create the same kind of problems. In connection with the National Village Development Program, one tjamat observed that the technical agencies in his kabupaten were most unhappy that the money was being given directly to the villages rather than to the tjamats. Without control over the funding and the chance to reap their own percentage, they felt very little incentive to be of service to the villages. Very likely this problem is being overcome with a 1970 public works program aimed at the regency level, but the point made still stands: without sufficient financial incentives, cooperation is likely to be weak. Development or change may become the new religion in time, but its attraction as ideology at this point is much less a resource to insure compliance than is money.

While some administrative problems are general and can be found at each level, it would be a mistake to generalize too far in this direction, particularly so for the administrative reformer who is looking for the specific type of resource inputs which will have the greatest impact on administrative performance. For this reason we sought to ascertain whether or not the causes of obstacles or delays in the administrative process were the same at the provincial and subdistrict levels. Table X below points to the type of differences which were sought.

TABLE X

Tjamat and Regional Executive Responses to the Question:

"In your own view, what factors are responsible for causing the main obstacles and delays in the working of the governmental system?"

(Multiple responses permitted)

Type of Factor Identified	Responses from: Tjamat		Provincial Bureaucratic Executives	
	No.	%	No.	%
General: weak administration, weak management, administrative apparatus incomplete, etc.	15	(7.6)	44	(32.1)
Lack of discipline and control: distribution of authority unclear, poor placement policies, conflicting regulations, overlapping jurisdictions, poor coordination.	47	(23.8)	57	(42.5)
Bad mental attitudes of officials: lack of loyalty to government, no public service ethic, apathy, etc.	55	(27.9)	35	(26.1)
Lack of skilled and semi-skilled manpower	43	(21.8)	26	(19.4)
Poor communications facilities	74	(37.6)	34	(25.4)
Lack of money, buildings, equipment, materials, and facilities	91	(46.1)	39	(29.1)
Political factors: interference from political parties, from the military, from other groups	50	(25.4)	34	(24.5)
General economic and social factors	38	(19.3)	23	(17.2)
Low salaries and scarcity of incentives for government officials	23	(11.7)	15	(13.4)
Other*	21	(10.7)	18	(13.4)
No Response	29		23	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970

* "Corruption" constitutes the major portion of these responses from both samples.

The higher provincial officials, most likely because of their more bureaucratized roles and settings, appear to be much more concerned over what might be termed structural problems in the system. The tjamats, on the other hand, far more frequently identified problems involving poor communications and the lack of facilities. The responses of both groups should not be looked upon idly. At the subdistrict level it may often be true that no matter how well-motivated or change-oriented the officials, resources are simply insufficient for them to carry out a program. The resource deficiency often includes their own salaries, for data cited elsewhere indicate that earnings from the government equal only about one-third of the amount of money needed to support their families at present standards of support. Moreover, as comparative data have shown, the tjamats' landholdings are less than those of the village headmen and they are forced into taking extra-government employment.[41]

Since the improvement of governmental program effectiveness hinges to some degree upon the willingness of officials to recognize the need for improvement, the interview schedule probed the question of current performance levels. Officials were asked to rate the performance of their own offices and to make judgments as to how they thought the general public rated the performance of the government apparatus. The following two tables are illuminating for the open reservations they show concerning current capabilities as well as the awareness they demonstrate about a less than positive attitude toward the government by the general public. Although in both cases the tjamats tend to give higher ratings,

TABLE XI(a)

Responses of Tjamats and Higher Officials to the Question:

"What is your own assessment of the performance of your office?"

Quality of Performance	Responses by Tjamats		Responses by Higher Level Officials	
	No.	%	No.	%
Poor up until now	29	(13.1)	21	(13.6)
Fair/average/good enough	109	(49.3)	85	(54.5)
Good	78	(35.3)	44	(28.3)
Very good	5	(2.3)	5	(3.3)
No response	5		2	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

TABLE XI(b)

Responses of Tjamats and Higher Officials to the Question:

"In your estimation what is the view of the general public concerning the performance of the governmental apparatus?"

Degree of Public's Concern	Responses by Tjamats		Responses by Higher Level Officials	
	No.	%	No.	%
Most do not care at all	29	(13.7)	40	(26.5)
In general, they are not happy with government's performance	30	(14.2)	62	(41.1)
They are happy enough with the government's performance	134	(63.2)	48	(31.8)
They are very happy with the government's performance	19	(9.0)	1	(0.6)
No response	14		6	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

a finding which might be explained in part by the fact that their publics (villagers) are less demanding than the more highly educated urban publics faced by the higher level provincial officials, their responses still show a clear awareness of slack in the system. Through further probing it was discovered that the tjamats' prime target for performance improvement would be employee discipline. Because this issue will receive further consideration in Chapter Six on productivity problems, it is enough to note here that the matter of weak discipline in government offices is a general one and results from a plethora of variables ranging from insufficient compensation to cultural norms which preclude the application of meaningful sanctions.[42]

Tjamat Perceptions of the Task Environment. The subdistrict officer's own perception of his environment is possibly more important for what it tells us about him than for what it says about the environment. His understanding of the problems faced by the people, his estimation of various elite roles, and his own loyalties--all of these factors condition his own behavior in both obvious and not-so-obvious ways. To understand these factors and their relationship to productivity at the subdistrict level would require far deeper analysis than the matter can be accorded here. The survey data, however, do delineate some important considerations that could be pursued, particularly in reference to development problems, the role of political parties and women's groups, and fundamental loyalties.

Taking the latter first, the tjamats were surveyed to discover what their own hierarchy of loyalties was. In descending order they placed the people first, the Government of Indonesia second, and the goals of the republic's Revolution third. This ranking coincides with that given by respondents in the three provincial capitals, but as the following table will show, the tjamats feel much more strongly attached to the people at large than do other officials. (See Table XII.)

TABLE XII

Responses of Tjamats and Provincial Officials to the Question: "In the framework of your own job, to whom do you feel most loyal or devoted at this time?" (Up to three responses permitted)

Focus of Loyalty	Responses by Tjamats.		Lower Level Provincial Officials		Higher Level Provincial Officials	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
My family	56	(25.7)	74	(53.2)	77	(50.7)
Myself	7	(13.2)	5	(3.6)	21	(13.8)
President, Repub. of Indo.	5	(2.3)	3	(2.2)	2	(1.3)
Goals of the Revolution (1945-1950)	131	(60.1)	49	(35.3)	55	(36.2)
Colleagues in Gov't Service	1	(0.5)	5	(3.6)	2	(1.3)
The Indonesian People	167	(76.6)	53	(38.1)	65	(42.8)
Regent in my regency*	4	(1.8)	--		--	
My political party	0		0		0	
My religion	57	(26.1)	37	(26.6)	29	(19.1)
My region or ethnic group	13	(6.0)	5	(3.6)	13	(8.6)
Governor of my province	2	(1.0)	5	(3.6)	4	(2.6)
Indonesia (the nation-state)	174	(79.8)	99	(71.2)	123	(80.9)
Other	4	(1.8)	3	(2.2)	5	(3.3)
No response	8		7		5	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

* This possible response was used only on the interview schedule designed for the tjamats.

The remarkably low response in terms of loyalty either to President Suharto or to the institution of the presidency gives cause for speculation as to what responses might have been a decade ago at the height of the Sukarno era. In any case, the charismatic Sukarno clearly did not elicit or develop an institutional loyalty to the presidency. The lowest ratings of all, those given to political parties, suggest an instrumentalist view of parties on the order of: "Political parties are nice for what they can accomplish for one sometimes, but I wouldn't want my son or daughter to become a party activist."

What we call an instrumentalist view toward parties is evidenced in the tjamats' reactions to a question concerning the kind of influence which political parties have on the working of the governmental system. The responses indicate a slightly positive attitude toward the role of parties, somewhat more so in Central Java. Comparative data show that the subdistrict officials tend to be more favorable to political organizations than are other provincial officials. (See Table XIII.) This latter finding may be an important one, suggesting that political parties may be more effective at the village or subdistrict level than they are at the provincial level.[43]

One of the fascinating differences between Indonesia and most other Islamic countries can be found in the status accorded women. By comparison, the women of Indonesia are far more active in public life--both inside and outside the government. They sit in parliament, hold a great many civil service positions, have good access to higher education, and they are particularly active

TABLE XIII

Responses of Tjamats and Provincial Officials to the Question:

"How do you view the influence of political parties on the working of the Government?"

Degree of Influence of Political Parties	Responses by Tjamats		Lower Level Provincial Officials		Higher Level Provincial Officials	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Parties generally cause great delays	17	(8.2)	33	(28.7)	40	(30.0)
Cause a few delays and obstacles	36	(17.3)	22	(19.1)	32	(24.1)
No influence	45	(21.6)	38	(33.0)	25	(18.8)
Help a little to speed up government work	62	(29.8)	15	(13.0)	22	(16.5)
Help greatly to speed up government work	48	(23.1)	7	(6.1)	14	(10.5)
No response	18		31		24	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

in the health and social welfare fields.[44] In light of the apparent contradiction in such a strongly Islamic nation, our study sought to discover whether or not the role of women had reached its zenith. Could their talents and potential be viewed as an important development resource? On the assumption that a partial answer to this question could be drawn from elite samples of civil servants and university students, the following question was posed: "In your view, should women take a more active role than at present in political, governmental and social activities?" The responses, which are shown in Table XIV, bespeak strong general support for women's public roles. Only in the sample of higher level

TABLE XIV

Civil Servant and Student Views on the Role of Women

Response	Tjamats		Lower Level Provincial Officials		Higher Level Provincial Officials		University Students	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Would be best if their role were more active	160	(71.4)	71	(51.5)	67	(44.7)	387	(71.3)
Present role is already important enough	61	(27.2)	61	(44.2)	76	(50.7)	139	(25.6)
Would be best if their role were less active	3	(1.3)	6	(4.4)	7	(4.7)	17	(3.1)
No response	2		8		7		11	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

provincial officials do less than 50 percent of the respondents feel that women should not be more active. Whether this reduced degree of support reflects perceived competition, a different view of ascribed status, or a generational variable, we cannot say. Any or all of these reasons might explain the difference. It is noteworthy, however, that an overwhelming percentage of the subdistrict officers favor increased participation by women--a percentage almost equalled by university students.

Finally, the study attempted to isolate those problems in society which the subdistrict officers consider to be the major stumbling blocks to more rapid development in their own regions. Are local political conflicts a serious impediment to change, as many high-ranking military officers believe? Is it a lack of

of entrepreneurial talent both inside and outside the government? Or is it that the traditionally agricultural peasant sector is strongly resistant to new technologies? Again, the answers provided below may be more accurate for presenting an exposition of the tjamats' own prejudices than for identifying selected development priority targets. But, in a very real sense this type of information may be more valuable for national economic planning purposes since it isolates those specific areas to which these key officials are likely to devote their energies.

One of the routine weaknesses of economic planning lies in the fact that the administration of the plans is often taken for granted. There is little or no effort to write those plans which can best be administered, with the result that sound economic calculations founder not only on a shortage in administrative capacity to carry them out, but on a simple lack of desire to see them carried out. Little input has been solicited from the objects of the plan and even less from those who must carry them out--i.e., government officials at subnational levels. The data presented in Table XV offer some important comparative differences. Of the four samples compared, only the tjamats rank educational weaknesses as the most important problem faced, although this problem gets sufficient attention from the other three samples. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that these three additional samples view the main development problem as being a weakness in government personnel, particularly so in the case of university students. This latter fact suggests that in Indonesia there is a

Responses of Tjamats, Provincial Officials, and University Students to the Question:

"From the list below and in addition to the problem of a shortage of funds, which problems in your opinion are the main ones affecting development in your area?"

(Three responses permitted)

	Tjamats		Lower Level Provincial Officials		Higher Level Provincial Officials		University Students	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Attitude of the people	121	(60.0)	61	(46.9)	63	(45.0)	217	(39.7)
Religious beliefs	24	(11.9)	24	(18.5)	16	(11.4)	72	(13.2)
Political problems	31	(15.3)	37	(28.5)	44	(31.4)	149	(27.5)
Lack of regional autonomy	36	(17.8)	24	(18.5)	29	(20.7)	97	(17.8)
Attitudes of government officials; lack of modern thinking	62	(30.7)	66	(50.8)	64	(45.7)	312	(57.1)
Lack of private entrepreneurs	65	(32.2)	37	(28.5)	49	(35.0)	135	(24.7)
Traditional agricultural techniques which obstruct introduction of new technologies	88	(43.6)	38	(29.3)	47	(36.2)	197	(36.1)
Lack of education	123	(60.9)	54	(41.3)	58	(41.4)	191	(35.0)
Role of military in development	5	(2.5)	24	(18.5)	25	(17.9)	108	(19.8)
Other	10	(5.0)	8	(6.2)	8	(5.7)	18	(3.3)
No response	24		16		17		8	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

very high level of expectation with regard to the government's role in development and that up to this point the government has been unable to fulfill this expectation.

This finding has double-edged implications for the Suharto regime. It shows a willingness to look to the government for major assistance in bringing about economic change, and thus implicit support for the regime's activities. But it also reflects a level of expectation that is beyond the capacity of the government, a fact bearing potentially ominous political implications. Unfulfilled expectations (and it is reasonable to anticipate that they are bound to remain largely unfulfilled) may eventually lead to a deterioration of support from bureaucratic and other educated elites. If a government cannot produce to the level expected of it, a strategy may be needed which both reduces those expectations and/or transfers them to a locus potentially more capable of meeting them. We have argued elsewhere, but can reiterate here that a policy of selected decentralization which places an increasing amount of the development burden upon the shoulders of regional governments is such a strategy.[45]

Summary and Conclusions

Although eschewing the opportunity to make a final judgment on the military takeover of the regent positions in the three provinces under study, some tentative conclusions are warranted. First, the hereditary principles has been broken in striking fashion and the regent roles have been filled by men who are less

status-conscious and apparently more devoted to performance norms. These new bupatis are apt to have little trouble in performing the traditional police function and there are indications that some are inclined to go far beyond that role in the way of introducing change. The main problem they face is that of eliciting popular participation for their programs. The bupati role, itself, generates a modicum of support among the people, but whether or not military officers can transcend the command philosophy of organizational behavior into which they have been socialized is still an open question. Their tenure is yet too short to tell how many bureaucratic entrepreneurs will emerge.

The tjamats are traditional career civil servants who have now been asked to become modernizers or "agents of change." Their education, mobility, and tasks are increasing. How successfully their village monitoring role can be transformed to accommodate the new role is a matter of conjecture, but the obstacles are sizeable. For most, the tjamat position is the highest they will attain, meaning that there are few built-in incentives for performance. Secondly, they do not have their own budgets, but act as field agents for the regents. Under these circumstances it is unlikely that they will find the right or opportunity to manipulate resource inputs for greater governmental output. Finally, they face a disadvantage in serving under military officers, many of whom are openly skeptical about the capabilities of the pamong pradja. Until greater military confidence in the civilian bureaucratic corps is developed, many regents will

doubtless continue to deal directly with the villages on development matters, bypassing the tjamats almost entirely.

Nevertheless, the tjamat role will continue to be an important one in the development effort. The villages must inevitably remain the main target for Indonesian development in the foreseeable future;and the tjamat's chief resource, that of information, will likely be in increasing demand. As village programs in agriculture, education, communications, health and family planning grow, it is he who must attempt to coordinate them. Without control over funding, however, his role will be dominated with responsibility that is unsupported by real authority.

FOOTNOTES

1. Haluan, Padang, West Sumatra, October 25, 1969. Two other minor conditions were appended, conditions that have become pro forma. First, a candidate may not be under permanent ban by the justice department, and second, he may not have been involved in the attempted communist coups of 1965--either directly or indirectly.

2. A bupati is the chief executive officer of a regency (kabupaten). A walikota is the mayor or head of a municipality (kotamadya). The rank, position, and status of each is the same. Only the title is different.

3. See Herbert Feith and Daniel S. Lev, op. cit., pp. 32-46.

4. See Babad Tanah Djawi, edited by Meinsma, Leiden: 1941; cited in Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century, Ithaca: Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project, 1968, p. 89.

5. B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, Part I, "The Position of the Regents from the Days of the Dutch East India Company to the Constitutional Regulation of 1854," Bandung: Sumur Bandung, second edition, 1957, p. 201

6. Ibid., p. 205.

7. Bernard H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of Indonesia, The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1943, p. 247.

8. Quoted in B. Schrieke, op. cit., p. 211. The effective date for this changeover was January 1, 1809.

9. Sophia Raffles, Memoir of the Life and Public Service of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, 1830, p. 215. Quoted in B. Schrieke, p. 214.

10. See Vlekke, op. cit., p. 247. The introduction of the culture system however, was not necessarily done for altruistic purposes. The costly Java War and Holland's own war with Belgium had left the home country's treasury bare. One way to replenish the coffers was through the extensive cultivation of crops in the Indies which were suitable for the European market. Van der Kolff viewed the first 20 years of the culture system (1830-1850) as being "characterized by

an increasing wave of extortion, without any consideration for the interests of the people." Moreover, the regents did not suffer heavily during this period, having been granted both land and certain cultural percentages. See G. H. Van der Kolff, "European Influence on Native Agriculture," in B. Schrieke, ed., The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilisations in the Malay Archipelago, Batavia: G. Kolff & Co., 1929, pp. 108-109.

11. See J. D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration, 1950-1960, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961. Also, Gerald S. Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem and Decentralization in Indonesia: Legislative Aspects, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958 and 1957.

12. Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Taksiran Penduduk Indonesia Pada Achir Tahun: 1961-1971, Djakarta, 1970.

13. Interview with the Political Adviser to the Military Commander for Central Java, March 7, 1970. As has been pointed out, the provincial governor theoretically carries the greatest weight in selecting the bupatis. Normally, however, he is outranked by the regional military commander who frequently has occasion to offer his own preferences. In a situation where the governor is also an Army general but of lower rank, little imagination is needed to understand the flow of influence.

14. His role is essentially non-activist, for among other things it was discovered that in eight months' time he had not visited one of his sub districts only six kilometers distant.

15. See "Wanokalada: A Case Study in Local Administration," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, July, 1970, p. 89.

16. Interview, Political Adviser to the Regional Military Commander, Semarang, March 7, 1970. The delicate job of sustaining political balance in Central Java apparently discourages many able military officers from considering the bupati position, thus making it difficult for the Army to develop a sufficiently large pool of high-calibre talent for this assignment. This accounts for the above-mentioned interviewee's admission that some of the Army bupatis are good and some are not-so-good.

17. Interview, bupati from West Sumatra, November 18, 1969.

18. A former bupati in West Sumatra who lost a recent election bid to continue in office argued that the bupati offices are frequently purchased. In his own case, he told of having a plurality of three votes guaranteed just prior to the

election. But by election time the same day his opponent had paid a high enough price for the votes necessary to win in the balloting.

19. At the end of 1960, 32 out of 34 regents in Central Java were from the pamong pradja. A majority of them had either been PNI members or held strong PNI sympathies. By contrast, in March, 1970, only five out of Central Java's thirty-five regents were from the pamong pradja, most of them having been replaced by Army officers. For information on the situation in 1960, see John Legge, op. cit., p. 219-221.

20. Herbert Feith, op. cit., p. 312

21. "Moonlighting" is too inaccurate to be used in this context. Nearly all officials have secondary and tertiary occupations which draw heavily upon their time. This problem will be explored in much greater depth below in Chapter VI.
    One military bupati in West Sumatra proudly demonstrated the discipline he had developed in his own office. At the stroke of 2 p.m. all kabupaten officials emerged from their offices to return home for the day, the only occasion in the writer's Indonesian experience in which all employees waited for the appointed time to stop work. This work discipline apparently has very shallow roots, however, for other informants indicated that whenever the cat (bupati) is away, the mice (civilian subordinates) are much less taken with the idea of working a full day.

22. J. D. Legge, op. cit., p. 16.

23. See Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962, pp. 31-32. In South Sulawesi and Eastern Indonesia, such organization did not take place until after Independence.

24. Ibid., pp. 149-151. Much of this interference took the form of an imposition of "hobby projects"--the newest whim of the rotating superior officials. Ever burdened and confused by these impositions, the peasant farmer tended to become passive in the face of demands for change. See ibid., pp. 232-234.

25. See Koentjaraningrat, "Tjelepar: A Village in South Central Java," op. cit., p. 278. See also Selosoemardjan, op. cit., 1962, p. 153.

26. See Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, 1957, pp. 28, 45-46.

27. Interview with a tjamat near Kudus, March 12, 1970.

28. An official who has the job of Coordinator for First and Second Level Governments in the Governor's Office of West Sumatra argued that whenever some of the tjamats make the rounds of their villages, they expect to return home with sacks of rice.

29. As a rule, it is very difficult to obtain accurate responses to potentially sensitive questions from the lower ranks of any Indonesian organization. Criticism of an immediate superior, either direct or implied, is eschewed almost in the extreme.

29a. Instruksi Gubernur Kepala Daerah Propinsi Djawa Tengah, No. Um G 2/2/1, April 7, 1969.

30. See Survey Struktur Pemerintahan Desa, Semarang: Governor's Office, 1969, pp. 44-45.

31. Ibid., pp. 86-88. In another question which asked "To whom are village governmental officials responsible in carrying out their duties," nearly all regents responded with two answers: to the village assembly and to the tjamat. The clearest answer came from Kabupaten Sukohardjo: "In autonomous activities village officials are responsible to the village assembly. In the field of delegated powers (medebewind) they are responsible to the bupati through the tjamat. Medebewind powers are in fact less powers than obligations to carry out policy tasks assigned by higher levels of government.

32. Interview with the Head of Personnel, Governor's Office, Makassar, January 10, 1970.

33. Sources: Governors' Offices, Semarang and Padang

34. In West Sumatra, the academy is used as a side-track for a few higher civil servants who are out of favor. They are banished from line positions in the governor's office to serve extended tours as instructors for future subdistrict officers.

35. Criticism such as this should, however, be tempered with the fact that leading educators throughout the world have not yet clearly identified the type of educational content most appropriate for inducing change.

From our sample of 226 tjamats, we derived the following educational breakdown: elementary school (15.2 percent), junior high school (27.7 percent), senior high school (17.0 percent), civil service academy (29.5 percent), other academy (4.0 percent), and university degree (6.7 percent).

36. The sample response of 54 percent with landholdings is probably slightly understated for at least three reasons: many of the tjamats may be too young to have already inherited family land; in West Sumatra matrilineal inheritance laws confuse the issue of ownership; and there is a tradition of underreporting taxable land.

37. The sample totalled 146 officials in salary grade II. They were taken in roughly equal numbers from the province capitals of West Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and Central Java. See Appendix I for a further explanation.

38. This figure was derived from a sample of 157 provincial executives (salary grades III and IV) in the same three provinces. See Appendix I for further explanation.

39. See Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963, p. 97.

40. By ethnic group we refer to the Indonesian suku bangsa. The term normally applies to a distinct group defined by culture and geographical origin.

One very strong socializing experience which shows up in our data is the university experience shared by higher level regional officials. For those in the Ministry of Home Affairs, it happened mostly at Gadjah Mada University in the Social-Politics Faculty; for those in the Ministry of Finance, the Academy in Djakarta; for those in Public Works, the Institute of Technology at Bandung; and for those in the Ministry of Education/Culture, the local teacher's college in most cases.

41. "Poor communications" constitute another obvious problem faced by the tjamats. Many village complexes are very difficult to reach, although 60.4 percent of the sample has the use of motor-scooters provided by the provincial governments.

Aside from the four differences between the tjamats and higher level officials in their identification of problems, the degree to which their responses coincide on the remaining questions is remarkable. The concern over the mental attitudes of government officials, for example, probably reflects mutual concern over the performance of subordinates.

42. Following improvements in employee discipline, the sample listed other solutions in the following order: (1) increased training for their subordinates, (2) greater social welfare benefits for government officials, (3) new equipment and facilities for their offices, (4) increased salaries, and (5) the strengthening of a public service ethic. Upset by current discipline problems in his own office, one tjamat urged that he be given the right to "Take legal-administrative action against those who are lazy or stone-headed (kepala batu)."

43. Caution is required because of the strong identifications which the tjamats of Central Java have with the PNI and those in West Sumatra with Mohammadijah. These loyalties doubtless affect perceptions of party activities, but how much cannot be told.

A modified view of political party development can be found in responses to a question which asked the tjamats to rank three specific kinds of development in their order of importance: (1) administrative progress, (2) economic and social progress, and (3) political progress. Economic and social progress was ranked first by 75.8 percent; 19.5 percent ranked administrative progress first; and only 4.7 percent put political progress first (sample size 226 with 11 not responding). While these responses bespeak a generally low regard for politics, a few of the more reflective officials argued that more rapid economic development was unlikely to take place until the political house had been put in order. While it is unclear from the data precisely what the meaning of political progress might be, participatory democracy through the free action of political parties appears to be in the minds of most of those interviewed.

44. Statistics covering officials from nearly all of Djakarta's government offices (93,200) show that 85.9 percent are men and 14.1 percent are women. In the top two salary grades (III and IV), 88 percent are men and 12 percent women. At these higher levels women are found to be more strongly represented in the Departments of Education/Culture, Health, and Justice. At lower levels, they are strongly represented in the Department of Religion. Source: Statistik Pegawai Pemerintah KBN Djakarta, Central Bureau of Statistics, June 1, 1969, pp. 3-5.

45. "Indonesia's Administrative System: Its Capacity and Problems in Connection with Economic Development," Djakarta, January, 1970, (Mimeographed). See also, R. S. Smith and Theodore M. Smith, op. cit., 1971.

CHAPTER V

PRODUCTIVITY PROBLEMS: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

> The universe is ordered by hard and stern rules--leading to an attitude of conservative traditionalism, a clinging to established customs, a distaste for change or for whatever may disturb the regular flow of events.
>
> In 400 years no basic changes seem to have taken place in the structural organization of the Mataram state, nor in the ideological bases of state-life.[1]

Statecraft in the Later Mataram period was designed to contain change. Performance was primarily judged in terms of the ability of the king's servants to maintain stability throughout the kingdom. During the colonial period the fundamental objective of the government apparatus remained essentially the same: the maintenance of political, economic, and social control. Compliance was achieved either by using coercion or by an implicit willingness to use it on the part of the colonial regime. In resource terms, this type of administration relied on a mixture of coercion and formal authority. With the successful struggle for independence, the resource position of the government apparatus underwent major changes. Aside from new confusion over organizational goals, the Indonesian bureaucracy found itself short of skilled manpower, uncertain about its organizational structure, and with an altogether new mix of resources. Coercion could not now be used to implement policy; decisions required a broader base of authority and

were subject to challenge by new groups competing for influence and legitimacy. In this situation, the loci of real authority were not clear. During the first ten years of independence, economic resources also became scarcer. While state revenues decreased due to both an economic decline beginning the late 1950's and a concomitant slippage in people's willingness to pay taxes, the bureaucracy grew rapidly in numbers and functions. Personnel costs rose as a percentage of the total budget until in the late 1960's they totaled close to 70 percent at the national level and even higher at lower levels.

In the post-1965 period there has emerged a clear mandate for economic change. The Five-Year Economic Development Plan (REPELITA) lists a multitude of new programs and projects with whose execution or implementation the various segments of the bureaucracy are expressly charged. Economic planning is not new, but the level of commitment given to REPELITA is new.[2] There is now genuine concern for output--for bureaucratic productivity--among civil and military elites. At the same time, there is widespread recognition by these elites of the fact that there is much room for improvement in the state apparatus. In the words of a recent confidential, high-level report, "In an honest way we must admit that the condition of our government administration has to be put in the category of 'still weak' (masih lemah)."[3]

The purpose of this chapter is to identify some of those weaknesses and their causes. The methodology employed is a simple one. Ideally the productivity of an organization is measurable through a comparison of an output with one or more resource inputs--

either over time or with another production unit. Analysis of this kind requires that there be some means of identifying and measuring both inputs and outputs. In the present work we have not attempted to make such measurements, primarily because we did not know which production variables were worthy of extended scrutiny. Nor could we tell what general ecological variables most strongly condition the behavior of Indonesian public organizations. In a very real sense, then, this work constitutes a pre-survey. Through the use of interview schedules which were applied to hundreds of provincial officials of varying levels and functions, we have attempted to generate suggestive data on specific productivity problems--current problems faced by public organizations in raising performance levels. In order to develop a representative sample, three provinces and four ministries were chosen. The samples were further broken down into both higher and lower level bureaucrats--those in top, executive line positions and those in subordinate staff positions.

By directly soliciting Indonesian responses to questions concerning those factors which inhibit increased productivity and higher performance levels, this work claims two advantages. First, it captures perceptions of problems from those officials who are in a position to alter resource combinations in order to achieve greater productivity. And second, it avoids the "neo-colonialist" trap wherein the principles of Western organization theory are applied without consideration for the sui generis character of indigenous institutions. The one thing more dangerous than the Indonesian's belief that only Western administrative science and

experience can improve his office's output is the Westerner's confidence in the universality of his own principles of organization.

The pages that follow contain a review of those productivity problems which Indonesian bureaucrats most frequently identified. The data and an analysis which clothe each of the problems provide the bases for testable hypotheses which follow them. No greater claim is made for this section than that a series of variables which are probably central to "getting things done" in Indonesian public organizations have been identified.

Structural Variables

Heuristic purposes lead us to divide productivity problems or variables into those that are primarily structural and those that are mostly motivational. The problem of authority, for example, is defined by both structure (an official's position and role in an organization) and motivation (his desire to maximize and utilize the formal authority accorded his role or his desire to enlarge the assigned role). As a case in point, the regent, as head of the second-level region, is delegated authority for minding the household of the regency. What he accomplishes in this task, however, is likely to be heavily contingent upon those factors which motivate him to use that authority for productive purposes. Similarly, motivation may be strongly influenced by structure. A very highly centralized, decision-making apparatus has obvious implications for the motivation of low-level, subordinate officials. Despite these overlaps, the problems outlined

here are either more structural or more motivational and have been divided accordingly. This chapter deals with structural constraints; the following chapter with motivational constraints.

Authority. The most fundamental of all problems faced by Indonesian public organizations is that of the distribution of authority. In what must be a fascinating paradox, there is at the same time both too little a concentration and too much a concentration of authority within the bureaucracy. This apparent paradox sorts itself out if we distinguish between the macro-view (that of the entire bureaucracy) and the micro-perspective (that of any single organizational component of the bureaucracy). First, we will look at the broader picture.

The Macro-centralization of Authority. During the Later Mataram period in Java, the structure of state administration was fairly clear cut.

> Because of the central position of the king, the whole apparatus of administration was inevitably an extension of the king's rule. Whatever power his administrators might have was derived from above.[4]

This pattern of rule was perpetuated by the Dutch colonial regime, primarily because the only way a small foreign elite could dominate the archipelago was to centralize most of the available resources necessary for control. In Clive Day's words,

> . . . the most striking characteristic is the immense concentration of power in the Governor General, who in his sole person represents the royal authority, and who is responsible for the conduct of all affairs. Both in legislation and in administration he is without rival and with few checks in India; the only serious limitation on his power is that imposed by the government in the Netherlands.[5]

Finally, this pattern of centralized government continues in force at the present time, partly because of exigencies attending Indonesia's struggle to form an integrated nation-state. The Dutch attempt in 1948 to establish a United States of Indonesia was perceived as a threat to post-independence unity and national integrity. Moreover, the potential separatist forces inherent in ethnic, language, geographic, religious, adat, and economic differences gave rise to an obvious need for what Geertz calls an "integrative revolution." These facts were not lost on the country's revolutionary leaders whose early efforts to shape the national bureaucracy included clear-cut attempts to maintain and strengthen centralized administration. In short, modern Indonesia's governmental structure is a legacy of traditional Indonesian statecraft, of the Dutch colonial structure, and of a widely perceived need to build unity in a highly fragmented and diversified national culture.

Evaluating the productivity benefits and costs of this highly skewed distribution of authority demands sensitivity because, as was noted in Chapter One, the pattern of authority distribution was not conceived in common productivity terms. The structure was primarily designed to serve the goals of stability and unity, or more mundanely, control functions. Therefore, the attempt to evaluate bureaucratic productivity must be carried out in full knowledge that this is not the main goal which the system was structured to serve. Still, however, there is compelling justification for analyzing the productivity costs, particularly so because, as we have shown, goals may be changing (shifting from

stability to productivity) and Indonesia's statesmen have a need to know how well the new goals can be served by the present structure of authority.

One initial assumption is that productivity is a function of the distribution of authority and that this function is curvilinear. Precise correlations cannot be established, but the following diagram illustrates the type of relationship between the independent variable (authority distribution) and the dependent variable (productivity). (See Diagram I)

DIAGRAM NUMBER I



Too high a concentration of authority tends to suffer several disadvantages. (1) It restricts the opportunity for potential change-agents at lower levels to enter into the process of development. Most studies of entrepreneurial history indicate that those most likely to make breakthroughs in assembling new resource combinations do not come from the ranks of career bureaucrats, but

often originate in underprivileged groups. (2) It tends to delay decisions and their implementation because of the long communications process involved. (3) Centralization requires the application of a multitude of controls through the issuance of laws and regulations because personal control cannot handle distant administrative activities. (4) Concentrated authority usually requires the issuance of general regulations which may not fit the needs of heterogeneous cultures. In effect, it denies the existence of these differences.

A topical example, which illustrates not only the high concentration of authority but also some of its possible costs, is that of Indonesia's revenue system. Between 1952 and 1970, revenues collected by regional and local governments amounted to between only 1.4 and 3.4 percent of total government revenues. The Central Government in Djakarta collected 98.6 percent of all government revenues in the fiscal year 1969-1970. The costs implicit in this concentration of revenue-raising authority are of two kinds. First, regional tax officials are probably less motivated in their work because they are serving a distant (almost alien) government in Djakarta rather than the revenue needs of their own communities. Second, the almost total absence of any relationship between tax payments and services provided by the government serves to encourage tax-dodging, thus reducing revenues still further. If a general lack of tax-consciousness (kesadaran membajar padjak) is indeed the major problem faced by tax officials, as they constantly maintain, it would appear that over-centralization of revenue raising authority is a main cause.[6]

The diagram presented above on page178 reflects the hypothesis that a limited increase in the distribution of authority would bring productivity increases, but that diminishing returns would likely set in not only very rapidly but precipitously. The basis for this hypothesis is the slack of potential which we identified in the provincial and regency levels of the Indonesian government during several months of field work in the three provinces. The hypothesized, precipitous fall in productivity that would attend very much of a deconcentration of authority stems from observable patterns in Indonesian administrative culture and from limited administrative infrastructure at lower levels of government. Indonesian society, particularly the dominant Javanese sector, clings to the notion that the king or supreme temporal authority is the main medium "linking the micro-cosmos of man with the macro-cosmos of god." As such, the king's powers are unchallengeable and unlimited.[7] This traditional view has given way to a general deference to and dependence upon high authority. To disperse authority very far would be to disturb a pattern fixed by tradition and custom. It would be order-shattering.[8] Aside from these cultural parameters, there are also relatively obvious limits in lower level administrative infrastructure. Broadly conceived, these include limitations on manpower (both skilled and unskilled), minimal financial resources, weak communication systems, and the lack of planning structures capable of assessing the economic as well as the political costs and benefits of comparative resource investments. They might also include lower levels of commitment to the goals of the national regime.

Coordination. Two frequently identified problems in the structure of the national bureaucracy are those which stem from failures in coordination and the overlapping of functions. Both arise from a lack of concentrated authority and are particularly instructive for showing the diminishing returns of authority dispersion. The main coordination problem in the national bureaucracy is not one of vertical coordination which is usually very smooth because of congruent authority structures, but one of horizontal coordination between and within departments. While this truth has an almost universal quality to it, it appears to have exceptional significance in the Indonesian case.

To take a specific example, the Ministry of Home Affairs has statutory authority for coordinating the efforts of all governmental departments which are operating at the provincial level and below. This means that the governor, the regent, and the subdistrict officer are, in theory, supposed to supervise all agency activities at the province, the regency and the village levels. Generally speaking, this pamong pradja chain-of-command has prime responsibility for routine administration, and the various other central government agencies such as agriculture and public works are responsible for the technical implementation of development projects.

That the functional agencies should have technical responsibility is not questioned. Problems arise, however, when two or more of these vertical technical agencies are, by necessity, required to coordinate their activities. Since the development plans are largely drawn up at the national level, it is customary

for field units to refer coordination problems (implicit compromises in the original plans) upward in their own organizations--even to Djakarta. In the words of one report, "All too frequently the technical agencies in the regions believe they stand independent by themselves, such that they pay no attention to the regional government."[9] Another report, from a different province, identifies the greatest development implementation problem of all as being the "zigzagging between two institutions, especially in connection with authority (wewenang or hak) and responsibility (kewadjiban or tanggungdjawab)."[10] To counteract these uncertainties and time-consuming tendencies, the pamong pradja has been called upon to mediate and resolve the issues at stake. But available evidence suggests that the strategy does not work very well. Quoting Presidential Instruction No. 4/1969, the Governor of South Sulawesi notes that he is supposed to be the "Government Administrator, the Development Administrator, and the Administrator for all public activities (in his province)." But, he adds, without the necessary authority to coordinate, this responsibility "constitutes only Wishful Thinking."[11]

To summarize, there is an important horizontal coordination problem in the Indonesian bureaucracy; a mechanism has been established to deal with it; but this mechanism lacks the necessary authority to perform this function. The question then arises as to why such a concentration of authority is necessary, given the fact that the general goal of economic development is broadly accepted. Four apparent reasons stand out: first, coordination normally involves a threat to an organization's resource position

for it means that project personnel money must, in some way, be shared. Second, the technical agencies do not like local politics to interfere with their work. Their projects are nationally assigned and the intrusion of the governor or the regent is often perceived as a politicization of their activities, a typically professional response. Third, there are a variety of cleavages within and across different government organizations. These may spring from differences in ethnicity, education, religion, language, and party affiliation.[12] Finally, there is a general tendency for nearly all officials to look upward for directions; a preference not to tackle hard decisions at their own levels. Horizontal coordination, however, demands that decisions not be referred upward but that they be resolved without the assistance of a higher official.[13]

Overlapping of Functions. A second case in which decentralized authority conflicts with national goals is found in the problem of overlapping functions. Several technical agencies as well as the Ministry of Home Affairs have assumed repetitive functions over time at the provincial, regency, subdistrict and village levels. By way of example, our study examined village adult education programs. There are a minimum of five agencies which have such programs, more yet if one takes a broad view of the agricultural extension and public health services.[14] All of these programs tend to be poorly financed, suffer severely from poor communications, and are operated with less than minimal facilities. In fact, some of them have no more than enough money to pay officials' salaries. Presumably, the integration of their efforts

would reduce personnel costs and generate the necessary resources to develop an effective program. This has not taken place because central government authority for these activities is diffused. Without such authority, no one agency can gain enough resources to put forward an effective program. This conclusion does not presume to argue the merits of such diffused authority, because the political returns in sustaining several programs may outweigh the importance of their organizational outputs. We claim only to have identified the probable costs and to have shown that such costs are directly attributable to the dispersion of authority.

Micro-centralization of Authority. The pattern of concentrated authority found in individual governmental organizations is similar to that just described in the whole governmental system, only more so. An office head (kepala kantor) normally permits only very limited amounts of his authority to be assumed by subordinates, and subordinates even more rarely request greater authority. This phenomenon reaches both amusing and frustrating heights whenever office heads are away from their jobs. It is not exaggerating the point to say that, in effect, the office closes down for all new business. No one has been delegated the authority to make decisions and only the most routine of considerations has a chance of being entertained. Even if entertained, chances are high that the matter will not be disposed of because a necessary signature or stamp (tjap) from the office head is lacking. This pattern of behavior is observable across most public organizations.[15]

One major correlative to this behavior is relatively obvious. Most decisions flow automatically to the top of an organization, and the head finds himself deluged with decisions to be made, some of major importance but most of a routine or trivial nature. It is said that President Sukarno waded through reams of papers to be signed as late as five a.m. Apocryphal or not, there is an observable tendency for office heads to become severely overburdened. Our survey of higher and lower officials showed that almost twice as many of the former felt overworked than those in the latter group, a finding which even so appears to be understated. These observations do not point to a purposeful, personalistic style of rule or administration that is found in some Latin American countries, but rather reflect traditional authority structures. Our efforts to map this structure proved useful not only in absolute, but in comparative terms as well. Data in Table I indicate that half the high-level executives in the regional governments have never received decision-making authority for non-routine matters and that fewer yet of their staff members have ever received such authority. (See Table I.). The subdistrict officers, discussed in Chapter Four, show slightly higher levels of autonomy, perhaps reflecting the fact that they are essentially "field men" and are the only ones in the above samples who do not work in the offices of their superiors. The high rate of "no response" from the two groups of line officials is subject to interpretation, but we suspect that most of these non-respondents would fall into the "never" or "seldom" categories.[16]

TABLE I.

Responses of Regional Officials to the Question:

"How often does your superior permit you to make decisions in his name that are of a non-routine nature?"

Frequency of Delegation	Responses of					
	Higher Level Officials		Lower Level Officials		Tjamats	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Never	53	(50.0)	78	(55.3)	64	(44.1)
Seldom	18	(17.0)	17	(12.1)	10	(6.9)
Sometimes	23	(21.7)	38	(27.0)	47	(32.4)
Often	12	(11.3)	8	(5.7)	24	(16.6)
No Response	51		5		103	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

A common complaint among Indonesian bureaucratic executives is the one that their "subordinates are not very capable" (bawahan2 kurang mampu). That this is doubtless true is less important than the factors which make it true. Rather than belabor the matter of training opportunities under the Dutch which were so restricted, the frequent irrelevance of Continental higher education to current bureaucratic roles, and the well-intended but questionable utility of short, "upgrading" courses that are so prevalent, our own bias is to see this weakness in authority terms. As long as responsibility and authority are not delegated to junior staff members, their pursuit of security in functionary roles is likely to remain undisturbed. Numerous interviews with young university graduates in the bureaucracy brought forth the conclusion that they very rarely participate in important decisions, that they would generally prefer the safety afforded by non-participation. This tendency can, in part, be explained by the shortage of manipulatable rewards in the governmental system; promotions and meaningful salary increases only rarely attend an increased measure of responsibility and authority, as the following chapter will show.

Thus, beyond the structure of authority, there are other contributing factors which work against the development of bureaucratic entrepreneurs at lower levels. The overall result might be called an "authority trap." Responsibility and authority are not delegated because subordinates are not capable of handling it, and they are not capable of handling it because they have neither sought nor been given experience with responsibility and

authority.[17] Elsewhere, we have argued normatively that this trap can only be broken and the full potential of staff subordinates can be exploited if office heads become willing to delegate limited degrees of responsibility and authority in equal amounts to their subordinates. Such a policy change is fraught with risks but the potential returns render it a promising strategy for offices heads whose own positions are relatively secure.[18]

Communications. In 1969 an unsealed letter addressed to one of the national ministries was mistakenly delivered to the writer's home. It was dated four months earlier and originated in a field office of the ministry in the province of East Nusa Tenggara. In plaintive, humble language, the letter noted that officials in that office had not received salary payments in the previous six months and went on to ask if someone could help out with this problem. While this incident is by no means the general condition in Indonesia, none of the Indonesians with whom it was discussed showed any trace of surprise.

In a previous chapter it was shown how informal communications serve to accommodate some public and private demands for government service. It remains for us to look at the formal side of communications. To begin with geography, the country is a 3,000-mile-long archipelago, some of whose provincial capitals still cannot yet be reached in a scheduled, one-day airplane flight. Surface transportation between Djakarta and almost all of the provinces is by water, in some cases requiring about two weeks. Reaching down from the provincial capitals, roads in Java are fair but in the Outer Islands there is very little except for

a few main arteries. It is not yet possible to drive a car from one end of Sumatra to the other. In some of the "developed" areas of Sulawesi and Sumatra, villages may be two to three days walk from the nearest road; in Kalimantan (Borneo) they are far more remote. In checking to see how often education inspectors made their "monthly" visits to some of the small islands off the coast of South Sulawesi, it was discovered that these visitations "take place about twice a year--if the winds are right." Sailing vessels are still heavily relied upon. In short, the Government of Indonesia faces a communications challenge encountered by very few other countries at this time.

In Chapter Four bupati and tjamat communications downward with the villages were mapped. Moving upward it was discovered that most bupatis do not rely on established communications infrastructure in their dealings with their governors' offices, but usually make personal visitations to carry out their business with the first-level regional government. One regent in West Sumatra, who lives about two-hours' drive from the provincial capital, put it very simply: "I don't use the mail service for communications with the governor's office. One letter which I sent three years ago has never been answered and many others have been lost. I deliver all letters to Padang personally."[19] Another regent in the same province indicated that it takes three or four days for a letter to reach the provincial capital. Since it takes him only one-half hour by jeep, he prefers direct communication.[20]

To better understand the level of efficiency of communication by mail, two strategies were employed. First, the responders

in the regional economic planner sample were asked to describe the status of mail service between Djakarta and their own provincial offices. Their responses, recorded in Table II, indicate that the majority of provinces enjoy reasonably good mail service (one week or less), but that there are still many areas where it takes three weeks or more. If these figures are doubled to account for two-way flow and if a month is added for turn-around time in Djakarta, it is evident that months may pass before a province receives a response to its request. (See Table II) This time may be lengthened considerably if the request contains some kind of demand for funding or for an interpretation of current regulations or directives. In the first case there is a tendency not to respond at all, and in the second, the response often must be decided upon and authorized by the minister himself. Almost all executives in the provincial governments recounted multiple instances in which they have never received either an acknowledgment or a response to their inquiries. One official in West Sumatra indicated that it normally takes between two and three months to get an answer from Djakarta: "Often we receive the responses long after the need has disappeared."[21]

The second strategy was a very simple one. The heads of two ministry regional offices in West Sumatra were asked to take the last ten letters they had received from Djakarta and to compare the dates of the letters with the dates that they were received. The time lapse would provide indicators on the efficiency of downward vertical communication. In one office, the elapsed time varied from 19 days to 88 days (average - 53 days); in the other

TABLE II

Responses of Regional Economic Planners to the Question:

"How long does it take a letter sent from Djakarta to reach your provincial office?"

Number of Weeks	Number of Responders	Number of Weeks	Number of Responders
1 week or less	32	6	0
2	7	7	0
3	2	8	0
4	3	9	0
5	4	10	1
		More than 10	0

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969.

it took from 12 days to 51 days for a letter from Djakarta to reach the office (average = 33 days). Two additional considerations must be noted: first, these indicators are drawn from vertical communication downward, the most efficient of all communication channels. Second, the figures given do not include "conception time," the time consumed in drawing up the responses. Normally, a letter bounces up and down one or more times in a Djakarta ministry before it escapes.

Not all written communications are this slow, however. The Ministries of Finance and Public Works, which appear to place more value on time as a resource than do other agencies, send most of their communications by airmail and often rely on a special delivery service established independently of the postal service by the country's national airline. The regional offices of the Ministry of Education rarely use even regular airmail service, even for priority project business, but this fact appears to be less a function of time-awareness than a budgetary consideration. Their budgets are so small that they cannot afford to send airmai communications.[22]

For officials in the five, first-level regional governments in Java, it is not too difficult to arrange for personal visits to the capital city of Djakarta. Such visits may be carried out as often as every month and, in the words of several officials, are immensely productive for the number of problems that are solved. In an effort to establish a tentative mapping of the frequency of these visits, the regional economic planners were further asked to indicate how often someone from their offices made official visits

TABLE III

Responses of Regional Economic Planners to the Questions:

(1) "How often does an official from your office come to Djakarta on government business?"

(2) "How often do officials from Djakarta visit your province?"

Frequency of Visits	Provincial Visits to Djakarta		Djakarta Visits to the Provinces	
	No.	%	No.	%
Weekly	4	(8.7)	2	(4.1)
Monthly	16	(34.8)	16	(32.7)
Quarterly	10	(21.8)	9	(18.4)
Semi-annually	7	(15.2)	6	(12.4)
Annually	6	(13.0)	9	(18.4)
Less than once a year	3	(6.5)	1	(2.0)
Never	0		1	(2.0)
Don't know	0		5	(10.0)
No Response	8		5	

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969.

to Djakarta and vice versa. The 1969 findings which appear in Table III doubtless deserve modification now that the Five-Year Development Plan is funding increased regional participation in national policy-making. By our own estimates, travel between the center and the regions has increased by 50 to 100 percent between 1969 and 1971. Nonetheless, it is clear that offices in Java have far greater access to the Central Government than do those in the Outer Islands. In an effort to counteract this tendency, most governors in the Outer Island provinces have established "embassies" in Djakarta to represent them with Central Government ministries. Long personal experience in dealing with these "embassies" leads us to conclude that they serve primarily as information conduits and that, by and large, they are ineffective as provincial advocates. As one governor puts it, "My representatives cannot get appointments with the ministers and their deputies; I have to do this myself."[23] If a tracking beeper were attached to each governor who visits Djakarta, one would find that in any given three to four-day span, signals would emanate from a minimum of ten to fifteen Central Government offices. Personal advocacy is paramount as a means of effective communication in the Indonesian bureaucracy.

Finally, the matter of communications is both one of infrastructure and system norms. That the downward flow of information is much more effective than the upward flow results not from differences in facilities, but from varying demands for information. Djakarta executives tend to discourage the upward flow of information for a number of reasons. Initially, they tend to be

overburdened already; second, there is also a tendency for them to lack confidence in subordinate judgments; third, conditions in the different provinces may be so varied that it is too costly for them to attempt to incorporate them into the decision-making process; and finally, the traditional system of reporting produces voluminous records that are seldom helpful in connection with reaching "change" decisions. Most of the reporting practices originated with the Dutch colonial regime and were not designed to thrust options forward, but to provide a monitor for control purposes. This lack of demand for information at higher levels reflects directly back upon provincial and regency government offices which find little incentive for giving much attention to the provision of information. During the 1964-69 period some regional offices even ceased to submit requested budgets to the Central Government because "they knew that no one would pay attention to them."[24]

It is obvious, then that much technically relevant information never reaches the capital city of Djakarta where most of the decisions are made.[25] Comparatively speaking, regional officials have a different resource mix than do those in the Central Government: higher on information but lower on authority and funding. That there is rather widespread regional dissatisfaction with this imbalance is shown in Table IV. Regional officials are often not only excluded from the decision process, but they are subsequently required to administer programs which may be inappropriate for their regions in varying degrees. Since the demand for additional regional autonomy is still very much at issue in Indonesia

TABLE IV

Responses of Regional Civil Servants to the Question:

"In your opinion, how much freedom to make decisions on its own should be given by the Central Government to the provinces?"

Response: Provinces Should Have:	Responders							
	Economic Planners		Higher Level Officials		Lower Level Officials		Tjamats	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
More freedom than at present	38	(70.4)	86	(54.8)	66	(45.2)	113	(50.0)
Less freedom than at present	0	(0.0)	6	(3.8)	3	(2.1)	6	(2.7)
Division of authority is already adequate	12	(22.2)	60	(38.2)	71	(48.6)	98	(43.4)
No response	4	(7.4)	5	(3.2)	6	(4.1)	9	(4.0)

Source: Primary data from field survey work, 1969 and 1970.

today, it would appear that national investments in regional information would prove to be an optimal, low-cost strategy for coping with current demands. Such investments could take one of two forms. Either provincial officials could more frequently be brought to Djakarta to participate in the decision-making process, or an increasing number of decisions could be delegated to regional governors and their deputies.

Summary and Conclusions

Indonesia's governmental structure is comparatively centralized, a condition deriving not least of all from the need to create unity in a highly fragmented national culture. As this need, real or perceived, declines in importance relative to national productivity goals, we would expect to see increasing demands for greater regional authority in decision-making and revenue raising. And as potential separatist threats appear to wane in the eyes of national leaders, there will probably be increased willingness on their part to meet some of these demands. This, in fact, is already taking place. Selected taxing authority has been transferred to the regions and there is now much broader regional participation in national development planning than has ever been the case.

Coordination, overlapping, and micro-centralization problems will continue to place limits on development efforts, but they are not problems easily dealt with by means of structural manipulations. Responsibility might be assigned in such a way as to reduce the need for coordination between agencies, thereby sidestepping the

problem. But this strategy could easily give way to functional overlapping and/or counter-productive agency competition. Finally, communications will continue to improve with the development of infrastructure, but the more fundamental problem of eliciting relevant regional informational inputs will inevitably demand compromises. Indonesia's variegated cultures provide too many special conditions to be accommodated by national policy under the current structure of authority.

FOOTNOTES

1. Soemarsaid Moertono, op. cit., p. 3 and p. 5.

2. President Suharto's own view of earlier development planning efforts was provided in his 1970 Address of State: "Indeed, in 1960 a development plan was drawn up--the Overall National Development Plan--but that plan was not only unrealistic and not based upon the existing abilities, but the policies and practices of the Government as well as the activities of the society were not at all geared to carry out reconstruction, but were aimed at supporting the confrontation policy pursued at that time, so that the development plan remained a mere plan." Published by the Ministry of Information, Djakarta, August 16, 1970, p. 7.

3. Laporan Tentang Hasil Analisa dan Evaluasi Atas Pelanksanaan Pelita Tahun Pertama 1969-1970, by the State Minister for Operational Supervision of Development, Djakarta, 1970, p. J-6.

4. Soemarsaid Moertono, op. cit., p. 5.

5. Clive Day, op. cit., p. 414.

6. This issue is dealt with at much greater length in R. S. Smith and Theodore M. Smith, op. cit., p. 762

7. Soemarsaid Moertono, op. cit., p. 35.

8. There is only scanty evidence to confirm this point. It can plausibly be argued that Indonesia failed in its early attempt to establish a constitutional democracy because the claims for resources (including authority) of competing political parties threatened to disperse that amount of authority which was necessary for a regime to govern.

   The same phenomenon was observable at the village level when the concentration of authority in a village's administration was threatened. Selosoemardjan's observations prove extremely topical:

   "At the time of the parliamentary election campaigns in 1955, on the eve of the first nationwide elections in the history of Indonesia, political parties were unusually active, to gain as many followers in the towns and in the villages as well. As a result many village communities became internally differentiated into political groups which started mutually contradictory, if not conflicting, actions in the wake of

policies set by party headquarters on the national level. Life in many villages, usually quiet and tranquil, became unpleasantly filled with mutual suspicions and unfriendly actions. The disruption in the community was reflected in the administration, which showed signs of falling apart because of adherence to different political parties among its members. Cohesion was weakened in both the community itself and in the village administration." (Italics supplied)

See Selosoemardjan, op. cit., 1963, p. 38. Also, Herbert Feith, op. cit., 1962.

9. See Laporan Pada Konprensi Kerdja Guvernur Kepala Daerah se-Indonesia, Djakarta, October 14-17, 1969. Governor of South Sulawesi, p. 17.

10. See Laporan Lengkap Survey Perekonomian Djawa Tengah 1968-1969, Jogjakarta, Faculty of Economics, Gadjah Mada University, 1969, p. 10.

11. Laporan Pada Konprensi . . ., op. cit., p. 16. It is important to observe that this open criticism of the central government was made in a published report directed to the Minister of Home Affairs.

12. See the section on The Problem of Leadership Legitimacy, "Masalah 'Legitimacy' Kepemimpinan" by Mely G. Tan and Koentjaraningrat in Perkembangan Sosial-Budaja dalam Pembangunan Nasional, Djakarta: Institute of Sciences, 1970, pp. 45-46.

13. The reasons for this tendency to push difficult decisions up the ladder are extremely complex. The tendency may derive from an official's uncertainty about his own authority to bargain with other agencies; often it doubtless comes from a culturally-derived abhorence for disorder. Sometimes fate and the passage of time are perceived as being more important decision ingredients than those that mortals marshal. Lastly perceptions of time itself enter the matrix. If a road or irrigation channel is not completed this year, who is to say that it might not be better done next year? Thus, there are a number of reasons for not taking action and one is never certain which one is likely to be dominant.

14. The agencies are: Pembangunan Masjarakat Desa (Village Community Development of the Ministry of Home Affairs), Lembaga Sosial Desa (Village Sosial Institute of the Ministry of Social Affairs) Pendidikan Masjarakat (Community Education of the Ministry of Education and Culture), Pusat Latihan Kerdja (Manpower Training of the Ministry of Manpower), and the regencies' own programs.

15. Westerners tend to be much more intolerant of this behavior than do Indonesians who seem to regard it as a basic fact of life not to be questioned. The writer is particularly familiar with this mode of behavior for he encountered it repeatedly during the course of several months in which scores of office heads were interviewed.

16. The rationale is twofold: first, an unwillingness to admit that, as line executives, they lack decision-making authority; and second, a reluctance to appear critical of their superiors.

17. Our implicit assumption here is that capability in handling responsibility and authority derives more from experience than from formal education or native intelligence.

18. See Theodore M. Smith, "A Tentative Report . . .", op. cit., pp. 6-8.

19. Interview with the bupati of Tanah Datar, November 19, 1970.

20. Interview with the bupati of Padang Pariaman, November 13, 1969.

21. Interview with the Bureau Head for the Provincial Inspectorate of Technical Education, Padang, November 15, 1969.

22. Interviews with regional office heads in West Sumatra and South Sulawesi, November, 1969 and January, 1970.

23. Interview with the Governor of West Sumatra, July, 1970. Aside from the matter of access, most governors face two additional problems in using Djakarta emissaries. Many issues are believed to be far too sensitive to be handled other than personally, and there is the matter of protocol. To send a representative may be to offend the Djakarta executive whose assistance is critically needed.

24. Based on interviews with the Kapala Kantor Perwakilan, Office of Education, in West Sumatra and South Sulawesi, November, 1969, and January, 1970.

25. No direct normative criticism need be thought to attend this statement. Under given conditions, Djakarta executives may be acting very rationally in not seeking to generate more information. The costs may simply be too high at this stage.

CHAPTER VI

PRODUCTIVITY PROBLEMS: MOTIVATION

Most of the newer nations, and especially those with colonial histories, have adopted various aspects of Western civil service norms. Sometimes these policies have proved productive but in other cases they have proved inapplicable. Brazil's administration system, for example, has gone through several different phases of civil service reform and been subjected to a series of "external" technical inputs. While these inputs can be said to ". . . have made a considerable contribution to the perfection of the formal system, they have achieved very little real change in administrative practices."[1] In the Philippines, a highly structured merit system and performance budgeting were formally adopted long ago, but the traditional patron-client system and line-item, pork-barrel budgeting continue to govern bureaucratic behavior, statutory provisions notwithstanding.

Indonesian public institutions, during approximately 250 years of Dutch control, absorbed many continental bureaucratic norms. But the fact that the Dutch relied primarily on indirect rule meant that not as many of these norms were transferred as might be indicated by the long duration of colonial control. Sultans and regents in Java and local princes in the Outer Islands continued their traditional style of rule, shaping it only to meet whatever demands might be imposed upon them by

their colonial superiors. Moreover, very few natives were brought into the higher levels of the Dutch East India bureaucracy. This is to say that at Independence following the Second World War, options for shaping the structure and functions of the national bureaucracy were comparatively open.

This chapter deals with only one of those options, that of strategies to increase bureaucratic productivity through the application of personnel incentives and sanctions. Unfortunately, these considerations are usually left to personnel technicians. Part of the burden of our argument is that they deserve the attention of those interested in the broader questions of productivity and comparative administration. The problems which Indonesia is encountering in the adoption of these tools are anchored in its history, its cultures, its politics, and its economy. To treat them as discrete technical considerations is to deal carelessly with reality.

I. Factors Governing Performance Levels

It is a fair assumption that by either providing or withholding resources from his subordinates, an office head can affect the level of compliance he gains from his staff.[2] However, statutory restrictions and procedural obstacles in the Indonesian national bureaucracy effectively deny such resources to nearly all public executives. As explanations for this curious phenomenon, two reasons appear to stand out. First, the historical function of the bureaucrat was not productivity of change, but the maintenance of unity through stability. During the Later

Mataram Period (16th to 19th century), the king's primary obligation was to maintain or restore order, a responsibility noted in the introductory chapter. To secure the loyalty of, or the control over, his ranking subordinates he tended to manipulate the distribution of state resources with great care and stinginess. Three chief strategies were employed to limit resource accumulation by these officials: they might be subjected to harsh punishment, including execution; they might be kept at court for long periods of time, leaving provincial rule to their representatives; or, power-seeking inclinations might be blunted through carefully planned marriage alignments. All of these strategies had the effect of limiting the amount of resources which the king's servants could draw to themselves.[3] During the colonial period, stability in the subsistence sector of the economy continued to be the number one goal. To serve this goal, resource accumulation was structured so as to be highly centralized, thereby creating a resource monopoly which was necessary for alien minority rule. Where productivity was desired under the Dutch regime, it usually could be obtained through coercion--a resource whose availability was to plunge precipitously with the coming of Independence.

Secondly, during the first ten years of self-government, the Topsy-like growth of Indonesia's bureaucracy threatened to swallow not only most of the national budget, but also much of the political arena as well. Its growth presented both an economic and a political challenge; as a percentage of total government expenditures, personnel costs rose rapidly, but more

alarming yet from the regime's standpoint was the fact that party cliques began to develop in the bureaucracy, thus raising the spectre of a growing multitude of internal bureaucratic interests structured around goals that were often at cross-purposes with those of the country's leaders. The bureaucracy was coming to represent not just a single sector which competed for scarce public resources, but a multitude of sectors. Various cabinets have sought to stem the overall growth of the bureaucracy, but direct strategies to pare the influence of intra-bureaucratic cliques were never seriously applied. Only through the centralization and tightening of those personnel regulations applying to promotions and salaries has some kind of control been achieved.[4]

Many of the controls appear to have been adopted on the assumption that they would prevent governmental bureaucracies from becoming more independent of the Sukarno regime. While such regulations could not dissolve the separatist proclivities which had developed in several ministries, they did put limits on these tendencies. Party-oriented bureaucratic heads found it more difficult to stack their offices with members of the faithful; other heads found relief in gaining a buffer against party demands for placement and advancement. Strict limitations on salary increases and the requirement that non-routine increments for high-level officials be approved either by the autonomous Civil Service Office (Kantor Urusan Pegawai) or the President served similar functions. They served to curb some executives and to protect others.

However necessary these controls, their costs have been large. They have effectively denied bureaucratic leaders the control of resources they might use to stimulate increased levels of performance. Bureaucratic heads were denied the use of financial incentives either to elicit or to reward outstanding performance (prestasi kerdja jang luar biasa), nor could they dangle more lucrative and prestigious positions before their subordinates. About all that remained as a strategy was that of personal persuasion--either directly in the form of exhortation, or indirectly in the form of their own exemplary performance.

If the economic resources which might be used for incentives have been denied bureaucratic leaders, what about the availability and effectiveness of sanctions? Presumably they, too, are a part of formal authority and an intuitively obvious strategy to elicit at least minimal levels of compliance. Here, one encounters fascinating historical and cultural variables which all but forbid the application of sanctions. On the historical side, when Indonesian bureaucrats succeeded Dutch officials at Independence, bureaucratic procedures and norms were laced with uncertainty. Rules and guidelines were lacking. "Where rules existed, they had lost actual validity because no sanctions were available to enforce them"[5] Where sanctions were understood to exist, there was great reluctance to apply them. Cohesion and unity were too important; conflict too costly. Moreover, sanctions were thought to be colonial--almost by definition.

There are equally strong cultural reasons to explain why, twenty-five years after Indonesia declared its independence,

sanctions are still inapplicable. By their very nature, sanctions engender or exacerbate inter-personal conflict, a condition abhorent to most Indonesians, particularly so to the Javanese.[6] Part of this abhorence stems from strongly-felt, mystical fears of retribution; part of it emanates simply from a desire not to offend anyone. Added to this, there is the perceived (and very often real) danger of bureaucratic retribution. The network of vertical and horizontal connections and personal loyalties within the bureaucracy is so pervasive that office heads can never be certain that their own positions will not be jeopardized if they levy sanctions against their subordinates. All of these factors effectively deny the use of administrative sanctions to bureaucratic heads who are searching for strategies to improve subordinate compliance levels.

II. Incentives

Salaries. Indonesian officials are among the most poorly paid in the world--even when salaries are reviewed in relation to the cost-of-living. Most of them receive incomes which accomodate no more than half of their monthly expenditures, a fact leading one provincial official to comment that the government pays him for ten days of work every month and he subsidizes the government for the remaining three weeks. The roots of this situation are many, but one is decidedly historical, as is indicated in the early policies of the Dutch East India Company.

> From the beginning of the Dutch rule in India the directors showed a nervous anxiety to prevent their commercial profits from being eaten up by the expenses of administration, and thought to reach their end by setting low salaries and resisting all requests to raise them.[7]

Dutch Governor General Daendels' decision to establish a salaried, native bureaucracy in the early 19th century turned out to be hardly more generous. Salaries were not only insufficient to guarantee good service but they did not even support native officials to the levels to which they were accustomed.[8] A combination of post-Independence factors served to insure that there would be little change in the bleak compensation picture: an economic downturn accompanied by high rates of inflation, plus the politically-motivated, rapid growth of the bureaucracy, foreclosed the possibility of meaningful salary increases. There were increasing numbers of people to pay, but less money with which to pay them.

The following table illustrates the gap between basic government salaries and minimal monthly rupiah requirements of various groups of provincial civil servants in early 1970. These figures include official salary supplements in rupiahs which may run as high as 100 percent for higher officials and show that, practically speaking, there is not an official (high or low) who can live by his government income alone.

TABLE I(a)

Responses by Economic Planners and Three Levels of Officials to the Question:

"How much money do you need (the very minimal amount) each month to fulfill the basic needs of yourself and your family? (For example, for food, clothing, housing, transportation, medicine, etc.)

Type of Regional Official	Number of Respondents in Sample	Respondents' Estimates of Monthly Needs (Average)	Official Basic Monthly Income (Average)[9]
Economic Planner	54	Rp. 15,132	Rp. 8,514
Higher Level (Salary Grades 3 & 4)	157	20,028	11,268
Lower Level (Salary Grade 2)	146	16,434	7,050
Subdistrict Officer (Salary Grade 2)	226	15,361	7,050

Source: Primary data from field work.

The data show that official income amounts to approximately half of the essential minimal monthly needs, half of an amount officials consider a basic survival figure under present circumstances. Actual monthly expenditures, probably a more accurate indicator of perceived needs, run somewhat higher but cannot be precisely determined. However, a general picture of the disparity between officials' government incomes and their expenditures is presented in Table I(b). Salaries and official bonuses amount to about one-third of the sum which most officials say they need to sustain their families' present standard of living. More than anything else, these figures reflect the burdensome effects which inflation

TABLE I(b)

"How large an increase in salary would you need before you would decide to give up your extra-governmental jobs or before you could fulfill the needs of your family?"

Type of Regional Official	2 Times	3 Times	4 Times	5 Times	5+ Times	NR
Higher Level (Grades 3 & 4)	35	48	23	16	14	21
Percent	(25.7)	(35.3)	(16.9)	(11.8)	(10.3)	
Lower Level (Grade 2)	34	39	22	14	17	20
Percent	(27.0)	(30.9)	(17.5)	(11.1)	(13.5)	
Subdistrict Officer (Grade 2)	55	57	39	31	25	19
Percent	(26.6)	(27.5)	(18.8)	(15.0)	(12.1)	
Totals	104	144	84	61	56	59
Percent	(23.2)	(32.1)	(18.7)	(13.6)	(12.4)	

Source: Primary data from field survey work.

has had on salaried government officials between the years 1958 and 1968. In 1966 the rate of inflation was about 650 percent and although there have been occasional salary increases (the latest was 50 percent in April, 1970), compensation levels still lag far behind price increases.[10] While the data presented in Tables I(a) and I(b) are not as "hard" as one might wish, they do illuminate the dilemma faced by government officials who are compelled to find additional sources of income.[11]

In terms of bureaucratic productivity, the inability to reward outstanding performance with meaningful salary advances is almost as important as the fact that salaries are so low to begin with. Longevity increases, which are applicable annually or biannually, average about US$.50 per month, and while performance increases are possible in theory, they suffer two serious shortcomings: first, they are a procedural nightmare, requiring special ministerial approval and even presidential approval in some cases. Second, they are so small as to discourage anyone from pushing for them. As long as outstanding performance can only be rewarded with maximum salary increments in the neighborhood of only US$.75 per month, most government executives feel that efforts to secure such advances for their top performers constitute little more than a waste of time. They are, of course, right.

Another result of the low salary structure which bears on bureaucratic productivity is the degree to which it encourages leakages of state resources. Findings in this study coincide with conclusions reached in 1970 by the President's select Committee of Four which attributed widespread corruption in government

TABLE II

Responses of Provincial Officials to the Question:

"In your opinion, what factors cause corruption?"

(Multiple Responses Permitted)

Province	Corruption Causes Identified by Regional Officials					
	Low Salaries	Civil Service Mental Attitudes	Generally Poor Economic Conditions	Weak Administration and Lack of Controls	Other	NR
West Sumatra(74)[12]	51	53	26	44	11	6
(Percent)	(69)	(72)	(35)	(57)	(15)	(8)
South Sulawesi(125)	69	50	39	58	12	12
(Percent)	(55)	(40)	(31)	(46)	(10)	(10)
Central Java(104)	51	35	35	43	17	11
(Percent)	(49)	(34)	(34)	(41)	(16)	(11)
Totals (303)	171	142	100	145	40	29
Percentage	(56)	(46)	(32)	(48)	(13)	(10)

Source: Primary data from field survey work.

principally to low salaries. While a host of other factors have obvious bearing on this condition, the data presented in Table II show that civil servants view minimal salary levels as the most important cause of present-day leakage.

It is hard to establish firmly the conclusion that corruption on balance detracts from bureaucratic productivity. What is, on its face, a loss of resources, may in fact have the effect of speeding business along and keeping civil servants on the job. In some senses, petty leakages represent unofficial compensation that permits bureaucrats to perform their jobs. One suspects, however, that the time given to arranging for, and hiding, such illicit practices cuts sharply into potential individual productivity. Moreover, opportunities for diverting resources seldom serve as incentives for organizational goal achievement.[13]

Salary Supplements. There are two general types of financial salary supplements in the Indonesian bureaucracy: those that are attached to particular kinds of jobs and those that accompany extra duties which might be assigned to an official. In the first case, practices followed in the Ministries of Finance and Public Works provide clear examples. To encourage better discipline and full-time work, the Ministry of Finance has traditionally awarded a monthly premium (called premi) to all of its officials. The premium amounts to 100 percent of each official's base salary. The Ministry of Public Works, in a desire to see the new Five-Year Plan projects progress rapidly, attached financial "incentives" to each public works project in the annual development budget--amounting in 1969 to about 2.5 percent of that

budget. These policies are significant because they represent major departures from Indonesian personnel policy norms. Beyond that, they are instructive for showing what kind of difficulties are faced when personnel strategies are used to stimulate productivity.

In the first place, these "incentive" policies were introduced in a cloak of secrecy. No one outside the two ministries was supposed to know about them. Why? Probably because the cultural norm of "shared poverty" extends from the village subsistence economy to the national public service; some kind of egalitarian principle appears to make it unethical for some to receive more than other officials of equal rank.[14] This principle also seems to account for the fact that every official in the Ministry of Finance receives the same amount (100 percent of his base salary) and that these so-called incentives are paid out automatically, regardless of performance. The last point is of key importance: salary supplements are being used to raise overall organizational performance, but not as incentives to encourage outstanding individual performance. This policy minimizes intra-organizational conflict and competition--behavior which is fundamental to most Western organizations but regarded as being too unsettling in the Indonesian context.

The "incentive" scheme adopted by the Public Works Ministry is consistent with that just noted. Supplements are awarded to officials working on each development project, but the supplements are <u>not</u> tied to performance. The size of the supplement depends upon the size of the project budget and the official's own salary

grade. He receives the supplement regardless of whether or not the road, bridge, or port project is moving forward or backward. Thus there is no competition for financial rewards and no discretionary authority for office heads to manipulate incentives.[15]

The second general type of financial supplement is that given to officials who are assigned extra, non-routine duties. The data in Table V show that this practice may constitute the most readily available tool which administrators have to reward performance. Although the practice of assigning extra duties which are attended by rupiah supplements is widespread, it is difficult both to map its frequency and to measure its effect. Mere attendance at an inter-agency meeting results in a Rp. 1,500 honorarium, or as much as an official's weekly salary. A lecture given in the ministry's training academy might bring the same sized honorarium. Aside from the incidental nature of these supplements, it is frequently difficult to trace the application of these incentives because they often represent budget deviations which no official is eager to discuss. In any case, two tentative conclusions are possible. First, this practice is much more prevalent at the central government level in Djakarta than it is in the regional governments. Second, although it may be considered a mechanism for providing financial rewards to those who prove themselves capable officials, it has the self-defeating aspect of spreading their duties so widely that they become increasingly less effective in their primary roles. This fact prompts the ironical conclusion that rewards are so structured that they reduce an official's future effectiveness.

Promotions. The dilemma over goals (stability versus change) is readily evident in the promotion policies of the civil bureaucracy. If change were foremost, promotion regulations would presumably be designed, first, to accommodate the rapid advancement of outstanding performers and, second, to serve as a mechanism to encourage better performance. Conversely, if stability and continuity were foremost, promotions would be so structured to ensure that advancement is slow and highly dependent upon factors such as seniority. Moreover, if the danger exists that rapid promotions may pose a threat to both the national budget and to control of the bureaucracy by the country's political leaders, there is added rationale for choking off advancement. Indonesia has followed the latter course for the reasons suggested. In the words of the chief of the Civil Service Office, "Rapid promotions are very difficult, but possible. A man cannot be promoted in rank if his job remains the same. To change his job, the minister himself must approve the promotion, and this happens very seldom."[16]

According to present regulations, an official is eligible for promotion (advancement in grade) every four years. But even this time-span is lengthened by several factors. There must be both an open position according to the formasi (authorized position) and there must be an approved budget to cover the position. Beyond these hurdles, there are important procedural complications. All officials in the top grades (between 10 and 15 percent of the total civil service) must not only gain ministry approval for promotions, but also that of the Civil Service Office. If this

TABLE III

Regional Economic Planner Responses to the Questions:[18]

"With the present system in operation in your region, (1) which factors are important for a government official in gaining a promotion? and (2) which factors should be most important as a measure for obtaining a promotion?"

Variables Affecting Civil Service Promotions	(1) Presently Most Important		(2) Should be Most Important	
	No.	%	No.	%
Connections (family,pol.party,etc.)	15	(31)	0	(0)
Experience/years of service	10	(20)	9	(17)
Education and training	11	(22)	13	(24)
Ability (efficient/effective work)	10	(20)	30	(56)
Loyalty to superior	3	(6)	1	(2)
Hard work	0		0	
Other	0		0	
No Response	5		1	
Totals (percentage) rounded	54	(100)	54	(100)

Source: Primary data from field survey work.

sounds simple, it is not, because it has to be arranged personally in Djakarta. Beyond personal lobbying, it almost always requires unofficial payments to the Civil Service Office. The size of the payment depends on an official's connections at this office and upon his rank, but ordinarily it amounts to about one-half month's salary.[17]

Through a sample of 54 regional economic planners which included at least one respondent from each of Indonesia's twenty-six governor's offices, the study tried to isolate key variables which presently have a bearing on promotions. The responses are particularly instructive for the low rating that is given to performance (See Table III). The relatively high ranking of personal connections (koneksi) reflects the ascriptive nature of authority in the bureaucracy, but the normative responses in the second question clearly serve to identify the achievement orientations of the planners.[19]

It might be argued that Western values are being infused into the Indonesian situation by stressing the procedural difficulties involved in arranging for promotions, but the evidence belies this. Table IV(a) reflects regional civil servant perceptions on the difficulty they face in moving up to better jobs. Table IV(b) scales their level of satisfaction with the current situation. While these data tend to mix reactions to both current personnel regulations as well as procedural roadblocks, it is clear that present promotion policies are a major source of dissatisfaction within the civil service. And the evidence is even stronger if one scales these findings to the negative side.[20]

TABLE IV(a)

Regional Officials' Responses to the Question:

"What are the prospects of your advancing to another job in the next two years?"

Type of Official	No Chance At All		Opportunity Very Limited		Fair		Very Good		NR
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Higher Level Officials	15	(11.2)	67	(50.0)	47	(35.1)	5	(3.7)	23
Lower Level Officials	25	(18.8)	81	(60.9)	26	(19.6)	1	(0.7)	13
Subdistrict Officers	46	(36.8)	52	(41.6)	26	(20.8)	1	(0.8)	101
Totals	86		200		99		7		137
Percentage	(21.9)		(51.0)		(25.3)		(1.8)		

Source: Primary data from field survey work.

TABLE IV(b)

Regional Officials' Responses to the Question:

"Do you feel satisfied with the process and time which are needed to arrange for your promotion?"

Type of Official	Totally Dissatisfied		Unsatisfied		Well Enough Satisfied		Very Satisfied		NR
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Higher Level Officials	25	(23.6)	58	(54.7)	23	(21.7)	0	-	51
Lower Level Officials	23	(16.6)	69	(49.6)	47	(33.8)	0	-	7
Subdistrict Officers	8	(5.6)	82	(56.9)	51	(35.4)	3	(2.1)	82
Totals	56		209		121		3		140
Percentage	(14.4)		(53.7)		(31.1)		(0.8)		

Source: Primary data from field survey work.

Most important, however, is the fact that promotions cannot be used as an executive tool to stimulate performance. Present regulations effectively remove them from an executive's hands and procedural bottlenecks turn responsibility back upon the individual official himself.

Other Incentives. There is a danger in concentrating too heavily on salary and promotion incentives. While they are most highly valued in Western industrialized society, it is not yet clear how true this is for various Asian societies where social status, occupational security, and educational opportunities rank very high as desired ends. Unfortunately these latter rewards are not readily divisible into quantifiable units and therefore render an overall incentives calculus very difficult. But it is possible to develop indicators, something the writer has done with two different samples: higher provincial officials and university students.

With the understanding that incentives are in very limited supply, a sample of 157 executives in provincial offices was asked to identify the kinds of incentives that are most needed and the kinds that are presently available for use. The results, as shown in Table V, indicate that salary increases are most valued but that several others are also important. Educational opportunities, housing and vehicles, and devices to raise supplementary income are most prominent among these.[21] As presently structured, however, these benefits do not serve as performance incentives because a man performs well; he must first attain a position which affords these perquisites. The results of interviews with scores

TABLE V

Higher Level Officials' Responses to the Questions:

"Many officials are concerned about the lack of incentives in the governmental system to induce good performance, hard work, and full-time work by civil servants. (1) Which incentives do you believe are most needed and (2) which are available for use at this time?"

(Three Responses per Official Permitted)

Type of Incentive	Incentives Most Needed		Incentives Now Available	
	No.	%	No.	%
Greater opportunities for education and training	79	(52.7)	51	(37.3)
More authority for decision-making	19	(12.7)	24	(17.5)
More rapid promotions	84	(56.0)	74	(54.0)
Salary increases	100	(66.7	69	(49.6)
More opportunities for travel	8	(5.3)	17	(12.4)
More housing and vehicles for officials	71	(47.3)	46	(33.6)
More responsitility which will permit salary supplements	51	(34.0)	74	(54.0)
Other	13	(4.7)	8	(5.8)
No response	7		20	

Source: Primary data from field survey work.

of officials confirm the fact that these perquisites are not regarded as available tools for the administrator who wants to stimulate performance.

Interview schedules administered to 554 university students in three national universities elicited data which tend to confirm impressions about the importance of social status rewards in the government service, but they also indicate that financial security is a prime force directing the young, educated elite toward government careers. Their occupational preferences, outlined in Table VI(a), indicate that a preponderant number have hopes of entering the civil service.

If one variable, that of salary size, is held even, the preference for government service among the students is overwhelming: 73 percent of the respondents would choose government, 10 percent private enterprise, and 17 percent indicated that they had no preference between the two. The data in Table VI(b) go on to show why the students are inclined to pick government service over private business. Basically, it is due not to performance incentives found in the government, but rather to security factors. That the guarantee of meager government pensions should rank so high in their judgment is a curious finding, but one which conforms to the general notion that perquisites guaranteeing economic security are foremost in their minds.[23] Nearly all of those selecting private enterprise felt that faster advancement, more freedom, and greater responsibility were to be found in those occupations.

In summary, it seems clear that guarantees of economic security attract and hold officials in the government service.

TABLE VI(a)

University Student Responses to the Question:[22]

"As soon as you receive your degree, what type of job or work will you choose?"

Occupational Preference	Number	%	Non-Gov't	Gov't & Non-Gov't	Gov't
Private enterprise (general)	5	(0.9)	5		
Small trading enterprise	5	(0.9)	5		
Large trading enterprise	38	(6.9)	38		
Small industrial enterprise	13	(2.3)	13		
Large industrial enterprise	51	(9.2)	51		
Doctor	114	(20.6)		114	
Political party leader	11	(2.0)	11		
State enterprise	61	(11.0)			61
Farming	16	(2.9)	16		
Government service	118	(21.3)			118
Teaching: school or university	36	(6.5)			36
Lawyer (private)	9	(1.6)	9		
State attorney or judge	46	(8.3)			46
Other	8	(1.4)			
No response	23	(4.2)			
Totals	554		148	114	261
Percentages		(100.0)	(28.3)	(21.8)	(49.9)

Source: Primary data from field survey work.

TABLE VI(b)

University Student Responses to the Question:

"If salaries were the same, explain why you would prefer to work for the government or for private enterprise."

Reason Given	Number	Percentage
Preference for Government Service		
Pension rights	174	(45.4)
Loyalty to Country	75	(19.6)
Guarantee of employment, facilities such as housing	62	(16.2)
Desire to serve the public/humanity	19	(5.0)
Desire to contribute to development	6	(1.6)
Contributions to Gov't more appreciated	2	(0.5)
Social status is higher	2	(0.5)
Preference for Private Enterprise		
Greater freedom, more self-reliance, and fewer restrictions	14	(4.7)
Faster advancement, greater leadership opportunities, better organization	14	(4.7)
No Response	171	

Source: Primary data from field survey work.

Executives seldom have to worry about recruiting good people for their offices or about keeping them, but when it comes to incentives that might have a bearing on performance, the store is almost empty.

III. Sanctions

Sanctions are normally an important part of the administrator's tool kit which enables him to secure minimal levels of compliance from his subordinates. In Indonesia, however, it is not clear whether the availability of sanctions can serve even this function. Because the reasons for this have been explained above in Section I, the intent here is to show briefly how inapplicable conventional sanctions are.

If performance appraisals carry almost no weight in connection with salary increase and promotion incentives, they are hardly more relevant as potential deprivational threats. Two factors are at work here: first, national policy is widely understood to provide for routine salary increases and promotions--almost as an inalienable right; and second, bureaucratic executives are not expected to exercise freedom with regard to personnel policies. The same is true in connection with the provision of housing and transportation. These perquisites attend the position and are also considered to be almost inviolable rights. The ultimate sanction, that of firing a subordinate official, is almost unknown in Indonesia. A man's right to work is a moral principle which even the strongest or rashest of high-level administrators seem determined to honor. In many cases this means

tolerating subordinates who seldom, if ever, appear for work. In other cases it means ignoring an official whose political activities are directly counter-productive to organizational goals. Even the mildest sanction, that of rebuke or criticism, is hardly more applicable. This is particularly true in Java where prijaji etiquette pervades intra-bureaucratic relations.[24]

The only truly effective strategy for coping with such a low resource position vis-a-vis the application of sanctions seems to be the practice of exiling someone, either in fact or figuratively. Non-productive or counter-productive subordinates may be assigned to positions which are out of the organization's mainstream of business. Alternatively, they may be allowed to remain in their present positions while the flow of activity is directed around them--not through them. Finally, they may simply be asked to stay at home. Salaries continue to be paid, but the officials are effectively removed from the organization.[25] These strategies are not available to every administrator, however. One Sumatran mayor, for example, bemoans the fact that he cannot send his "problem" subordinates off to sume jungle outpost; there is no "out back" in the city.[26]

IV. Strategies to Improve Performance Levels

Of the two strategies reviewed here, incentives merit a great deal more attention than do sanctions. Sanctions are likely to be prohibitively costly and their application will probably always be very limited, regardless of how much enabling authority statutory provisions provide. On the other hand, the current dearth

of meaningful incentives would appear to point to high marginal returns wherever they can be used. The magnitude of the challenge should not be underestimated, however. Objective measures of performance have not yet been developed and civil service achievement examinations are only now being introduced. Although it has declined in recent years, the politicization of the bureaucracy still presents a potential threat. Finally, combined official and unofficial personnel expenditures, as a percentage of the national "routine" budget, are already extremely high--between 60 and 70 percent.[27] The addition of new incentives might actually deny some ministries the critical minimum level of materiel resources which they need to mount their programs.

What options does this dilemma offer? Initially, it would appear that some combination of selective salary increases coupled with reductions in other personnel expenditures could be used to finance the change. This would mean general reductions in personnel through an extension of the present hiring freeze and the early retirement of superfluous officials. Possibly, it could also mean reductions in those perquisites which have little direct bearing on performance levels--the rice, vehicle, and housing allowances. This strategy also assumes that an effective mechanism for allocating the incentives can be developed, such that incentive payments actually result in higher performance levels rather than in merely being absorbed. This last assumption is probably the most troublesome of all. In 1970 the Government of Indonesia considered a proposal for selective salary increases and dismissed it as unworkable at the time. Government officials

who reviewed the proposal rejected it primarily on political grounds; there could be no assurance that the extra funds would not be used to reward the faithful (not the performers) in bureaucratic cliques. In short, the political costs appeared higher than the potential return in government productivity. This fear, while perhaps magnified by a quasi-military national leadership, is nonetheless real and will probably persist for some time to come. Although gradual progress will doubtless be made in the introduction of performance incentives, it is unrealistic to expect that much zeal will attend these efforts at the national level in the near future.

Under these circumstances, might not ministry and provincial executives take the lead on an individual basis? In fact, this is being done in some cases. Certain ministers, governors, and regents have set aside small parts of their budgets for this specific purpose. But the perceived need for national financial control brooks against this strategy in the form of tightly restricted, centralized budgeting. Budgets for central government departments and their field offices are drawn up at the national level with two results: first, personnel incentives cannot be included, and second, savings in one area cannot be applied to another. In the case of ministry regional offices, there is then no incentive whatsoever to encourage improved performance.[28]

Governors and regents are in a slightly different position in that, as heads of "autonomous" governments, they have greater control over their own budgets. But this positive note suffers two qualifications. First, personnel expenditures, as a

percentage of provincial budgets, are already extremely high. For example, the 1968 figure for Central Java was 86.2 percent and that for West Sumatra, 80.7 percent.[29] However desperately they may be needed, the addition of new personnel costs would doubtless threaten the viability of current programs. Second, provincial governments presently receive about 85 percent of their budgeted revenues from the central government--money which is all earmarked. Thus, the bulk of each governor's budget is, for all intents and purposes, untouchable.[30] In addition to this fact, the governors are by no means immune to the kind of political pressures found at the national level and demands for services from various sectors of the polity are equally strong if not stronger. Finally, with all but three governors being military officers, there is a general tendency to rely on a command philosophy rather than on a more refined incentives scheme to elicit compliance and performance. Under these circumstances, strong individual initiatives by regional executives are unlikely.

V. Conclusions

Strategies to stimulate compliance and improved performance face a multitude of obstacles. Sanctions are presently all but inapplicable and are unlikely to have a measurable impact in the foreseeable future. A policy to introduce meaningful performance incentives is trapped in a web of political, cultural, financial, and control demands. There exists no obvious optimal strategy to meet these demands. The most feasible available alternative is that of experimentation in a selected ministry. Such an experiment

could test these demands. Would the incentives follow political cleavages? Would preferential treatment for selected officials seriously affront "shared poverty" norms? Would overall organizational effectiveness suffer if personnel allocations were slightly increased and program funding slightly decreased? And finally, would financial control deteriorate if executives were permitted increased authority over their own budgets? These questions will remain unanswered until such probes into the administrative culture are attempted. Quite possibly the costs may turn out to be higher than the returns.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Lawrence S. Graham, Civil Service Reform in Brazil: Principles Versus Practice, Austin: Latin American Monographs, University of Texas Press, 1968, p. 165.

2. The only situation in which this assumption might be subject to question is under the condition of surplus labor--in a situation where supply greatly exceeds the demand for bureaucratic positions. But it will be made clear in the case of the Indonesian bureaucracy that artificial (but real) restrictions on demand make concern with supply irrelevant.

3. See Soemarsaid Moertono, op. cit., pp. 108-109.

4. Herbert Feith, better than anyone else, recounts the centrifugal tendencies at work in the bureaucracy as well as the various prime ministers' attempts to maintain control during this period. Thus, ". . . .(I)n implementing the government's policy, the bureaucracy tended more and more to respond to demands made of it from elsewhere. It frequently vetoed policies which would hurt a significant portion of its own membership--as in the case of the efforts of successive cabinets to reduce the number of civil servants and the efforts of the Wilopo Cabinet to impose its rationalization scheme on the army." Among other attempts to curb the growth of the bureaucracy, the Hatta Cabinet publicly declared its intention to halve the number of civil servants; the Natsir Cabinet called for reductions; and the Minister for Personnel Affairs in the Sukimam Cabinet called for a cut of 30 percent.

   Although unable to dismiss the officials he inherited, each new minister sought to secure his own position by building cliques of new officials around him. The result, as Feith notes, was a general weakening of the relative power of the government service vis-a-vis the political parties. See The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, op. cit., pp. 306-372.

5. Selosoemardjan, op. cit., 1957, p. 186.

6. See Clifford Geertz, op. cit., 1965, pp. 78-87, "The Bureaucracy Sector: The Development of the Civil Servant Elite." For a more general treatment of this phenomenon, see Lucien Pye, op. cit., 1969.

7. Clive Day, op. cit., p. 95.

8. Ibid., pp. 299-300.

9. To show how these figures were determined, we have taken the case of a single higher-level official. He is a Bureau Head in one of the governor's offices, has a university master's degree, ten years of government service, a wife and five children. His monthly financial compensation is as follows:

Basic Salary	Rp. 5,040*
Implementation allowance (20% of base)	1,008
"Responsibility" allowance (20% of base)	1,008
Rice allowance (10 kilograms x 7 people x Rp. 40)	2,800
Wife allowance (5% of base)	252
Child allowance (2% of base x 5 children)	504
Gross Income	Rp.10,612
Health/pension deduction (10% of base)	504
Total financial compensation	Rp.10,108 = US$26.95

*US$1.00 = Rp. 375

10. This problem has not been lost on the Government of Indonesia which is presently trying to raise salaries. In President Suharto's words, ". . . (T)he situation here is most critical, the more because the salaries of the civil servants (including the Armed Forces) have almost lost any meaning as a result of the speed of inflation so that it has become extremely difficult to keep order and discipline in the civil service." See the "President's Address of State," August 15, 1970, p. 29, published by the Ministry of Information, Government of the Republic of Indonesia.

11. Despite its inferential nature, the author believes that these data are more accurate in clarifying the gap between official compensation levels and needs than any ever developed in Indonesia. The situation in Indonesia's capital city of Djakarta may be slightly different, but, not much. Djakarta living costs are higher but mechanisms for supplementing salaries, both inside and outside the bureaucracy, are somewhat better developed. See the daily, Kompas, September 21, 1970, p. 1, for a more complete description of "official" and "non-official" government salaries in Djakarta, ("Perbedaan Melangit Antara Gadji 'Resmi' dan 'Tak Resmi'").

12. These figures refer to the number of officials in each provincial sample. Multiple responses account for percentages which total more than 100.

13. A more extended treatment of the corruption issue in Indonesia can be found in the writer's "Corruption, Tradition, and Change," Indonesia, No. 11 (April, 1971) pp. 21-41.

14. The concept of "shared poverty" is one first articulated by Clifford Geertz. Among other works see his Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963, p. 97.

15. The Public Works Ministry "incentives" suffer from the additional shortcoming that they constitute a fixed percentage of each project budget. While the incentives would doubtless do more for productivity in connection with labor-intensive projects, they create big windfalls for small numbers of higher officials assigned to capital-intensive projects. Additionally, the incentives are attached only to development projects, a fact which reduces attention to routine maintenance work.

16. Interview with the Head of the Civil Service Office (Kantor Urusan Pegawai), January 28, 1970.

17. This practice tends to discriminate against provincial officials whose access to the Djakarta office is extremely limited. When provincial officials do plan to visit Djakarta, they are normally besieged by colleagues to call on the Civil Service Office and are loaded down with the necessary payments and documents. Aside from the inconvenience and financial burden, this practice is but one factor driving capable regional officials to seek positions in Djakarta.

18. The data offered here are drawn from the author's study of 54 regional economic planners carried out in August, 1969.

19. While it is not surprising that "hard work" counts for so little at present, its low ranking on the normative side is mystifying. Possibly, many of the respondents subsumed it under "ability."

20. Partly out of the respondent's pride, partly out of shame, and sometimes because of concern over possible retribution, there is a tendency for most survey results to be biased toward the positive side in questions requiring performance judgments. The same factors account for the high "no response" rates from subordinate officials. Unfortunately, not enough survey research has yet been completed in Indonesia to permit one to estimate the magnitude of these biases.

21. The Indonesian Government has long been in the housing and vehicle business. The tradition stems partly from Dutch colonial practices and partly from an awareness of the need to compensate officials for their low salaries. Roughly half of

the executive (higher level officials) sample here is provided with housing and a vehicle. Attempts have been made in the past to permit and encourage officials to purchase their homes from the government, but in 1970 this program had lapsed and studies were being conducted on the feasibility of constructing thousands of new government dwellings for officials. The Indonesian Armed Forces were also deeply involved in similar plans.

22. The sample was composed of third-year students from Andalas University in West Sumatra(178), Hasanuddin University in South Sulawesi (195), and Diponegoro University in Central Java (181). Respondents were drawn in roughly equal numbers from the faculties of economics, law, social-politics, medicine, and agriculture. Data were collected during the period October, 1969, and April, 1970.

23. This finding is curious for two reasons: first, rarely in the author's four years of discussions with Indonesian university students did he encounter individuals who held definite ideas about what they might do subsequent to graduation. In short, it appeared to be a rare individual who was even thinking about the immediate future, to say nothing about retirement years. Second, the pensions are at present so meager that they constitute not more than a small fraction of one's monthly living costs.

24. Prijaji etiquette consists of "the polishing of interpersonal behavior into smooth decorum." In Geertz's words this etiquette provides the official ". . . with a set of rigidly formal ways of doing things which conceals his real feelings from others." See Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960 edition; especially Chapter 17, "The Background and General Dimensions of Prijaji Belief and Etiquette," pp. 227-260.

25. This practice has given rise to a clever Indonesian pun. Officials who are requested to remain at home are said to have been awarded a Drs., the Dutch-derived equivalent of an American master's degree. In fact, the letters DRS mean Di Rumah Sadja, or "at home only," a smug reference to those whose careers have been derailed.

26. Interview with the Mayor of Bukittinggi, November 17, 1969.

27 Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, "Administrative Improvement for Development: The Indonesian Case," Djakarta, 1970, p. 32, (mimeographed).

28. The only flexibility in this system derives from unauthorized budget manipulations which are widely known to take place in some regional offices. Development budget funds, for example, are sometimes used for routine expenditures.

While this practice may result in some windfalls or reward money, these rewards are not linked tightly to performance.

29. Sources: Struktur Organisasi Pemerintahan Desa, Governor's Office, Semarang, 1968, p. 16; and Laporan Gubernor Kepala Daerah Propinsi Sumatera Barat, Governor's Office, Padang, October, 1969, p. 17.

30. See R. S. Smith and Theodore M. Smith, op. cit.

CHAPTER VII

BUREAUCRACY AND CHANGE

> Perhaps the most important general problem faced by all the bureaucracies was the necessity to adapt themselves to the goals, new spheres of activity, and new social needs that arose from the growing differentiation and diversification of the social structures, the extension of the scope of social and political participation of many groups in the society, and the development of new social and political goals.[1]

Types of Change. While Eisenstadt's point of reference appears to be the transformation of colonial bureaucracies into nationalist bureaucracies, his summary view is equally adequate in accommodating the continuing challenge. Change is the problem, adaptation the process. The reason that change is the problem is that it places new and often larger demands on institutions. If these demands are to be met successfully, organizations must engage in any one, or combination, of three general types of adaptive behavior. First, they might attempt to capture various "free-floating" resources in the society, resources unhinged by social change. It is difficult to attach an inclusive definition to such resources but an apt example in the American context is that of changing attitudes among young people.[2] In the new states, not only formal education but also shifting values with the intelligentsia are likely to unhinge resources (support, leadership, technical

manpower) which are subject to capture by institutions such as the civil bureaucracy.

The second type of adaptive behavior is simply the generation of new resources. This process usually requires institutional investments to disconnect the resources from the values, social structure, and behavior to which they have previously been attached. It may involve such things as the application of political strategies to obtain larger budgetary allocations, propaganda or information campaigns to garner support or compliance for ongoing or prospective programs, educational investments to generate new levels of technical capability, as well as a multitude of additional possibilities. Occasionally, it develops that investments are not required in order to generate additional resources. The decision of Indonesia's leadership in 1969 to favor agriculture as the first development priority meant that a tremendous amount of new resources was channeled into the Ministry of Agriculture for rice-intensification programs. But the fact that the ministry absorbed this increase without showing a corresponding short-run output increase, and that the allocation was subsequently reduced, suggests that any longer-range plan for capturing resources must include the application of investment strategies.

The third form of adaptive behavior is the most complex and probably the most difficult for an organization to handle. This involves the combining or mixing of its various resources in order to achieve its goals, goals which may either be output or system-maintenance oriented and need not be mutually exclusive. Resource mixing involves choice, not only in the type of resource to be

used but also in the quantity of resources to be applied. Tax collection offers an instructive example. A minister of finance must decide not only whether, but how much, to rely on such investments as added training for tax officials, salary increases or other incentives to elicit higher levels or compliance, additional inspectors to insure control, or the recruitment of new officials to permit the extension of the tax base. There is also likely to be the need to mix resources with sectoral interests in the task environment: informational investments to mobilize higher support levels among taxpayers, productivity increases to justify demands for increased operating allocations from the regime, and very likely the non-application of selected revenue-raising regulations to muster support either from powerful political or commercial clienteles. None of these forms of adaptive behavior is novel but choice is involved in each case. How wisely these choices are made ultimately determines how effective an organization is in achieving its own goals or in serving the goals of others.

If adaptation is treated in exchange terms, the entreprenurial function of change inducement can be accommodated along with the passive, sometimes reactionary, behavior which the word adaptation seems to imply. There is considerable debate as to whether bureaucracies are merely change-reacting organizations or should be viewed as change-inducing organizations. Probably they are both although the literature seems to treat this as an either/or question. To Eisenstadt, the bureaucracy is a "major element for political and social change," though it is never certain that power acquired will be directed to the fulfillment of society's goals.[3]

Others are less sanguine about bureaucratic capacity for change. Daland, with Brazil in mind, argues that the bureaucracy is far better at resisting change than in accommodating, much less initiating it.[4] Waterston feels that administrative development will lag increasingly behind economic development.[5] Field work on French bureaucracies leads Crozier to conclude that a bureaucratic system of organization cannot adjust to societal transformations without crisis, a rather ominous view given the ubiquity and rate of social change in this era.[6] Riggs has written that with increasing power, bureaucratic officials become "less effective," although he doubtless does not have a regressive linear curve in mind.[7] Finally, in the context of the Sukarno period, Feith speculated that the Indonesian bureaucracy would resist a resolute attempt to stimulate economic development because of vested interests in the status quo.[8]

Signs of Change. There is enough evidence in the recent Indonesian experience to suggest cause for siding with Eisenstadt. A small economic elite group in the bureaucracy promoted and secured approval for price stabilization policies that effected a remarkable turnabout in the economy. Prices dropped from an annual rate of increase of about 650 percent in 1966 to about eight per cent in 1970.[9] A nationwide, rural public works program, only recently instituted by the Ministry of Home Affairs, shows early signs of drawing substantial manpower contributions for local infrastructure projects. Studies are currently underway to measure the effectiveness of a mass rice-intensification program carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture; and while the common

assumption is that the program has thus far failed to meet its goals by a wide margin, perhaps not only the estimated returns but the time period required for such massive social change were miscalculated. The cost of inducing social change is normally higher than most economists would like to admit. Though it is hard to measure attitudinal changes except through the device of repetitive survey research, there is enough evidence in the foregoing text to suggest that there is force for change among regional and local officials, even at the village level. Another possible indicator, that of in-service training courses, reflects substantial bureaucratic investments in strategies to change values and behavior. Although such courses are in some degree part of a traditional ritual, their increasing number and content evidence adaptive processes at work that cannot be ignored.

Neither can the role of the Indonesian bureaucratic entrepreneurs be slighted. In certain provinces, notably, West Sumatra, Djakarta, Atjeh, East Java and to a lesser extent South Sulawesi, civil officials are clearly among the most change-oriented of elites. Political party leaders in the regions appear to be much closer to traditional interests, a finding which will surprise no one who has studied Indonesian politics. As such, the role of party leaders appears at present to be primarily one of brokerage, in many cases restraining bureaucratic entrepreneurs from moving too fast in the adoption of new policy objectives. This is partially reflected in the data presented in Chapter Four concerning the influence of political parties on the administrative system, but more so in a series of extended interviews with high level

bureaucrats and party leaders. That no political party offered an alternative development policy in the 1971 elections is symtomatic of both party thinking and party style in Indonesia today. Religious organizations have been no more programmatic than the established parties in their claims for resources. Among elite groups, only the military (the Army in particular) appears to evidence change-inducing capabilities, and there the judgment is somewhat untidy because it is frequently in civilian roles that military officers are demonstrating their entrepreneurial talents. Findings noted in Chapter Four suggest that military officers in regent roles generally, but by no means always, are more productivity oriented (goods and services) than are their civilian counterparts in those roles.

The intellectual elite has been recruited into service by the regime in such a way as to be almost one and the same with state administration at the national and provincial levels. University economists are almost entirely responsible for the present five-year plan which has reshaped bureaucratic goals and procedures substantially. At this writing, former academics are serving in such responsible positions as the ministers of finance, agriculture, trade, manpower, and state apparatus reform, and as chairman of the development planning agency. This pattern is being repeated at the provincial level where regional university personnnel are being drawn into government offices in increasing numbers. In two of the three provinces under study here, governors have turned over regional planning almost entirely to staff members of economics faculties. In the north Sumatran province of Atjeh, economics and

agriculture faculty members dominate the provincial development board and have made it a major force for economic change. In sum, the "new men of science" are very much a part of Indonesia's present transformation; and they are successfully basing their claims for authority on functional expertise, not in terms of traditional resources. They have few bases of conventional political support, only the authority conferred upon them by the regime and, at lower levels, bureaucratic elites.

For all its problems, the Indonesian bureaucratic elite appears to have proved itself adaptable to a variety of forms of change since 1967. Daland's findings on Brazil do not coincide with ours on Indonesia. If Waterston can accept an increased capacity for policy innovation aimed at production as a part of his definition of administrative development, then administrative development may well be preceding Indonesian economic development, particularly in the rural sector. Nor has the bureaucracy suffered under the crises that appear to affront French bureaucratic structures in times of societal transformation. Adaptations to a major shift in power favoring the National Development Planning Agency have been made with remarkable celerity--adaptations both in terms of the restructuring of authority and in accommodating new procedural demands. Admittedly, adaptation was facilitated in part by broadly distributed increases in the allocation of financial resources, something that was made possible through large infusions of foreign credits as well as domestic revenue increases. However, one need only review Mihaly

on Nepal to see that massive foreign assistance need not necessarily induce change.[10]

Riggs' contention that bureaucratic power and bureaucratic effectiveness vary inversely needs qualitative clarification if applied to the Indonesian situation. Prior to the inauguration of Suharto's presidency, a fragmented bureaucracy with multiple power bases was largely ineffective as a change agent and often unresponsive to the regime it was presumably intended to serve. Its components usurped power, displaced goals, and recruited new members in orders of magnitude that could only be overshadowed by so colorful a figure as Sukarno. Under Suharto, both power and authority have been centralized in such a way as to make formerly independent components of the bureaucracy much more responsive to the regime. At the same time, the pattern of authority distribution within the bureaucracy has been altered to provide the National Development Planning Agency with greatly increased authority, and it is this internal restructuring that has facilitated the effective promulgation of new goals and higher levels of bureaucratic output. Riggs' proposition, therefore, appears to hold for the macro-system, but yields to refinements within the bureaucracy, for it is clearly increased power in the hands of selected bureaucratic elites that is making change possible.

And finally, Feith's pessimism about the capacity of the bureaucracy to adapt to changes in national goals was, as he would doubtless admit, conditioned by the nature of the Sukarno regime whose stability and solidarity investments were well

reflected in dispersed bureaucratic privilege. During the ten years between 1957 and 1967 the production of goods and services by the bureaucracy was in little demand as a means of reinforcing the legitimacy of the government. Sukarno could and did personally develop critical levels of support for the Republic and his regime by communicating an overwhelming sense of promise to the Indonesian people. He set out brazenly, as Geertz writes,

> to capture the imagination of a people who thought they had seen the last of kings . . . . (W)hat he created, or tried to create, was a modern version of the theater state, a state from whose pageants, myths, celebrities, and monuments the small peasant or peddler . . . could derive a vision of his nation's greatness and strive to realize it.[11]

The emphasis was on form and on the ideal. The metaphysical quality of the nationalist experience tended to de-emphasize temporal considerations. Economic and social change would only be derivatives of higher pursuits. Whether these forms of political investment were necessary at the cost of economic change during the early years of independence is still an open question, but one little understood in popular Western forums. Less debatable is the thought that Sukarno would not have had it any other way.

But the regime has changed and so have some of its goals and fundamental strategies. Suharto does not have the self-dramatizing talent of Sukarno; however, he does have the Army. Sectoral demands, principally those of the political parties, religion-based organizations, andthe undifferentiated general public, are lower than before--partly a result of reduced expectations following the 1965-1966 bloodbath and partly because of a new style of rule

that has dealt party leaders out of major positions of influence and replaced them with army officers who look upward for sources of authority rather than in both directions. Members of the intellectual elite, as we have already noted, have been co-opted into taking a broad range of key bureaucratic roles. These changes have had their effect on the bureaucracy though it is more appropriate to talk of adaptive rather than revolutionary change. Within limits the Government has evidenced a concerted attempt to place putatively capable individuals in most positions of importance. Compromises, of course, have been made with respect to ascriptively colored demands on the civil side and with regard to selected clique demands inside the military, but the changes in recruitment are real and significant.

There is also in evidence adaptation to changes in time perspectives. The sense of promise offered by Sukarno is gone and the present regime is seeking to justify its claim to power through performance in economic change. An underlying assumption in this strategy is that there must be a pay-off within a comparatively short time period. Although Repelita is a five-year plan, most of the planning is annual planning. Programs, projects and budgets must be developed within specific limits or face deletion; and funding for approved projects (intriguingly referred to as dropping) is now carried out systematically with much greater alacrity than ever before. Although the relationship between output and altered time horizons is not yet clear, the tying of resource allocations to rapid-fire deadlines has made

its impact on decision-making and spurred the improvement of intra-national communications significantly.

Economic planning has also created new demands for information, a resource essential to the success of such a sizeable undertaking. There has been a quantum increase in the flow of two types of information within the bureaucracy: the technical inputs used to justify project proposals, and information of a more general sort pertaining to economic and social conditions in the regions. Outer Island officials who formerly found opportunities to present their cases in Djakarta no more than once a year are making monthly or bi-monthly visits to the capital. In several regional cases, provincial demands for information have spurred the initiation of economic and agricultural research endeavors never before carried out in Indonesia. While these conclusions about the increase in the flow of information are yet unsubstantiated by data (even the 1969 data presented in Chapter Five are obsolete), they spring from four continuous years of participant observation on the part of the writer.

It may be possible, as Fainsod argues in the Soviet case, for a bureaucracy to instill and implement economic modernity without absorbing any of the changes it disseminates.[12] It is too early to tell about this in the Indonesian context. Perhaps most of the new recruits from the intellectual and military elites will not remain in government service for the long term. Nor is it certain that the recruitment patterns of the last four years are being institutionalized to the extent that they will

persist, particularly in the event of a major change in regimes. Procedural changes have been substantial, but less is known about attitudinal changes with respect to bureaucratic roles. Perhaps it is a formalistic change that is being absorbed, a change largely devoid of content.[13] On the other hand, a common thread running throughout the interviews with bureaucratic executives was their voiced exasperation over the "mental attitude" (sikap mental) of subordinate officials.* For the short-run, this offers confirming evidence on the persistence of traditional attitudes toward bureaucratic roles. But at the same time and perhaps more importantly, it suggests a level of dissatisfaction with the status quo that will doubtless engender change through proselytization. Possibly additional survey research could identify advances in secularization of thought and new levels of genuine commitment to economic change, but the task is not an easy one. In sum, it is clear that the bureaucracy is absorbing some of the change that it is currently disseminating. Less clear at this stage is the magnitude of that change.

While the focal point of this analysis has been the direction of change, and the interpretation has been cast in somewhat positive terms, it would be a mistake to conclude that there are not important weaknesses in the Indonesian bureaucracy. Many of these weaknesses have been dealt with directly in Chapters Five and

*The absence of the word mental in the Indonesian language, at least as employed in this sense, is, itself, significant.

Six, others only noted in passing. In addition to those mentioned, the problem of leakage is probably the most significant. We refer here not only to the leakage of financial resources described in another work by the author, but to the leakage in authority. None other than a former minister of finance has spoken candidly of a type of syndicalism that persists within the customs agency, an organization almost impervious to outside control. Authority continues to be abused at regional and local levels; unofficial taxes are levied, tributes are extracted, and regulations are selectively enforced. Not so subtle forms of coercion are applied, sometimes for ends outlined by the regime, sometimes for personal gain only. Leakages of the nature just described can be minimized by two mechanisms, either through internal control if it is strong enough, or through forcefully articulated public interest claims from groups outside the bureaucracy. Pre-Suharto regimes, including that of Sukarno, lost control of the bureaucracy to a multiplicity of cliques representing parochial interests. Many of those interests have been effectively neutralized in the last five years, but except for circumspect writing in the Djakarta press, there is as yet little articulation of a public interest. The effect is to compound an existing weakness in the generation of policy-relevant information, information which is an important element in the accumulation of political capital.

Change and Village Institutions. The emphasis directed toward village government in this study stems from two important truisms about Indonesian development. First, the village is the

basic unit of society and the locus of most of the country's 120 million people. Second, more is produced at the village level and with less governmental assistance than in any other sector of the economy. Because village headmen are often written about in a condescending way under the rubric of traditionalism, normally a synonym for stability and passiveness, it seemed important to evaluate potential indicators for autonomous local change in the Indonesian situation. The indicators used were somewhat ascriptive in nature and it is not certain to what degree they should be made to serve as productivity variables, but the scope of the survey and the lack of comparative data over selected time intervals necessitated such an approach.

From the sample of 389 village headmen selected patterns emerged. Ascendancy to the headman position is still a matter of hereditary right, but much less so than anticipated: about 10 percent in West Sumatra and approximately 36 percent in both Central Java and South Sulawesi. Although some headmen are indeed beyond the age of 80 and living in another era, the mean age of the sample was just over 45 years of age. But change is in the air, as the Central Java parliamentary report cited in Chapter Two bears witness to. The acceptance of life-tenure for village chiefs has also been thrown into question, due mostly, perhaps, to recent mutations in Indonesia's social and political history, but representing a break in tradition nonetheless. The current mean tenure of the sample is close to nine years. That more than half the sample has received formal education beyond the primary level reflects post-independence changes in

opportunities for education--changes that are likely to continue. Our sample finding that 75 percent of the chiefs own irrigated riceland (sawah) with a mean hectarage of 1.5, and that 50 percent have some kind of plantation holdings, indicates a direct stake in national agriculture policy and programs for most headmen; but aside from tentative, even inferential, conclusions about levels of commitment, there is little we can say about behavioral changes. Nor is it yet clear whether or not perceptions with regard to village headman roles are changing, either popular perceptions or self-perceptions. Perhaps the data presented in Chapter Two can serve as a baseline for future comparative studies in this area.

Possibly the most important question concerning change in village productivity is the extent to which traditional institutions appear capable of accommodating and promulgating change. It is assumed, and properly so, that it is normally more efficient in terms of resource utilization to work through traditional authority structures and to rely on existing social institutions than to rely on new institutions. The data presented in Chapter Two appear to indicate that traditional village authority structures can and are adapting to new demands for change. Headmen responses to village priority questions are, of course, open to interpretation; but the strong weighting toward infrastructure (water use and communications) suggests a level of commitment substantial enough to encourage these types of investments. One can agree with Selosoemardjan's assertion that the traditional system of ascriptive leadership guarantees stability and quietude which

neither inspire nor motivate village publics, but the evidence suggests a greater potential than that.[14] Our own previously expressed view is that the adaptive and absorptive capacity of village authorities is greater than it appears to be and that investments directed toward them will demonstrate the comparative advantage of "working through the system." There is some tentative evidence confirming this point in the results of the national public works program directed at the villages, but not yet enough to speak in terms of input-output ratios.

The social institution most likely to serve the nation's new economic goals is that of gotong-rojong, or community mutual assistance. The data in Chapter Three suggest a number of supporting reasons: first, in many villages gotong-rojong contributions are the foremost public resource; second, most such efforts are directed at the development of community infrastructure; and third, the missing ingredients to expanded output through this mechanism are identified by village chiefs as being primarily finance and technical advice, both of which higher government levels possess. Some skepticism over the actual effectiveness of community mutual assistance projects stems, as has been noted, from its overuse as a slogan during the Sukarno years. In addition, our survey work indicates that the practice of gotong-rojong is almost unknown in certain villages. But the positive evidence on this point, if combined with the fact of ubiquitous heterogeneity of village Indonesia, suggests the value of a decentralized strategy which searches out growth points within different social and cultural groups. Matching funds and programs which attempt to support

existing authority structures and utilize traditional mechanisms for productivity are unlikely to result in uniform development throughout the archipelago. But diversity is reality in this case and an attempt to balance the entire development effort appears needlessly wasteful.

Conclusion

The nationalists' primary post-independence goal of integration is well reflected in Indonesia's motto, "Unity in Diversity." When the bases of a constitutional democracy proved too fragile to sustain integrative efforts, Sukarno was there to give conceptual purpose to it all. When rhetoric failed to provide the levels of solidarity and stability necessary to keep the regime from going politically bankrupt, Sukarno secured support through the dispensation of bureaucratic privilege. This latter choice was eventually bankrupting, too; the investments were made too late, as if in the form of payments overdue which could no longer generate commensurate returns. In retrospect, the politics of the late Sukarno years appear to have been reactionary politics, an attempt to buy time for the perpetuation of the Revolution.

In a comparatively short time-span, the Suharto regime has consolidated most of the fragments through several strategies which took advantage of the numb passiveness that followed the 1965-1966 massacres: the Indonesian Communist Party was outlawed, loyalists were placed in higher bureaucratic positions, the military was reorganized to provide greater control at the top, and economic growth was adopted as the priority national goal.

The bureaucracy has been given the main role in stimulating economic development through formulation of policy and the implementation of national programs. The magnitude of this charge is best emphasized by the size of the national budget which in recent years has run close to half of Indonesia's gross national product. How successfully this function is performed depends in large part on the willingness of the regime and the bureaucracy to capitalize on the pluralistic strengths of Indonesian society. If maximum growth rates within the country's potential are to be realized, uniform, national planning must give way gradually to greater degrees of decentralized regional planning. The real challenge ahead is that of inverting the national motto to mean "Diversity in Unity," and that challenge is likely to be with Indonesia for many years to come.

FOOTNOTES

1. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States," in Hoselitz and Moore, op. cit., p. 163.

2. The most trenchant case is that of today's young law graduates who formerly attached such high status to corporate law practice in major cities. With shifts in values, their talents are now available to a variety of anti-poverty agencies and legal assistance programs.

3. Op.cit., p. 171.

4. Op. cit., p. 212.

5. Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1966, p. 280.

6. Op. cit., p. 198.

7. Op. cit., 1964, pp. 227 and 263.

8. Op. cit., in Kahin, p. 257.

9. The content of the stabilization policy along with its effects are now being admirably documented in a dissertation by John M. Newmann. See Inflation in Indonesia: A Case Study of Causes, Stabilization Policies and Implementation (1966-1970), Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts),(forthcoming).

10. Eugene Mihaly, Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal: A Case Study, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.

11. Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 83 and 86.

12. Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

13. Fred Riggs has written most extensively about formalistic behavior. For a more recent case study of adaptive but formalistic bureaucratic behavior, see Lawrence S. Graham, Civil Service Reform in Brazil: Principles versus Practice, op. cit., 1968.

14. Op. cit., 1971, p. 2.

APPENDIX I

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

Geographical Decisions. Three provinces were selected for field work in order to bring the reality of Indonesia's complexity into the analysis. West Sumatra was chosen for several reasons: it is geographically positioned in the western part of the archipelago; it has a reasonably homogeneous population and a distinct cultural tradition in matriarchal Minangkabau; its people have the reputation for being entrepreneurial; and the leadership of the provincial government was known to be dedicated to change goals. South Sulawesi was selected because it is the province with the greatest economic growth potential in eastern Indonesia, if the long-range prospects for West Irian are set aside. This province has a population of over 6 million people, not much less than the entire country of Malaysia, and is the hub of the Eastern Island trade. With a potpourri of cultures ranging from recently Christianized Tanah Toradja in the north to those of the ancient kingdoms of Goa, Bone, and Wadjo in the south, the province presents some interesting challenges for regional integration, to say nothing of national integration. The Dutch were slow in penetrating this part of Indonesia and their influence did not go very deep.

Central Java is different again. Unlike the two Outer Island provinces, it has what Geertz calls an involuted agrarian economy: highly intensive rice cultivation in an arable land area that is rapidly decreasing in proportion to the size of the population. Its administrative infrastructure is comparatively well-developed and communications with the central government are markedly better than those of regions outside Java. The tradition of associating status with government careers among the Central Javanese is measureably stronger than among most other Indonesian cultures, a condition guaranteeing the presence of a large proportion of native sons in the national bureaucracy of Djakarta. Important differences in style and behavior are referred to in the text. The sample of three provinces is not intended to represent Indonesia, only its diversity. Excellent cases could be made for the selection of three other provinces; perhaps some would insist on the inclusion of all the provinces.

Organization Decisions. The decision concerning which organizations to include in the analysis was not an easy one. An attempt to draw a representative sample would have resulted in the analysis being strongly influenced by the Ministry of Religion, a department whose role is somewhat peripheral to the development effort (though this need not necessarily be the case). In the end, we made decisions that would incorporate higher-level and lower-level bureaucrats from four departments, each department being chosen for a different reason. (1) Home Affairs (Dalam Negeri) is the backbone of the civil structure.

The pamong pradja serves as the core administrative network, reaching down to the sub-district level, and it is at least nominally responsible for coordinating all governmental activities in each province. (2) The Department of Public Works (Pekerdjaan Umum) was chosen for three reasons: its elite is professional, graduate engineers for the most part; it is reputationally efficient in its operations; and its operations have probably been least touched by the influence of political parties. The Department of Education and Culture (Pendidikan dan Kebudajaan), on the other hand, represents almost the opposite pole: professionalism is weak, the department's reputation for effectiveness is poor, and its history is highly partisan. Finally, the Ministry of Finance (Keuangan) was selected because of its central function in the government and the facility with which changes in output levels might be evaluated. An intended external economy in selecting the Ministry of Finance was the fact that it served as the focal point for a study of Indonesia's revenue system, a study lying beyond the boundaries of the present work.

Respondent Decisions. In 1968 when this research was begun, neither Western nor Indonesian scholars had yet applied survey techniques to a major research work on Indonesia. The descriptive-empirical tradition was already strong as several outstanding studies of anthropological, sociological, economics, and political persuasions were available. With a few exceptions, and those being limited to very narrow issues, no one in the non-economic social sciences had yet attempted to develop data

that could be used for comparative purposes. Many scholars who had worked in Indonesia were in fact skeptical that its culture(s) would accommodate survey approaches or successful quantitative analysis. It was argued that responses to attitudinal questions, even to questions of fact, would be biased to the point of being useless for purposes of analysis.

Given this background and the fact that the present author had only passing familiarity with survey research techniques, the survey approach was adopted as a supplemental strategy and an experimental one. The idea of developing explicit and refined answers to major questions posed by the study was eschewed in favor of indicative, general evidence to confirm or raise doubts about principles emerging from other approaches to the research.

The principal objective in the selection of the respondents was to secure a cross-section, both vertical and horizontal, of officials working below the national level of government.

(1) High-level Bureaucrats. 157 officials in salary grades III and IV (based on the Peraturan Gadji Pegawai Sipil, or the Civil Service Salary Regulation of 1961) were selected as respondents. The objective was to obtain responses from not merely a sample but the entire population of officials at this level in the four previously mentioned departments of the three provinces. With two exceptions, those of officials in the Home Affairs and Public Works offices in Central Java, the objective was almost completely achieved.

(2) Low-level Bureaucrats. Respondents in salary grade II were selected in such a way as to achieve a representative sample from the same departments and provinces. Problems of access resulted in the development of ad hoc strategies to obtain the total of 146 respondents. In one case we were able to get two respondents from each major division within the office; in several others, every fifth official on the employee rosters was selected. Strenuous efforts were made to insure that the sample would be as representative as possible, but no claim is made for precision.

(3) Economic Planners. The 54 regional economic planners represent two officials from the governors' planning offices in each of 26 provinces and West Irian. The respondents were selected by their governors to attend a training course in economic planning and, while no better geographical balance could be hoped for in a sample of this nature, the respondents were pre-selected as far as this survey is concerned. Nonetheless, the data derived from them represents a cross-section of Indonesia's regional planning elite that has never been generated before.

(4) Sub-district Officers (Tjamats). Fortuitous circumstances in West Sumatra resulted in our using the entire population of sub-district officers as respondents. Interview schedules were administered to the 80 tjamats in two groups of forty while they were attending upgrading courses sponsored by the provincial government. In South Sulawesi, the sample constituted half of the total population. The respondents had been selected by the provincial government for the first of two training

courses designed to expose all provincial sub-district officers to changes in development programming. Half the tjamats in each regency were selected for the first course, insuring complete geographical representation in the sample, and the writer was informed that a concerted effort was made to mix less capable officials with the more capable ones. In Central Java, a third approach was used. Seven widely dispersed regencies were chosen by the writer and interview schedules were administered to the total tjamat population in each of those regencies. The strategy represents a form of quota sampling.

(5) Village Headmen. In West Sumatra the 134 village headmen were selected by the use of a table of random numbers after a representative sample of ketjamatans (sub-districts) had been chosen by the same mechanism. The method was used in concert with a research effort on family income carried out by the Economic Research Institute at Andalas University, and the sample total represents about 25 percent of the total population of village headmen in the province. In South Sulawesi 106 (about 10 percent of the population) headmen were selected through the use of a table of random numbers. In eight cases, substitutions were made because of the inaccessibility of the respondents. The substitutes were chosen, not by using the table of random numbers, but by selecting villages in close proximity to those deleted. As interviewers were already in the field, financial limitations on the study made this strategy imperative. Because of its size and large population, the sample in Central Java was first limited by the quota selection of eight geographically dispersed

regencies, including two regencies inside the Special District of Jogjakarta. Following this, a table of random numbers was again used to determine the particular villages to be visited. The sample total of 149 represents between one and two percent of the total headman population in the geographic area of Central Java which includes the two, first-level regions of Jogjakarta and Djawa Tengah. Appendix II contains maps indicating the location of the villages of our respondents in each of the three provinces.

(6) University Students. Third-year students from the faculties of economics, medicine, agriculture, law, and social politics were chosen as respondents. They were drawn from the three provincial universities of Andalas (West Sumatra), Hasanuddin (South Sulawesi), and Diponegoro (Central Java) and in most cases represent the complete population in each of the faculties at that level. The total number of respondents was 554.

Interview Schedule Decisions. Questions designed for four of the samples (higher-level, lower-level, economic planning, and sub-district officials) were divided into three principal categories: those dealing with the personal histories of officials, with their attitudes and perceptions on the working of the bureaucracy, and with their attitudes and perceptions on the task environment. The approximately 120 questions were translated into Bahasa Indonesia by the author and then reviewed by Indonesian colleagues for refinements in meaning. The core questions, which were to serve three of the four schedules mentioned above, were

pre-tested on the group of economic planners and revised substantially following that pre-test.

Questions in the village headman interview schedule were directed at three primary topics: the personal histories of the headmen themselves, indicators which might speak to self-development capacities at the village level, and indicators of local performance levels of higher-level governmental units. The schedule was pre-tested in West Sumatra, revised and then employed. In South Sulawesi a few changes in terminology were made to accommodate language differences, but no pre-test was attempted. In Central Java, the schedule was expanded to cover activities or practices not applicable to the two Outer Island provinces and was pre-tested in several villages within the Special District of Jogjakarta. Pre-test results indicated that no important changes would be necessary before the instrument could be employed.

The university student interview schedules were designed to elicit general attitudinal data about bureaucratic performance from an extra-bureaucratic sector and were concerned with student career preferences. As this part of the research was merely supplementary in nature and little more than a fortuitous opportunity involving the commitment of little extra time, no pre-test was employed.

Timing Decisions. Respondents from all of the samples were interviewed in the period beginning in September, 1970. Most of the interviewing in West Sumatra was completed during October and

November of 1969; that in South Sulawesi during December, 1969, and January, 1970; and that in Central Java during February and March, 1970. In the case of the village headman interviews, these were done concurrently during the early months of 1970.

A Language Decision. Each of the six interview schedules was administered in the country's national language, Bahasa Indonesia. In only rare cases did the writer encounter any confusion on the part of government officials with respect to the appropriate meaning of the questions posed. In the case of the village headman sample, student research assistants conducted the interviews in Bahasa Indonesia, but occasionally it was necessary for them to interpret a question for the respondent by using his own regional language--Minangkabau, Bugis, or Javanese being the principal ones.

APPENDIX II

1. Map of Indonesia showing the three provinces of West Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and Central Java.

2. Map of West Sumatra showing the villages included in the headman sample survey.

3. Map of South Sulawesi showing the villages included in the headman sample survey.

4. Map of Central Java and the Special District of Jogjakarta showing the villages included in the headman sample survey.

MAP NO. 1

MAP NO. 2


WEST SUMATRA
Padang
• Villages Included in Headman Sample Survey

MAP NO. 3


SOUTH SULAWESI
Makassar
• Villages Included in Headman Sample Survey

MAP NO. 4


CENTRAL JAVA and the
SPECIAL DISTRICT of JOGJAKARTA
Semarang
Jogjakarta
• Villages Included in Hardman
Sample Survey

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